

By David B. Ottaway
and Lou Cannon
Washington Post Staff Writers

A delegation of conservative groups strongly supportive of the administration met with President Reagan yesterday to express their opposition to his decision to sign the U.N.-negotiated Geneva accords providing for a Soviet pullout from Afghanistan.

The eight-man delegation told the president in a letter signed by representatives of 28 groups that they felt "you have let down the Afghan resistance" because it has been left out of the accords and because "the war will continue and there will be no peace."

"The continued bloodshed in Afghanistan would be a blight on the Reagan administration and a lost opportunity for freedom and self-determination of the Afghan people," the letter said. "How can you assure that the U.S. will continue to support the Mujaheddin [Afghan resistance fighters] when the U.N. accord prohibits 'outside interference'?"

Resistance leaders have vehemently denounced the accords and pledged to escalate their struggle against the Soviet forces and the Soviet-backed Kabul government.

The delegation included Paul Weyrich, president of the Free Congress Foundation; Henry S. Krieger, executive director of the Committee for a Free Afghanistan; Shelby Cullom Davis, chairman of the Heritage Foundation board of trustees; retired lieutenant general Daniel O. Graham, chairman of High Frontier; and Peter Flaherty, chairman of Citizens for Reagan.

Also in the group were William W. Pascoe III, a Heritage Third World analyst; Constantine Menges, a former National Security Council expert on Central America; and Dan McMichael, a conservative activist.

Administration officials at the 50-minute meeting in the Cabinet Room included Defense Secretary Frank C. Carlucci, national security adviser Lt. Gen. Colin L. Powell, and White House Chief of Staff Howard H. Baker Jr.

Weyrich said that neither side had changed the other's view about the wisdom of the United States signing the accords. Reagan insisted that he knew more about the situation than the conservatives did.

Weyrich said conservatives were concerned the United States could "lose the moral high ground" on the Afghan issue and the Soviet Union could look "like the good guys."

He said Reagan assured the delegation that the United States was not going to stop sending supplies to the resistance and that there was no doubt in his mind it would win once the Soviets withdrew.

Krieger told the president he feared the accords—which involve a pledge by Pakistan to end outside interference in Afghanistan—would put so much pressure on Pakistan it would have to stop serving as a conduit for U.S. arms supplies.

"I got the impression the president didn't understand the implications of the accords," Krieger said.

Carlucci sought to reassure the conservatives that Pakistan would

continue to play its role as conduit and that Pakistani President Mohammad Zia ul-Haq had assured him he could "take the heat."

Meanwhile, Rep. Charles Wilson (D-Tex.), one of Congress' foremost Afghan resistance supporters, swung his weight behind the accords and urged support of them. He said, "It's a satisfactory solution that everyone should applaud...."

He said Pakistan had asked for the United States to sign the accords, a point Secretary of State George P. Shultz also made in justifying the administration's decision to serve as co-guarantor.

THE WASHINGTON POST, APRIL 13, 1988



Geneva Accord: A view from Moscow

By V. ANDREYEV

It is only Afghans themselves who can settle the situation in the country and choose the way for the country's further development, and the Geneva agreements provide conditions for doing this without foreign interference. Now the Geneva package is being criticised because it cannot put an immediate end to bloodshed in Afghanistan. In this connection it should be noted that fighting between the Afghan government forces and the armed opposition began long before the necessity emerged to conclude international agreements on non-interference. If the United States, its allies had not interfered in the Afghan affairs, had not trained thousands of mercenaries and had not unleashed an undeclared war against Afghanistan, the Afghan government would not have been forced to ask for Soviet military aid, and the internal Afghan conflict would not have developed into an international problem.

Kabul and Moscow believe that an end to bloodshed in Afghanistan can be put by the

policy of national reconciliation as a result of which a coalition government on a wide base should be formed. The People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan has offered the opposition 27 high posts, including the posts of the Vice-President and the Prime Minister of the Republic. The People's Democratic Party is not opposed to the participation in the reconciliation process of Afghanistan's former King Zahir Shah who has been living in emigration since 1973. The party is in favour of forming coalition governments in provinces and at the same time guarantees the commanders of the opposition's armed units an autonomy in regions controlled by them. Kabul strives to achieve the ceasefire terms except for cases when self-defence is needed.

This policy is opposed by the alliance of seven parties of Afghan Mujahideens. They have stated that the termination of the overthrow of Dr. Najibullah's government. Hikmatyar, the alliance's Chairman, has even promised to wage war until the Muslims in the Soviet Union are liberated. The fundamentalists are categorically opposed to Zahir Shah's return to Afghanistan. They pretend that they have Washington not less than Moscow. It is said that Hikmatyar has never met U.S. officials. But it is he and people like him who have been the main recipients of U.S. military aid.

The Afghan fundamentalists

began their activity in Zahir Shah's times and when Mohammad Daud came to power, they, hostile to Pakistan, from where they made raids against Kabul. And when in 1978 a revolution occurred in Afghanistan and the CIA mediated in the Afghan affairs, it did not have to create anything anew. Since then the CIA has provided the fundamentalists with weapons worth about 2,000 million dollars.

It is hard to suppose that the fundamentalists will ever get reconciled with President Najibullah's government. Even the former Afghan king is regarded by them as a left-wing figure. But Kabul has enough strength to resist them. All provincial and district centres and most of kishlaks are under the government's control. Even now Soviet troops are not stationed in 13 (out of 30) provinces of Afghanistan.

The policy of national reconciliation is bearing fruits. In the course of pursuing this policy, over 40,000 members of the armed opposition have stopped combat operations against Kabul, and 6,000 of them have joined local coalition governments. No doubt the realisation of the Geneva accords will speed up this process.

The fundamentalists have always been a very insignificant element in Afghan society and up to now have no followers among the Pashtuns who make up more than 50 per cent of the country's population. The fundamentalists' aim are alien to the majority of the Afghan people. Their present policy reflects their aspirations.

AP barred from covering pullout

MOSCOW: The Associated Press has been told that its correspondents have been barred from travelling to Afghanistan to cover the scheduled withdrawal of Soviet troops.

Foreign Ministry officials have said that the Afghan government objected to a question posed by an AP correspondent during a recent news conference held by Afghan leader Najibullah in Kabul.

Yevgeny B Isayenko, a ministry press official, said Afghan authorities would refuse a visa to any AP correspondent, several of whom had applied to cover the withdrawal.

Mr Isayenko said that, during a news conference in Kabul last month, Carol Williams asked a question that "was very insulting" to Mr Najibullah.

Ms Williams asked him whether, if rebel forces in Afghanistan emerge victorious after the Soviet pullout, he would seek refuge in the Soviet Union. The pro-Soviet Afghan leader replied he would never allow such a victory.

He did not object to the question at the time.

HK Standard 5/13 — AP

Kabul Times 6/6

Khalil Ahmad Abawi chaired the 1st session of the ROA Nat'l Assembly. Elected Assembly VPs were Abdul Rahim Hatif, Gen. Moh'd Rafi, Abdul Hamid Muhtat & Abdul Wahid Sarabi. Dr. Abawi is Chairman of the House of Representatives.



Khalil Ahmad Abawi

Behind the Soviet Pullout From Afghanistan

By Armand Hammer

When I was in Moscow here on earth would one rather have been this week than in Moscow. The skies were clear, the weather balmy, the mood of the people summery and light, and conversation everywhere was buoyant with excitement at the events of these days and expectations of the future. The city was as packed as Bethlehem in the tax-gathering season, and you could sell a room at any inn for a ton of myrrh; fortunately, I was spared the competition for hotel rooms, having an apartment of my own in Moscow.

For myself, this week of superpower summery feels like one of the culminating events of my life. The stage is set for a great development toward the peace between East and West that has been one of my lifetime's dreams to see accomplished. This summit meeting has been depicted as a meeting with no major targets, no vital agenda. It is true that no major arms initiative was expected. But the meeting most assuredly continued the momentum toward the settlement of regional conflicts that was established in Geneva, with the Afghan accords. Such cooperation — often overlooked in the excitement about arms control — could mark the most decisive change in relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, beginning an era of peaceful co-existence.

The success of the superpowers in framing an agreement over Afghanistan provided two important lessons and guidelines for the solution of other regional conflicts: first, that the superpowers can deal with each other rationally and pragmatically to achieve solutions; and, second, that the Russians should be believed when they say that they intend to seek solutions to these conflicts.

I was very glad to play a part in the events leading to the signing April 14 of the Geneva accords on Afghanistan and have the privilege to see — close-up and at first-hand — the development of trust and understanding between Moscow and Washington that led to that historic agreement.

In February 1987, Diego Cordovez, Under Secretary General of the United Nations, visited me in Los Angeles to let me talk that on Afghanistan were stalled and that I could play a role in the peace process. He said that none of the participants in the Geneva talks could agree on a timetable for the withdrawal of Soviet troops and that they could not agree on the identity of a leader for a government in Kabul to supplant the Najibullah administration.

Naturally, I told Mr. Cordovez that I would do everything within my power as a private individual to achieve a settlement. During the following 14 months, I flew to Kabul once and to Pakistan half a dozen times to meet with President Zia ul-Haq and his cabinet and with leaders of the guerrillas, or mujahideen. My travels took me in and out of Moscow and Washington for meetings with officials at the highest levels.

By the end of 1987, it had become clear that the Soviet Union was determined to withdraw its troops, in extremely quick order, provided that Moscow was confronted with no preconditions as to the nature of a government in Kabul to replace Najibullah. Thus, with dazzling speed, the central problem in the Afghanistan peace process became an issue of credibility and confidence. Could the Soviet Union be believed and trusted?

In Moscow in September, Foreign Minister Eduard A. Shevardnadze and Yuli M. Vorontsov, a Deputy Foreign Minister, told me Secretary of State George P. Shultz had finally accepted that Moscow honestly and fully intended to withdraw. On the other hand, as late as Jan. 7, 1988, President Reagan's chief of staff, Howard H. Baker Jr., wrote to ask my opinion of Mr. Gorbachev's attitudes toward Afghanistan. "I would welcome your insight into his current thinking based on your discussions with him during the [Washington] summit," he wrote. "We are unsure just how much the Soviet signals reflect a serious interest in moving forward quickly towards an Afghanistan solution and to what extent they are merely 'public relations'."

I relayed this uncertainty to Mr. Gorbachev in the Kremlin last Jan. 13. I also told him that I felt sure the Pakistanis would not enter fully into any quickening peace process until and unless he dispatched Mr. Vorontsov to negotiate personally with President Zia in Islamabad.

Mr. Gorbachev decided to inform President Reagan that, while the Soviet Union would definitely withdraw by the end of 1988, it was determined to avoid a bloodbath. It was not directly to my suggestion regarding a Vorontsov mission to Islamabad but when I saw Mr. Vorontsov the next day he laughed and said: "You did a job on the boss." Mikhail Sergeevich ordered me last night to pack my bags and get to Pakistan."

I promised Mr. Vorontsov I would fly to Islamabad to be there when he dispatched Zia to a promise I kept on Feb. 10, two days after Mr. Gorbachev's announcement that Soviet troops would begin to leave Afghanistan in May.

President Zia and his colleagues were evidently stunned by Mr. Gorbachev's coup. They admitted as much. General Zia said that the Soviet Union had "stolen a march on us," and one of his most senior advisers voiced the fear that the superpowers "have us in a diplomatic box." President Zia desperately needed the reassurance that Pakistan and the millions of Afghan refugees living in that country would not be abandoned by the United States in the rush to superpower rapprochement. In my presence, General Zia dictated a letter to Ronald Reagan, which I carried to Washington when I returned.

I gave the letter to the President and, when I visited him in the Oval Office to present my report as chairman of his Advisory Panel on Cancer, I urged him to call General Zia. I said, "It will make a difference. If you speak to him personally. If he gets a letter, he will think it was written by somebody on your staff, but if he speaks to you on the telephone, he will be reassured that you personally intend to support him."

We know he called General Zia. And we know that, following that call, the Pakistanis ordered the withdrawal to the Geneva accords and went ahead and signed.

Afghanistan has not gone away. The superpowers may have resolved the major differences between the officials, which Mr. Gorbachev once called "this bleeding wound." But the superpowers are bickering about continuing military aid to the combatants, and as President Zia will no doubt continue to remind us, the killing continues, the refugees have not gone home and the Kabul government will be unable to govern. It includes all elements, if it is to represent the wishes of the majority.

Even so, the Afghanistan agreement bodes well for the future of the world. We may have confidence the Moscow and Washington will apply

the lessons they have learned there to other regional conflicts. In fact, Mr. Gorbachev told me in April that Afghanistan could provide a model for superpower understanding that could be applied to the Middle East and other trouble spots, including Cambodia, southern Africa and Nicaragua.

The model will work only if the Soviet Union has genuinely turned away from the policy of exporting Communism. I believe it has. I believe Mr. Gorbachev has committed himself to making Socialism (not Communism) work in his own country by raising the standard of living of his own people and that this ambition is his single-minded priority.

In the three years since Mr. Gorbachev has acceded to power, the Soviet Union has engaged in no new adventures around the globe, it has commented no new conflicts in the third world, it has sent no "military advisers" to developing trouble spots. In itself, this suspension of expansionist activity marks a significant break with Soviet foreign policy throughout the greater part of this century.

However, my chief reason for optimism in believing that this summit meeting may mark significant progress toward the resolution of regional conflicts lies in a tiny anecdote relayed to me by my old and respected friend, Max Kampelman.

Max remembered attending a small conference in Moscow where, in conversation with a senior Soviet official, he said that the Soviet Union would soon learn a lesson that the United States had learned already: "Empire does not pay." According to Max, the Soviet official smiled and said, "We are learning."

The hope of the world depends upon the truth of that statement. We must pray that they are learning fast. I am glad to report that my impression, here in Moscow this lovely summer week, is that the lesson has been absorbed. Afghanistan drove it home. □

Armand Hammer is chairman and chief executive officer of Occidental Petroleum Corporation.

THE NEW YORK TIMES

JUNE 4, 1988

دو خربوزه نه
يك دست گرفته
نمی شود

"Two watermelons
cannot be held
in one hand."

Mujahideen and Geneva Talks

IN A NUTSHELL

The Afghan Mujahideen have, from the start, disapproved of the Geneva proximity talks not because they are not involved but as a matter of principle. Moreover these talks are in the interest of the Russians for the following reasons:

• These talks involve Pakistan and Iran (on the sidelines) in a conflict that must be dealt with by the Soviet invaders and the Afghan resistance.

• The talks give legitimacy to the Kabul regime by making it a direct party to the negotiations.

• The Geneva talks justify Soviet claims that the problems have not been caused by the invasion but by direct and indirect interference and intervention of Pakistan and Iran in the affairs of Afghanistan.

• The proximity talks give the Soviets ample opportunity to try to gain time by repeated procrastination in order to crush the

resistance by military means.

• The talks help the Kabul regime to offend all concerned parties by ridiculous "concessions" such as deleting the word "democratic" from the name of Afghanistan and introducing so-called multi-party system while shoring up PDPA party has no desire of abdication through election or otherwise.

• Most of all the Geneva talks provide the UN an opportunity for an undertaking for the future government of Afghanistan without legitimate representation since such an undertaking deprives the people of Afghanistan of their right to self-determination? It will be sheer hypocrisy if the UN on the one hand tries to achieve self-determination for the subjugated nations elsewhere while it denies it to the Afghans given the heavy price they have paid for it — 1.5 million martyrs, the same number crippled and more than 5 million refugees.

5/1/88

Freedom

...The essence of the final document of the Geneva agreements was recognition of the right of the Afghan people to decide how to live themselves, without foreign interference, and to create the necessary conditions for this. The Soviet troops which came to Afghanistan to fight against foreign interference are leaving the country. The Afghan people must decide independently how to live, what system to have, and what government.

Does this mean a defeat for our army? Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze has already answered this question, now it's the turn of Colonel-General Lobov. I'll also try to answer it as I understand the situation. I'm an old officer and war journalist. I've been to Afghanistan many times and have observed battles more than once while with the troops.

Throughout these years not a single, even the smallest unit of our army has retreated before the enemy, left a single point or given up a single position. In each clash the enemy suffered greater losses than our troops, so there's no question of a "military loss".

Then it was a victory? Victory's rather a special issue. On learning that I was going to Kabul once more, a friend of mine, a well-known writer from Moscow said: "Even if Gorbachev had failed to make anything of what he had done already or failed to do what he had still to do, if he only pulled our troops out of Afghanistan, he'd earn the eternal recognition of our people."

I suppose that is the truth. But not the whole truth.

The signing of the Geneva agreements is connected inseparably with the great process of renewal which is going on in our country, and with the fresh wind blowing beyond its borders. The true meaning and significance of the Geneva agreements cannot be understood if they are torn out of their historical context.

History determined exactly when all that had to happen, but a political settlement around Afghanistan and the withdrawal of our troops from that country - now this is especially clear - could be achieved only together with the settlement of our internal and international problems.

Let's imagine for a moment that the Soviet troops had pulled out of Afghanistan under Brezhnev, when the USA-USSR confrontation was continuing and escalating, when there was no INF Treaty, and no clear and realistic Soviet plan for achieving a non-nuclear peace.

The Soviet people would have welcomed the return of their soldiers from Afghanistan in such a case, too. But then, with all the grief caused by the losses, there would have been some alarm over the security of our Motherland, and not necessarily passive alarm. The earth, full of nuclear weapons, and with the numerous flaring local armed conflicts, would have become even more vulnerable.

Now it's different. Now, both in our country and abroad, people feel easier; they know that a realistic step has been taken towards strengthening peace. That's why we can mention victory with assurance. Not a military victory, of course. It was not planned. History, by the way, has shown us that military victories are often fraught with future troubles and prolonged

conflicts. In this case we're speaking about the victory of reason, a victory under which only the logic of war suffer defeat, when the whole of humanity is the winner and there are not defeated nations.

Now the victory achieved in Geneva besting? Will it be followed by other victories? We'd like to hope so.

Together with Vadim Okulov, Pravda correspondent in Kabul, we managed to pass through all the guards that appeared at night and get to the city square near the Pamir Cinema. The dead bodies and the wounded were already evacuated, but there was still the acrid smell of TNT in the air, and a heap of crushed iron was emitting smoke - this was all that was left from the PPK-945 lorry, packed with dynamite, which came to Kabul from the road from Torkham. Palaces, fountains and dancing beauties are painted on their high iron sides, which also bear quotations from the Koran.

As I was told, the movement of arms from Pakistan to Afghanistan has increased sharply lately.

Yes, these are troubled times in Kabul and outside Kabul. On April 28, when the country was celebrating the 10th anniversary of the revolution, a military parade was held in the capital, and a 200,000-strong demonstration. On that day at about 10 a.m., many of the government troops' positions were shelled.

Now the militia is exercising stricter control in Kabul, documents are being checked more thoroughly and people at government organizations and military HQs are more concentrated and businesslike.

Mirshab Karwal, Secretary of the Central Committee of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, received me immediately, despite his being busy. We got to know each other once, not in a study but in a trench during a military operation. Acquaintances under fire bring people closer together.

The Afghan people are tired of the war," Mirshab said. "Everyone is tired. The people, the army, the party members, the non-party people, young people, old people, revolutionaries and counter-revolutionaries. This is already a political factor. It is precisely this factor that imparts real force to the national reconciliation. We shall be conducting our policy of national reconciliation undeviatingly and consistently in the past years we've made quite a few mistakes but learned a lot, too. We're prepared to cooperate honestly with those who are ready to build a peaceful, free, neutral and non-aligned Afghanistan. And we shall fight those who continue the fratricidal war. I know that difficult times lie ahead of us, but we're prepared for any danger. The unity of the party is the most important condition for success. Real danger breeds real responsibility. And now all of it rests on our shoulders. Realistically, this is how it should be."

Moscow News asked

1st Dep. Chief of Staff of the USSR Armed Forces Vladimir Lobov

if 5/15 would be a troublesome day for the Soviet army...

V. L.: For our army all days are troublesome. But the troubles of that particular date are something we were undoubtedly waiting for.

I've also met with Shah Nawaz Tanai, Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Afghanistan.

"The army now has at its disposal all the necessary means and forces," he said. "Our units are starting to take over the zones of responsibility from the Soviet troops. We are redistributing our defences, concentrating attention on securing the more important communications and on the key routes."

Shah Nawaz Tanai's pencil flits over the map, over the cities, roads and airfields. The map is full of green drops - areas, where the enemy's bases are. The drops are in the east of Afghanistan, near the borders of Pakistan.

"What about the western direction? After all, Iran did not take part in the Geneva agreements."

"We are taking this into account as well. But Iran is seriously weakened by the war with Iraq. Besides that, our fundamentalists, such as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, find it hard to arrive at a common language with the Shi'ites in Iran. And the western plans are wide open. It is hard to operate there in different groups."

"Maybe, now, after the Soviet troops' pullout the enemy will try to change the forms of war? They'll start forming large units, or they'll try to organize fronts, won't they?"

"No, I don't think so. The strife between the different groupings of armed opposition continues. We also hope that Pakistan will be fulfilling the Geneva agreements honestly. We must take these factors into account."

I think the opposition will be using the old methods - raids, subversive acts, or firing from some hideout far away."

I listen to Shah Nawaz Tanai, and glance at the gold stars on his

shoulders. Now he has three, and is a Colonel-General. The last time I saw him, at the Panjshir gorge, he had only one gold star and was a CO of a division. The operation was a hard one. The enemy, led by Ahmed Shah, was putting up stiff, organized resistance.

"There are rumours in Kabul that Ahmed Shah will perhaps join in the national reconciliation. Is there any hope that talks with him will be successful?"

"Najibullah, President of Afghanistan, has said clearly that we're prepared to cooperate sincerely with all those who wish to bring peace to the Afghan people. Now, as for the setting up of a demilitarized zone..."


The Colonel-General's pencil again starts flitting over the map, and I don't bother to repeat my question. Apparently, life will show.

The military plane took off from Kabul late in the evening. Without lights it circled in the air for a long time over the airfield, gaining altitude, then flew over the mountains and started to descend rapidly. We undipped our parachutes and went out on to the concrete. We heard a command being given. A ray of light from a car's headlights illuminated a row of Soviet soldiers. Our soldiers never look nicer - no matter at what review - than on the day they leave the army. Everything on him shines, everything is new and his will.

"I congratulate you, comrades! Are you glad?" I asked, after going up to them.

A pause ensued. Then someone answered: "Thank you, OI course, we're glad."

Yes, they are glad. They've fulfilled their duty and are returning home.



"That one is for learning the lesson of Afghanistan."

AFGHANISTAN: THE SOVIET TOLL

	Dead	Wounded	Missing
From Dec 27, 1979 until May 1, 1988	13,310	35,478	311

THE VIETNAM COMPARISON-US CASUALTIES

From Feb 17, 1963 to March 29, 1973	47,321	153,303	2,305
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The Sydney Morning Herald

Viki Ramsay

On February 23 in Peshawar, the seven-party Islamic Alliance of Afghan Mujahideen announced the formula for the broad-based transitional government to replace the Najib regime in Afghanistan. The alliance has appealed to the USSR to participate in the reconstruction of war-ridden Afghanistan.

There will be a transitional government which will ensure a cease-fire and the peaceful transition to law and order, to permit the safe and complete withdrawal of Soviet forces, the return of the refugees with honor, conduct general election consistent with Islamic laws, within 6 months after the withdrawal of Soviet forces.

The structure of the state will include:

1) A Shura-i-Ala (grand council) which will be the supreme body of the state, comprising of the leaders of the seven-party alliance. This body will provide joint leadership during the interim period.

2) A broad-based transitional government representing all sectors of the Afghan nation. This government is proposed to replace the present regime in Kabul before the signing of the Geneva Accords under the auspices of the U.N.

The government will consist of a cabinet composed of 28 ministers under a ra'is-i-hukumat (head of government) who will also be the ra'is-i-daulat (head of state). The cabinet will consist of 14 mujahideen, 7 refugees and 7 Muslims presently residing in Afghanistan.

There will be a mashwarat-i-shura (consultative council) comprising of 75 members (2 from each province (56) and one-third (19) from the scholars, intellectuals and technocrats.) This will frame the interim laws to run the country until the formation of the new constitution by an elected shura (constituent assembly).

Provincial councils will be set up by mutual consultations to administer the provinces in the interim period.

A fully autonomous election commission will be set up to draw up procedures and rules for holding elections to the shura (constituent assembly). Immediately after the withdrawal of the Soviet



Before assuming the chairmanship of the 7-Party Alliance in Peshawar, Pir Gailani issued this statement:

1. The Afghan Refugees should rest assured that unless conditions for their honorable and voluntary return to Afghanistan has been secured, they, in lieu of assurances of the fraternal Government of Pakistan, and also in conformity with the spirit of the relevant Geneva agreement, have no obligation to return to Afghanistan.
2. NIFA has constantly declared that no government devoid of the approval and the trust of the Moslem people of Afghanistan could muster unity and harmony within the rank and file of the mujahideen and amongst the various stratas of the Afghan nation. Without an overall unity, The Resistance will lose vigor, which in turn will strengthen the position and longevity of the PDPA's puppet regime. The continuation of war and turmoil will make the return of the Afghan Refugees impossible.
3. NIFA considers the right of self determination by the Moslem people of Afghanistan imperative and vital for both stability and continued tranquility in Afghanistan. This right has been usurped by the imposed "Khalk" and "Parcham" regimes and later by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
4. With the withdrawal of Soviet forces and then by the collapse of the imposed regime of Kabul, the people of Afghanistan will regain their self determination. They will be able to vote for the formation of their choice of government and legislative system through elected representatives of the Refugees and Mujahideen. Such an elected council may adopt, reject, alter and correct the transitional government and any charters, laws and regulations.
5. The Transitional Government, after securing the vote of confidence of the representative Council of Refugees and Mujahideen, should promote peace and order. It should also draft the Afghan Constitution and election laws within a fixed limit of time and call for the traditional Loya Jirga to adopt, alter or reject the constitution. After the adoption of the constitution, the Transitional Government will hold General Elections and the Parliament of Afghanistan will materialize. From there the future Afghan Government will emerge. The Transitional Government should fulfill it's mandate at the earliest possibility.
6. NIFA considers any imposed government, which does not have the vote of confidence of a representative body of the people of Afghanistan, as non-legal. It also considers such an imposed government as unable to muster national unity and therefore impracticable.
7. There should be full cooperation and collaboration between the Interim Government and International Organizations in regard to the repatriation and rehabilitation of external and internal Afghan Refugees. All relevant funds and allocations should be spent only and only on rehabilitation purposes under the strict observations of international bodies. Any misuse of such funds for political or partisan gains must be curtailed.
8. The reconstruction and the infrastructure of Afghanistan should be the duty of the future legal government of Afghanistan, since such vast and serious undertakings require long term scientific and technical planning.

forces, the name of the future Afghanistan will be Daulat-i-Islamia Afghanistan (Islamic State of Afghanistan) wherein the Qur'an and Sunnah (examples of the Prophet Muhammad (SAWA)) will be supreme. It will have an elected shura and an elected head.

The alliance has also decided to set up a reconstruction commission and calls upon all qualified Afghans to apply for appoint-

ments to this body which will start functioning at the alliance headquarters.

The transitional government will sign the Geneva Accords and undertake full responsibility for their implementation, including the safe return of Soviet forces when the accords become acceptable to the transitional government. The transitional government will pursue an independent and non-aligned foreign policy and will have friendly relations

with all countries, particularly with its neighbors, provided that they do not interfere in Afghanistan's internal affairs.

For the purpose of reconstruction, the alliance requests all the countries of the world and in particular the Soviet Union, to participate in the reconstruction of the infrastructure and economy of Afghanistan.

KATHYAN INTERNATIONAL, MAR. 31, 1988

Where as today, May 15, 1988, coincides with the commencement of the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan, The National Islamic Front of Afghanistan issues the following declaration:

Afghan Islamic Parties:

By HENRY KAMM

Special to The New York Times

Options Are Divided

The alliance parties are divided: four subscribe to revolutionary ideals, like Mr. Hekmatyar, or profess a rigidly fundamentalist interpretation of Islam, while the three others are deeply Islamic but preach a return to the tradition-bound political and social structures that prevailed until the overthrow of the King in 1973.

The traditional parties share a feeling that they have been strongly disadvantaged by Pakistan — the distributor of the arms and supplies from the United States, China and the rich Arab nations — in the allotment of arms granted to them.

The criticism of Pakistan is muted but it is shared by most of the Afghan educated and professional men in Peshawar. Afghan women, because of the heavily fundamentalist atmosphere of the refugee camps and in Peshawar, are hardly ever heard speaking on public matters.

"We have only one right — that is to fight," said an official of a traditional party. "We have not one political freedom, in Kabul or here."

In a view widely held in the thin layer of educated refugees, Pakistan plays a decisive role in shaping the tendencies of the guerrillas by exercising close political control. The government of President Mohammad Zia ul-Haq, who

has directed the military and political character of the guerrilla alliance from the outset, is said to have favored the most emphatically Islamic trends to the detriment of the traditionalists.

The result has been, according to Afghan professionals who are, like all Afghan refugees, strongly anti-Communist and devoutly Moslem, a polarization of Afghan political power between the Communist regime in Kabul and the rigidly Islamic guerrillas in Peshawar. This misrepresents the outlook of the great majority of Afghans, a refugee political scientist said.

Viewpoint of the Educated

Pakistan's support for Mr. Hekmatyar and the fundamentalists is, explained among this silent opinion by General Zia's own fundamentalist faith and by the theory that Islamabad wants to create Afghan clients and prevent the formation of a government with strength in representing the aspirations of the Afghan majority.


Educated Afghans tend to view the alliance and its member parties as a Pakistani creation to influence the guerrilla political leadership and the establishment of a future Afghanistan favorable to Pakistan. Pakistan determines the strength of each party through the arms and supplies allotted for distribution to military commanders in Afghanistan. Most Afghan intellectuals believe that Mr. Hekmatyar

gets most American and Arab bounty through Pakistani distribution.

Since the signing of the Geneva agreement, which refugees believe is a step toward their return home, criticism of the alliance is also heard among the rural, largely illiterate, refugees.

"The parties may be as alien to the Afghan people as the Communists are," a party official said.

Officials of the traditionalist parties and intellectuals who are unaffiliated despite their nominal membership in a party, also expressed concern over possible Iran and Arab influence over alliance leaders.



Gulbuddin Hekmatyar

Burhanuddin Rabbani, leader of a large fundamentalist party, the Jamiat-Islami, last month visited Iran for several weeks and, according to Western European diplomats, was received by President Hojatoleslam Ali Khamenei and other top officials.

Afghan intellectuals note the absence of any tangible American interest in laying the basis of a future Afghan democracy, which they favor. They regard this as inconsistent with the fact that the United States is the principal backer of the guerrillas.

"We know the Pakistani delegates and the Saudi candidates, and maybe some other candidates," an Afghan historian said. "but the Americans don't seem to have a candidate."

CHIEFS AGREE ON KEY ROLE FOR UN

AFGHAN RESISTANCE leaders have agreed to let the United Nations play the key role in repatriating refugees and reconstructing their country, but are still demanding a change of regime in Kabul before the 5m refugees in Pakistan and Iran return home.

Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan, the UN co-ordinator for Afghanistan, reporting after his first visit to Kabul, Islamabad, Tehran and Peshawar, said yesterday that it was premature to set a date for the start of the repatriation.

However, his team has started to identify zones where mines can be cleared, villages rebuilt quickly and a climate of confidence created.

Before the middle of the month, the UN will formally launch its appeal for funds. A sum of between \$1bn and \$2bn, spread over three years has been mentioned.

Before the co-ordinator's visit, resistance leaders in Peshawar had voiced reservations about the role given the UN under the Geneva agreement on the withdrawal of Soviet troops. The guerrillas refuse to recognise the agreement, to which they were not a party.

Prince Sadruddin stressed the need for flexibility but said his "intuition" was that some of the refugees would decide independently to return to their valleys.

The Governments in Kabul, Islamabad and Tehran have all promised to facilitate UN access. Prince Sadruddin urged donors to keep humanitarian assistance out of the bilateral "truts" used to provide military aid to the warring factions in Afghanistan.

Financial Times 6/2

THE NEW YORK TIMES, FRIDAY, APRIL 29, 1988

Joint Administrative Council

During an interview with AAP Pakistan at Pabbi Refugee Camp near Peshawar, Ahmed Shah ruled out the possibility of a government in exile. He said that the announcement will be made in liberated Afghan territory. He said that Afghan leaders are engaged in consultation among themselves for the establishment of joint administrative councils in the areas controlled by the Mujahideen. He said that they are entering the first phase of organizing liberated areas of Afghanistan.

Regarding a general amnesty, Ahmed Shah said that the majority of Kabul regime officials are forced to obey Russian orders and only those active members of the Communist Party and those responsible for crimes against the Afghan people will face accountability trials.

Muhammad Nabi Muhammad, leader of the moderate Harkat Islami Party, said the government may be set up in one of five areas Kunar, Nooristan, Pakia, Panjshir or Hazarajat. "If we come under pressure in one place, we will move to another," Sebghatullah Mojaddi, leader of the moderate Afghan National Liberation Front said.

KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL, APR. 16, 1988

THE AFGHAN parliament is expected to hold its inaugural meeting this weekend, in the government's latest attempt to entice the mujahideen guerrillas to stop fighting and embrace "national reconciliation".

In an associated move, President Najibullah has named as his new Prime Minister Mohammad Hassan Sharq, 52, who is not formally a member of the ruling People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan. He is, however, a close ally of the President and his dominant Parcham wing in the party. The Prime Minister-designate is in charge of refugee affairs, and held one of the largely ceremonial posts of Deputy Prime Minister.

Mr Sharq replaces Sultan Ali Kishmard, who was Prime Minister for six-and-a-half years, and was a founding member of the PDPA in 1965. He played a key role in the 1973 coup against King Zahir Shah, which suggests that the government has ruled out any plan to invite the exiled monarch back to act as a figurehead leader, now that the Soviet troop withdrawal from Afghanistan has begun.

In the turbulent, not to say murderous tradition of Afghan politics, Mr Sharq is considered a survivor. In a recent interview he said he did not know how he managed to survive the 1978 coup, as he was closely associated with the assassinated President.

From Bruce Palling in Kabul

Mohammad Daoud. After a brief spell in jail, he was made ambassador to India following the assassination of President Hafizullah Amin and the Soviet intervention. He returned to Kabul in 1986. Diplomatic sources consider that, with his charm and reputation for honesty, he is probably the most acceptable candidate for achieving the difficult, perhaps impossible, goal of "national reconciliation".

The parliament's first task will be to ratify Mr Sharq's appointment and that of his cabinet, which will be the first indication of how far the government is prepared to go to widen its tribal and political base from the present domination by the PDPA. The mujahideen guerrilla alliance denounced last month's elections as a fraud, but the government has kept 50 of the 234 parliamentary seats open for them, in the unlikely event of their changing their minds. The PDPA only holds 46 seats in the new assembly, but is assured of support from both the National Front organisation, which has 45, and the allied parties, which hold a further 24 seats.

An interview with an independent senator yesterday confirmed that the PDPA has nothing to fear from its political allies. Said

Ashan Hashimi, chairman of the education authority in Jozjan province of north-western Afghanistan, said the government's policies "are good for the people", and he had no policy disagreements with the government whatsoever. He rejected any real role for the mujahideen. "They do not have enough authority to face the government directly. They come and go like thieves, so they will fail in their objectives," he said.

The rebels have not launched any rocket or bomb attacks on the capital for several days. The feeling is growing among Western diplomats here that the mujahideen are unlikely to launch an all-out offensive to capture Kabul, as this would mean exposing themselves to heavy Soviet retaliation.

■ GENEVA — Afghanistan needs a big international aid programme to recover from the destruction caused by years of war, Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan, co-ordinator of United Nations aid to the country, said yesterday Reuters reports.

"They all realise that to reconstruct the country, which has been virtually destroyed, you need a tremendous international effort, a kind of Afghan Marshall Plan," he said. Prince Sadruddin is to travel to Afghanistan and neighbouring Pakistan and Iran to try to establish the precise assistance required.

Najibullah's team of reconciliation

Some thoughts on the future of Afghanistan

Often, in human affairs, the attainment of an objective, though involving blood, toil, tears and sweat, is not as difficult as the handling of affairs that flow from such an attainment. The Geneva Accord, signed and sealed after eight long years of bloodshed and tears; is only the beginning of a process that may last quite some time, involving the safe return to and rehabilitation of millions of Afghan refugees in their homeland. The process will naturally be accompanied or preceded by a whole lot of logistical and infrastructural support requirements needed by various agencies of the United Nations, alongside perhaps, a train of unsuspected difficulties or events that can arguably create the crises of the future.

Since most of the refugees travelled to Pakistan and Iran across tortuous mountain routes, known only to the tribesmen living on both sides of the borders, they would probably want to go back across the same way. Monitoring of their return in the circumstances will be quite a difficult task and will require foolproof procedures and disciplines operating from their present encampments outside the borders to the places they choose to go in Afghanistan. It is likely that most of the homes in which they lived before migrating have fallen victim to the devastation of war and new temporary shelters for them may have to be constructed in the vicinity of their former hangings until such lodgings themselves are reconstructed. The Prime

Minister in his speech on the Geneva Accord has rightly stressed the need for the Soviet Union, more than another country, contribute to major efforts in the economic rehabilitation of the returning Afghans because, after all, it was due to the Soviet aggression that these people were driven from their homes. Indeed, nothing would efface the cruel memories of Soviet occupation of Afghanistan quicker than heavy economic aid given by it, which hopefully, would be forthcoming. No speculations as to the magnitude of aid needed for rehabilitation can be made at this moment of time. Its extent can only be gauged after collection of figures and data indicating the material losses and needs of the individual Afghan sufferers, but it will be safe to surmise that a colossal amount will be needed for the purpose.

Economic rehabilitation of uprooted Afghans presupposes a political climate under which the rehabilitation process can operate. The political and peaceful climate needed for Afghanistan is the prevalence of conditions where the country's government is chosen by its own people and where the writ of such a government is not only enforceable but is willingly accepted by all and sundry. How all this is to come about remains to be seen, with full faith of the concerned parties in the negotiating prowess and geniality of Mr. Diego Cordovez, who will be overseeing the arrangements in his personal capacity.

Mr. Cordovez has already

earned for himself the reputation of winsome ways and persuasive eloquence. Be that as it may, the bringing together of Afghans of all shades of opinion and of the Mujahideen and the local Afghan elements, and making them constitute an acceptable government in Afghanistan will be no easy matter. We, in Pakistan, are hopeful that every kind of factionalism within the various groups will disappear and give way to a common understanding in the best interests of Afghanistan. There is also hope that those who have handled the Afghan crisis in Pakistan, with such ability and diplomacy, including President Zia-ul-Haq and Prime Minister, Junjo, will help the Mujahideen to come to the right decisions. A similar process on the other side of the border will have to be undertaken by somebody equally responsible for bringing the two estranged parties together, and it is here that Mr. Cordovez will be expected to call on his ingenuity and diplomacy in the formation of an acceptable Afghan government.

Because the time lag involved in fixing such issues will be considerable and because nobody as yet can safely predict the nature and complexion of a future Afghan government, it is somewhat premature to surmise what its internal and external policies will be. The geo-political complexion of a free Afghanistan will, hopefully, remain non-aligned, but mindful of the sanguinary nightmare through which the country has recently

passed, nobody would want to grudge its good relationship with its powerful neighbour, the Soviet Union, but independence never means dependence. The profound sympathy and brotherhood for the Afghan people displayed by Pakistan over the years should dispel all politically motivated devices given to Afghanistan against Pakistan by countries inimical to the latter. By compulsion of geography, culture, religion and history, Afghanistan should draw much closer to Pakistan than it ever was, knowing that this fraternity and closeness can only create goodness all around and will not be directed against any foreign power.

If one were an optimist, one could foresee a new and dynamic relationship flowering between the Soviet Union, Afghanistan, Pakistan and China. Such a dispensation could have enormous international impact because that the long shelved Sino-Soviet detente may mature after all as a result of Soviet evacuation of Afghanistan. Detente could descend to other countries on the eastern coast of Asia and there could be better understandings everywhere. But that is a dream. One could hope for better North and South Korean relationship and for the return of normalcy in the relations between Kampuchea, Laos and Vietnam. Such a scenario will dissolve the suspicions which most Asian countries have to each other and the continent can emerge as the world's strongest in terms of man and material power.—NPT

LONDON, April 19: Fifty per cent representation in the cabinet to be formed for the broad-based interim Afghan Government would be given to the Mujahideen and Mujahreen living in Pakistan and the 50 per cent to the Afghan technocrats and intellectuals in Europe and other countries.

The informed sources of the Afghan Alliance told Agency Afghanistan Press that each of the component parties of the Alliance had nominated their two representatives for the cabinet who are important office-bearers of the organisations.

The proposed names of the cabinet members from the Afghan Alliance include Syed Noorullah and Maulvi Mir Hamza Khan (Jamiat-i-Islami), Ustad Ali and Najullah (Hizb-i-Islami), Mohammad Shah Fazi and Ustad Siddique from Harkat-i-Ingilab-i-Islami, Farooq Azam and Ustad Garar (National Liberation Front), Engineer Ahmed Shah and Mohammad Yasser (Ittehad-i-Islami Afghanistan), Haji Deen Mohammad (Islamic Front), Commander Matullah Khan (Hizb-i-Islami Khalis) and Zabihullah Mujaddadi and Irshad Kahn (Jabba Nijadi-i-Milli).

It was learnt that three delegations each consisting of 14 members would visit Afghanistan to meet the people.

The proposed cabinet would hold its weekly meetings under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister designate of the proposed interim government.

4/20

ZAHURUL HAQ

Kabul training youth to fight Mujahids

KABUL, May 7: At a military school near here, about 400 young and not so young Afghans are learning the rudiments of fighting a war.

Many are conscripts, just turned 18 and drafted for two years military service. Their fresh crew cuts and uniforms several sizes too large and little to their military bearing. A handful wear their late 30s have been redrafted.

Almost all look bewildered as tough Afghan instructors put them through their paces at education centre No 37. Six months from now, they will be packed off to military units to fight a war that they know little about.

We train them here in artillery, transportation and engineering, said centre Commandant Colonel "Khahtimst" (Irreversible) Sarajuddin.

After their training, the men at No 37 will join the 45,000 strong Afghan army, fighting and armed and highly motivated enemy, the Mujahideen.

Will this army of mainly teen age conscripts be able to fight when Soviet troops are in Afghanistan. This is one of the main questions facing the Kabul Government as it prepares to bid goodbye to the Red army after nine years.

The U.S. backed Mujahideen, fighting to topple the Kabul government under the banner of Islam, have rejected the April 14 Geneva Accord paving the way for a Soviet troop withdrawal from May 15 and vowed to pursue the war.

"We have taught them how to fight on their own," Lieutenant General Ivan Ivanovich of the 103 Airborne Division said.

Najibullah said on April 25 that Moscow had fashioned a "contemporary" Afghan army and helped Kabul achieve military balance with the Mujahideen. He said Kabul's priority would be to "over-muster" its armed forces to maintain the balance.

But western diplomats in Kabul say pullout of the estimated 115,000 Soviet troops from Afghanistan inevitably alter the military balance.

The men at education centre No 37 are the elite, they said. The army is largely poorly-trained and lacks the morale to fight. The average conscript is given barely a weeks training before being sent to the front.

The armed forces are said to be riddled with Mujahideen sympathisers, divisions in the upper

ranks and a large desertion rate.

"The Afghan Armed Forces have little chance of whipping the Mujahideen all by themselves when the Soviets—who are better trained and better equipped couldn't," said a member of a U.S. delegation that visited Kabul to attend a conference on the Afghan Conflict.

"My impression is the regime doesn't know it the army can fight," he added, adding: "If the army of conscripts collapses, there will be continuous fighting till the Mujahideen get to the perimeter of Kabul."

Besides the army, Kabul has a 50,000 strong air force with Soviet trained pilots. The Sarandoi, or paramilitary police, is about 35,000 strong, while KHAD, the Afghan secret service, has about 30,000 men.

Diplomats put the Mujahideen fighting strength at about 130,000. Kabul's regular armed forces are equipped with Soviet hardware including T-55 and T-62 tanks, armoured personnel carriers, long range guns, helicopter gunships and fighter planes.

But this is standard equipment which will be extremely important in defending. More important is how to use the equipment and the will to use it, one diplomat said. "What they really need is large numbers of well trained and loyal soldiers and they don't have them", another diplomat said.

"The Sarandoi, KHAD and the

Air Force are elite units which can be used for shock effect in an attack situation and not defend—which is what the Kabul Government must mostly be doing once the Soviets leave," he added.

A major Government advantage in the nine-year-old war had been its air superiority, but this has been considerably neutralised by the deadly U.S.-made Stinger and British made blowpipe missiles supplied to the Mujahideen.—AFP

\$600 m. needed to resettle refugees

NEW YORK, May 11: The International Rescue Committee (IRC) of the United States estimates that resettlement costs for the Afghans will run about 200 dollars per person. This means 600 million dollars are needed for Afghanistan in the first year alone.

This has been stated by Mr. Roy Williams, Deputy Director of the IRC, which is currently operating a large-scale resettlement programme which includes seven mobile medical units in 11 camp states in Pakistan and had lodged 30,000 patients visits a year.

Nearly 4.5 million Afghan refugees who may now return to their homeland will require a great deal of attention from the humanitarian agencies and others in the international community.

India has no role to play in the Afghanistan problem, a silent spectator to the gory drama for 8 years. It has abruptly jumped into the arena trying to refurbish its tarnished image, after supporting the Soviet occupation. The stakes being very heavy Pakistan will have to focus on Indian moves to forestall any ugly situation as India is vitally interested in keeping its western border destabilised.

Looking ahead to road, water system and farmland requirements as the refugees return, Mr. Williams noted that most of the Afghan roads are mined—PPI

A crucial difference between the Afghan situation and others of lesser magnitude, Mr. Williams stressed, is that "you didn't have the total destruction of an infrastructure that we have in Afghanistan."

5/12

Mujahideen ready to advance on Kabul after Soviet pull-out

LONDON, May 11: The Mujahideen are ready to move on Kabul, after the withdrawal of Soviet forces.

The Afghan Mujahideen leaders are confident that the departure of Soviet troops would be immediately followed by demonstrations against Najib administration and acts of sabotage and will set off defections from the Afghan Armed Forces.

Mujahideen leaders and commanders in interview with the Western news media said defections from the Armed Forces will facilitate the resistance in taking over Kabul. The leaders and commanders are now planning the strategy to be pursued after the Soviets start withdrawing.

Abdul Haq, one of the resistance's top commanders, called a meeting of some 40 military chiefs, most of them members of Yunus Khalles's Hizb-Isлами Party. The purpose was to discuss notes. We were given to see what attitude the Soviets are going to take. Abdul Haq, who is sabotage expert said, "Without this we can't pursue any offensive. At this rate, I'm not fully convinced they are going to leave."

Ahmed Zia, brother of commander Masud and his spokesman in Peshawar, is interested in the next step: "We are currently reorganising the Afghan council and the northern provinces combined into a single military command by Masud forces around Kabul. We are not at the moment in a position to take the capital. What's important is that the Soviets should go. During their retreat some of the commanders are going to try to seize Kabul. We in the Jamiat think this would be a mistake, that it's better to allow them to leave. The Soviets have all left to mount a combined assault." Once they have gone, he has no doubt at all as to what will follow.

"Najib's Government will fail. That's why conditions for peace have to be created as now."

Abdul Haq does not think Kabul will stand up long to an attack. Sequel to Mojaddedi's orders of the Jabba, one of the traditionalist parties, explained that the three royalist groups had long decided not to attack Red Army troops during the retreat, but added that such a commitment

"obviously does not apply to Soviet bases." Mojaddedi favours attacking Kabul immediately, although he knows, he else he knows "slip-ups" could happen. "I'm hoping there won't be too much fighting among ourselves," he said.

Abdul Haq does not leave anything to chance. It is this careful preparation that has permitted him to mount daring sabotage operations inside Kabul where he is said to have a big network of informers in every Ministry. Most of them belong to the Khalqi, which is one of the groups (the other is the Parcham) forming the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). Leading Parcham figures will leave with the Soviets, thinks Haq. Those who come over to his side will be a valuable asset in the attack on the capital, and he is counting on them to seize the Ministries and prevent destruction and looting. "I don't want the capital to be messy," he said. "We'll do our utmost to coordinate actions."

Simple logic — and also prudence — should dictate beginning a Soviet pull-out from the south, from Kandahar and moving towards the north, turning over one by one the garrisons farthest from the capital to President Najibullah's army. This is likely to freeze the invasion indefinitely in the regions north of the capital (but the Mujahideen are well entrenched here), and would set in motion a de facto partition of the country.

Finally, one thing is certain: The corridor plunging eastwards towards China — the "Pamir Fingers" and Wakhan which are currently under seven regions parties will never be returned to the future Afghan Government.

Like most Afghan field commanders and Peshawar-based political party leaders, Abdul Haq does not think the resistance is under any obligation to facilitate an "honourable retreat" by the Soviets. "After all," he told me, "If they want to go away in orderly fashion, the have only one thing to do: Talk to us. We will continue our strikes as usual." Gulbadin Hekmatyar, President of the Alliance of seven regions parties and head of Hizb-e-Islami Party, was of the same opinion: If the Soviets are prepared to reach an agreement with the resistance, the Mujahideen will let them go.

Long-range threat

MICHAEL HAMLYN

The nights in Kabul are disturbed these days not only by a stream of Russian transport planes flying in and out of the airport, but also by occasional and newly threatening explosions, mostly in the south-western suburbs.

A new longer-range rocket is believed by Western experts to be in the hands of the Mujahideen guerrillas, and to be already falling on the city.

According to Western diplomats the use of the new rockets is part of a rebel attempt to build pressure against the regime of President Najibullah as his Russian protectors withdraw, and to increase tension generally.

The diplomats have counted 14 incidents in Kabul in the past week, and these include a number of rocket and mortar bombs which have been louder than previous strikes. One diplomat tracked a rocket over the northern part of the city and felt convinced that its range had exceeded that of earlier missiles.

The range of the new rockets is estimated to be about 12 miles, which would put all parts of the capital within range of Mujahideen groups operating outside the security perimeter. The new missile was said by the Afghan Government to have been captured from the Mujahideen in the Logar valley, south of Kabul. It was not in local news reports and was said by experts apparently to be a two-stage device.

According to local newspaper reports, a number of civilians including children have been killed and severely injured in the attacks. Kabul citizens to whom I spoke are unwilling to blame the rockets on Soviet attacks. They prefer to put the blame on the retreating Russian forces. It should in fairness also be pointed out that tension within the city is far from relaxed, perhaps the atmosphere is more relaxed, with people out and about after dark, and an almost total absence of check-points on street corners.

Activity over the perimeter is still thought to be heavy, with diplomats reporting continuing fighting to the north and west of Kabul, with explosions in the nearby areas often coming from the centre. At night, loud bangs from the parachute flares hang like flood-

lights over parts of the outer ring.

Outside Kabul, the diplomats here say that Mujahideen pressure on areas where the Russians are withdrawing is continuing to grow.

According to one diplomat, 15 districts towns in the far east of the country close to the Pakistan border have now fallen to Mujahideen control. The latest to be taken this week was the little town of Lalpur, which is said to threaten an outpost at Dakkah, dominating the main road from the border to Jalalabad.

The diplomat also told me that his sources in Jalalabad itself report that the Russians have not entirely withdrawn from the city, as was widely reported earlier.

Russian soldiers seen there in the past few days were not simply the military advisers who will now accompany any Afghan formations above a division in size, but he suggested that they could possibly be actively engaged in the field.

Some idea of the extent of Mujahideen activity in the provinces can be seen from the claims of the Afghan news agency, Bakhtar.

Reporting on the success of the Government forces, "Personnel of the armed forces inflicted heavy blows on the extremist groups," the agency reported, "in different parts of the country, including the provinces of Kandahar, Nangarhar, Faryab, Ghazni, Kunduz, Baglan, and Khost grand district." The seven areas mentioned range from the far north of the country to the far south.

PESHAWAR: In the most significant step in the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan so far, Russian troops have moved out of positions in the key strategic Panjshir Valley in north-east Afghanistan, according to reliable sources here.

June 6, 1988.

Kabul's new ruling body

Fierce political infighting is said to be delaying the announcement of a more broadly based "council" Government in Afghanistan.

A new Council of Ministers should have been read on television last Sunday, according to East European diplomats. Now, however, the programme of the Government's information centre no announcement can be expected before Saturday.

move was aimed at gaining international legitimacy.

Shah Nawaz reportedly said that the necessary conditions for launching a programme of rebuilding Afghanistan do not exist. The Soviet troops have still to withdraw and the refugees have not yet returned. Those conditions must be met so that the Government were able to decide on a government of their choice. Only then an international aid effort would be beneficial to the people.

The ECO's plan was to wake up Kabul's request on Monday. Meanwhile, the Pakistan delegation is contacting delegates from friendly countries and informing them of its position. —APP.

5/5

Before the hold-up, observers here were expecting that the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan would reduce the number of ministerial seats it held to fewer than half the total. It was also seen as though the remaining posts, as though the members of smaller parties, or to non-party figures like Mr. Hassan, the new Prime Minister, or others might be left open for opposition figures.

It was suggested, for example, that Mr. Abdul Wakil, the Foreign Minister, would be technically demoted to deputy, and his job left open for a Mujahideen leader if one could be enticed to fill it.

"But Mr Wakil, who is in Havana for a non-aligned meeting, said he would have fought vigorously against any such plan. A Foreign Ministry official made it clear yesterday that Mr Wakil expects to stay in place.

In the key Ministry of Defence, the prime minister was also expected to be demoted. But he has still offered to someone like Ahmed Shah Massoud, the charismatic commander in the Panjshir valley.

Another suggestion was that Lieutenant-General Shahinawaz Tannai, the Army Chief of Staff, might take over. But General Tannai is a member of the Khalqi faction of the ruling party, and his appointment is said to have been fiercely opposed by the Parcham faction. The Parchams, the urban intellectual wing of the party, are in power at present, but are heavily dependant on Russian support.

The Khalqis, who tend to be the rural radicals, control many key army posts, and especially the Panjshir valley force, the Tashardar. They come under the direct control of General Sayid Muhammad Gulabzoi, the Interior Minister.

Gen. Gulabzoi, the leading Khalqi in the Government, was also expected to be promoted away from direct control of the Interior Ministry, but is said to have vehemently resisted this move, which would have separated him from his powerbase.

President Najibullah has relied a good deal on the support of Gen. Gulabzoi, and the Khalqis have become more resilient, and more demanding. They have, for example, been able to demand and get the release from jail of 17 former Khalqi ministers, including Mr. Shah Wali, the former Foreign Minister.

More surprisingly, they have been able to engineer the return of the imprisoned Prince Mongolia of Assadullah Sarwari, the former secret service chief who was personally responsible for the torture of Mr. Sultan Ali Keshmendar, who has just resigned as Prime Minister.

With their tails up, and the prospect of increased power and influence once the Russians withdraw, the Khalqis are evidently demanding a greater role in the Government for themselves.

MICHAEL HAMLYN June 8

Pakistan trying to block Kabul attempt

UNITED NATIONS, May 4: Pakistan is trying to block a Kabul attempt to claim a role in rebuilding Afghanistan. It has been ravaged by extensive fighting between the Soviet-backed Afghan troops and the Mujahideen.

According to knowledgeable sources, the Kabul delegation received an initial setback when the Economic and Social Council last night put off until Monday a decision on the request for an urgent discussion on international assistance to Afghanistan, now that the Geneva Accords have been signed.

The postponement came after Ambassador S. Shah Nawaz apprised the 54-member council of the inscription of a new item on Venezuela and other ECOSOC office-bearers of Pakistan's strong objections to the proposal that he called "a propaganda play and 'premature'".

The Kabul move was shrouded in an ostensibly innocent request for the inscription of a new item on ECOSOC's agenda, and on Economic and Social Assistance to Afghanistan and came on the eve of ECOSOC's session which opened on Tuesday.

In a letter to Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar, Aibule representative, Shah Mehsud Dost, said the Geneva statement had paved the way for the normalisation of the situation in Afghanistan.

This enables the government of Afghanistan to embark on a huge reconstruction effort to undo the enormous damage inflicted by the war and to resettle Afghan refugees returning to their country," Dost said.

"Such an effort is beyond the domestic means available to Afghanistan and requires the assistance of this world body," the Ambassador said. "It is understood to have told President Aguiar and his associates that such an effort could not be undertaken through a regime which does not control 80 per cent of Afghanistan. In fact, he said, Kabul's

SOVIET SAYS PAKISTAN BROKE AFGHAN WITHDRAWAL ACCORD

UNITED NATIONS, June 2 — The Soviet Union has removed 10,000 soldiers from Afghanistan since it began its withdrawal May 15 and shows no sign of slowing the pace despite its threats to do so, according to United Nations officials monitoring the pull-out.

At his summit talks with President Reagan this week, the Soviet leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev accused Pakistan of violating the terms of the accord under which Moscow agreed to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan. Soviet officials said they might slow the withdrawal in retaliation for these violations of the pact, which was reached in Geneva in April.

The Soviet Union and the Afghan Government of President Najibullah have accused Pakistan of allowing guerrillas fighting the Kabul Government to cross into Afghanistan with their military supplies. They also said Pakistan allowed the guerrillas to keep training camps on its territory. *

Under Secretary General Diego Cordovez, the United Nations mediator for the Afghan withdrawal accord, reviewed the working of the agreement with officials from Pakistan and Afghanistan at a secret meeting last week in Geneva. At these talks, the Pakistani representative, Abdul Sattar, a senior Foreign Ministry official, denied claims by Moscow and Kabul that Pakistan had violated the agreement by continuing to aid the guerrillas.

Mr. Cordovez said at the Geneva meeting that the 50 United Nations military observers in Kabul and Islamabad, the capital of Pakistan, would investigate the Afghan and Soviet complaints.

DIPLOMATS SAY REBEL PUSH IS DELAYING SOVIET PULLOUT

By Denholm Barnetson
United Press International

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan — Intense fighting between Afghan rebels and government forces apparently has forced Moscow to postpone a withdrawal of its troops from Afghanistan's second-largest city, Western diplomats said yesterday.

They also said the U.S.-backed guerrillas had captured a district capital on the main highway southwest of Kabul and were continuing to battle Afghan troops in a nearby city from which the Soviets had withdrawn.

On May 15, Moscow began the withdrawal of an estimated 115,000 soldiers from its landlocked southern neighbor, which it invaded in December 1979 to support a communist government wracked by internal feuds and under threat from Muslim guerrillas.

Many diplomats and analysts predict that the Soviet withdrawal, under an accord reached in Geneva, will lead to the eventual overthrow of the government of President Najibullah by the guerrillas, most of whom are based in Pakistan and

Mr. Cordovez also urged the parties to the Geneva agreement to keep any future complaints confidential to avoid the appearance that the accord might be unraveling.

If the Soviet Union maintains its current withdrawal rate of roughly 20,000 soldiers a month, United Nations officials said, it will have removed some 60,000 troops by Aug. 15, or slightly more than half the 100,300 soldiers it has told the United Nations it had stationed in Afghanistan.

The Soviet Union promised in the Geneva accord to remove at least half its troops within three months of starting the withdrawal and to pull out the rest during the following nine months.

United Nations officials said the guerrillas have made a few attacks on the retreating Soviet forces.

Mr. Cordovez, who is due to become Foreign Minister of his native Ecuador this summer, plans to continue to oversee the withdrawal agreement he helped negotiate and to assist in helping form a coalition government in Afghanistan.

United Nations officials said the violations claimed by Kabul might have occurred by accident because the Geneva agreement was completed later than expected.

The Soviet Union initially wanted to sign a withdrawal agreement by March 15. That would have given the guerrillas two months to move their camps and supply dumps back into regions of Afghanistan under their control before the Soviet withdrawal began and Pakistan was obliged to stop helping them.

But the Geneva negotiations dragged on an extra month and the withdrawal

backed by the United States, China and Iran.

The diplomats reported heavy fighting in Kandahar, 280 miles southwest of Kabul and Afghanistan's second-largest city, and said Afghan troops had pulled back from the outer two defense perimeters and taken up positions on the rim of the city.

One diplomat quoted a medical source as saying the fighting had caused "very high" casualties among Afghan troops, with the bodies of 60 soldiers reaching Kabul from Kandahar in one three-day period alone late last month.

Diplomats and analysts have predicted that Kandahar, scene of a seesaw battle for control since last year, might be the first city to fall to the resistance, which has yet to capture a major urban center.

The diplomats said *mujaheddin* guerrillas also were massing on the outskirts of Jalalabad, 70 miles east of Kabul near the Pakistani border and from where the Soviets began their withdrawal last month.

Diplomats have rejected Soviet claims that they have completely

agreement was finally signed on April 14, just a month before Moscow began to evacuate its troops. That left the guerrillas less time to move back into Afghanistan.

Pakistan has denied it allowed the guerrillas to maintain training camps on its territory, saying all its Afghan camps were used by refugees from the eight-year-old civil war.

Some Western diplomats and other political specialists warn that the recent dismissal of Pakistan's civilian government by President Mohammad Zia ul-Haq could lead to further differences with Kabul and Moscow over the Geneva accord.

President Zia, a former army general who is supported by the Pakistani military, is believed to favor an outright victory by the largely fundamentalist Islamic guerrillas, rather than a political compromise.

In the past, diplomats and other specialists said, the civilian government restrained President Zia and the military, urging them to respect the letter of the Geneva accord. But now, these experts said, the President and his military backers may feel freer to work for a guerrilla victory, even if this involves bending the agreement.

Against this background, Mr. Cordovez plans to visit Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran at the end of this month to work on forming a broad-based coalition government and ending the fighting between the guerrillas and supporters of the Najibullah Government, according to diplomats and United Nations officials.

Mr. Cordovez is said to believe that by then, with the Soviet withdrawal well under way, leaders of Afghanistan's various political factions may be willing to compromise.

NYT 6/3

withdrawn from Jalalabad, and resistance sources say that several hundred Soviet troops remain in the city in case of a guerrilla assault.

According to the diplomats, the Soviets have completed their withdrawal from Ghazni, capital of Ghazni province, 70 miles southwest of Kabul.

They reported heavy fighting between the guerrillas and Afghan forces in and around the city, with the resistance capturing several Afghan military posts on the outskirts.

At the United Nations yesterday, Najibullah accused Pakistan of violating the Geneva accords and said Afghanistan reserved the right to react "in a manner warranted by the situation."

"To our deep regret and contrary to the provisions of the accords," he said, "Pakistan is training of the extremist Afghan opposition still exist on the territory of Pakistan," he told a General Assembly special session on disarmament.

He said Pakistan was helping to transport arms to Afghan rebels so they could commit "subversive and terrorist activities."

AFGHANGATE?

Meanwhile, in the United States, a teacher charged with illegally shipping guns to Pakistan, allegedly for Afghan rebels, may use classified documents to show that the United States Government encouraged his activities, a Federal appeals court ruled on Wednesday.

The Ninth US Circuit Court of Appeals ruled two-to-one that Eugene Ray Clegg, a high school teacher from Kelso, Washington, could assert the defense that several US army officers and other Government officials were aware of his arms smuggling and offered him help.

The court also said certain classified documents, provided by the Government, could be used.

Clegg, arrested in 1982, was charged with arranging four illegal shipments of guns during the previous year from Washington to Pakistan, where he was then teaching in an American school. He said the guns were intended for Afghan rebels fighting Soviet troops.

In his defense, Clegg said the US army's second in command in Pakistan, identified as Lieutenant-Colonel Durham, had told him the US Government was supplying arms to Afghan rebels, offered to put him in touch with the rebels, helped him plan a large secret arms shipment that never took place, and once supplied him with arms for resale to the rebels.

Associated Press

SCMP 5/20

Afghan flood toll higher

ISLAMABAD: Floods in northern Afghanistan have killed about 350 people, 10 times more than a government figure, an Afghan exile news service said yesterday.

Afghanistan's official Bakhtar news agency last week reported that flooding at the village of Rabotak, near the Soviet border, had killed at least 35 people.

But the Afghan Islamic Press (AIP) said the floods on April 30 had killed 200 people at Deena Ghauri in the adjoining Baghlan province and 150 at Rabotak.

SCMP 5/13

June 8, 1988 The Philadelphia Inquirer

Afghans indifferent to politics, want only peace

By Helen Wornack, *Reuters*

KABUL: Ordinary Afghans exhausted by war seem to care little who rules the country after the withdrawal of Soviet troops — as long as they have peace.

"After nine years of war my hair has turned white," said Nabi, a Lapis Lazuli merchant, summing up the weariness of people in the Afghan capital.

He shared the seemingly widespread delight that Soviet forces would start leaving Afghanistan on May 15 under an accord concluded in Geneva earlier this month.

"I don't care what government we have as long as it is

rebels fulfil their vow to overthrow the Soviet-backed government of President Najibullah.

Some analysts believe protracted fighting would effectively partition the country, with the rebels in command in the south and Mr Najibullah, backed by Soviet advisers and aid, remaining in power in Kabul and the northern areas.

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Despite the animosity towards the Soviet Union, a visitor from Moscow discovers that Afghanistan under Mr Najibullah seems in many ways like a southern Soviet republic.

Mr Najibullah has adopted many features of Soviet life — a Red Square-style revolution parade, television evening news modelled on the Soviet programme Vremya and even traffic police boxes like those of the Soviet state inspectorate.

Afghans say Russian is now taught in all schools — even in

the old Anglo-American School — and is required to build a good career.

But at the same time Moslem believers — almost all the Afghan population — remain unconvinced by Mr Najibullah's policy of national reconciliation and his gestures towards Islam, including his allowing pilgrims to go to Mecca this year. Moslem sources say.

Previously pilgrims had to give the documents of their houses to the state when they went on the "Haj" as a guarantee that they would return.

HK Standard 5/1

Soviet advisers to stay, weapons to go: Najib

KABUL, April 28: Dr. Najibullah, leader of the Kabul regime said here Thursday that Soviet soldiers would not leave behind their weapons for use by Afghan forces when they begin their phased withdrawal on May 15. Soviet-established military installations would, however, continue to be used by Afghan armed forces, he said.

Addressing a Press conference he said Soviet military advisers

would also remain in Afghanistan. "It is not our desire to stop our close military cooperation (with Moscow)," he said.

He said he was confident that implementation of the Accord guaranteed by the United States and the Soviet Union, would ensure peace to his war-torn country and lead to a halt in fighting which has left a million Afghans dead.

Mr. Najibullah said his People's Democratic Party and Government were ready to negotiate with the seven-party Afghan Resistance alliance "anywhere, any place" and he asked the Mujahideen leadership to reciprocate.

HK Standard 4/29

Paratroopers see another foreign mission through

FROM Austria at the end of World War II to Kabul nearly 40 years later, the 103rd Soviet Paratroop Division is proud of its foreign missions. It has even made a museum in Kabul about the men who will be leaving "25,000 enemy dead" behind them.

A map has been painted on a wall in the small museum at the barracks of the division's general staff at the end of a runway at Kabul airport. It has three arrows on it, each leaving the Soviet Union and three dates: 1945, Austria, 1968, Czechoslovakia, and 1979, Afghanistan.

Division commander Colonel Nikolai Porokonenko, jovial in his camouflaged battle fatigues, has carefully prepared his guided tour for foreign correspondents based in Moscow.

"We have carried out our task of solidarity in Afghanistan. We have taught the Afghan Army to fight on its own and now we can leave," he said.

After a first room full of souvenirs of the paratroopers' various operations, the visitor finds one celebrating "co-operation between the Afghan and Russian armies".

Down the corridor, a row of photographs of mutilated bodies overlooks a display of daggers, mines and ancient guns — arms seized from the

enemy. Another room pays tribute to the "victims of this undeclared war".

A board proclaims that the 103rd Paratroopers have "killed 25,000 enemies" during their nine years in Afghanistan.

The last room is devoted to the division's heroes, some of them still alive, most not. Each photograph is accompanied by a personal object, a watch, a torch, a penknife, a pistol holster and a metal canteen containing a handful of soil from which they were born.

Colonel Porokonenko's aide, Lieutenant-Colonel Ivan Ivanovich, who has been in Afghanistan for a year, apparently shares the commander's assurance about the future of the country.

"The Geneva accords will be implemented, the war will come to an end, the refugees will come back," he predicts.

Next is a heroes' row, adorned with portraits of some of those killed in combat, which leads to the occupied part of the barracks. In each corridor a guard, a knife at his belt, stands besides a field telephone.

The dormitories were empty during the visit, but pictures of Lenin and Krenin leader Mikhail Gorbachev are there to watch over sleeping soldiers at night. In a

nearby room, posters illustrate the military way of ironing shirts or cutting hair with the equipment left behind.

The mess offers chess, cards and Moscow newspapers flown in on the day of publication. The walls are covered with Communist Party slogans.

Outside, benches have been installed and bushes planted. The shelters behind each hut have been decorated with very garish, imitation pebbledash designs drawn in chalk.

A few soldiers in combat gear are on hand to talk to the visiting press. Some of them belong to a mine disposal team which uses dogs.

Throughout the visit, the racket of the helicopter gunships that escort the transport planes in from the Soviet Union every day never stops.

Colonel Porokonenko's paratroopers, a symbol of "co-operation between the two armies", have trained Afghan soldiers in hand-to-hand combat.

In his eyes, the Afghan Army is now "capable of defending itself".

He refuses to conceive of a victory for the Mujahideen rebels of the Islamic Alliance, though he no longer refers to them as *dushman* — bandits.

Agence France Press

Mr. Najibullah said Afghanistan wanted to live as an "independent non-aligned country, a friend of the Soviet Union and all neighbours and nations of the world".

The Afghan leader ruled out an early release of French journalist Alain Duval, serving a 10-year prison sentence for alleged espionage.

A large number of foreign journalists are in the Afghan capital ahead of the Soviet pull-out.

An explosion took place in Kabul Wednesday killing several people as the Kabul regime was celebrating the 10th anniversary of the April 27 communist coup.

Soviet officers in Afghanistan said Thursday their troops had started drawing back from areas around the Pakistani border to create a corridor for returning Afghan refugees.

An officer from the Ukraine, who asked not to be identified, told Reuters he was shopping in central Kabul that Soviet outposts had been dismantled in preparation for the withdrawal of the first Soviet troop contingent from Afghanistan on May 15.

He declined to say exactly which areas Soviet forces had already abandoned but said the idea was to create a corridor for the refugees running north from the border.

Well-informed Soviet sources said the military were anxious to avoid any clashes between their men and large numbers of refugees.

In Moscow, the Soviet news agency Tass reported that Afghan Foreign Minister Abdul Wakil had written to U.N. Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar saying Kabul was ready to create a demilitarized zone along the border with Pakistan.

Afghan guerrillas said earlier they had taken control of a garrison and two border towns of Aghsar and Maruf, after they were abandoned by Soviet-backed government troops.

In Kabul, Soviet soldiers are waiting to hear who will be the first to leave but, for security reasons the officers are keeping them in the dark about exact withdrawal plans.

A Soviet military adviser told Reuters the withdrawal would be in stages and troops in Kabul were likely to go last.

The Ukrainian officer, speaking with surprising openness as he bought jeans and running shoes for his son in Kabul's chicken street bazaar, said half of Moscow's forces were due to be out of Afghanistan by August.

He could have left more quickly in just the time it took to pack up and go — it had been guar-

anteed" said the Ukrainian officer.

"But in the circumstances, we need the nine-months to make a secure withdrawal" he said.

The Ukrainian officer said he thought it was very likely that the rebels "would try to attack Soviet troops as they left".

But he said he doubted they could completely grip the Salang tunnel going north to the Soviet border. This is the likely route of Soviet forces.

"We hope the United Nations can help us to withdraw smoothly" he said.

The Soviet Military adviser, who also talked in a relaxed way while doing his shopping, said he was due to go home this month but he would be replaced.

In Moscow, the communist Party newspaper Pravda said one route Soviet soldiers would take out of Afghanistan was the main road from Kandahar, north through Herat and into the Soviet border town of Kushka.

Pravda warned the Soviet soldiers that they may be attacked on the way home by "rebel groups" armed with anti-tank missiles.

The article was written by a Soviet Colonel who has been to the area.

"Soon the columns of our boys will go on their armored cars for the last time in the direction of Kushka," Pravda said. "I don't exclude that there will be mines, and clashes with 'separate bands' on the road by which they will be returning home" Colonel P. Studenkin wrote.

"I close my eyes and once again I see that road and I want to say to those who will take it on their way home — boys be careful," he wrote.

"We are waiting for you."

He said the road was some 750 km (450 miles) long. It is a main artery from the Afghan border with Pakistan north into the Soviet Union.

AFP/Reuters

The Muslim 4/29

Propaganda, Rumor Fuel Intrigue in Jittery Kabul

By RONE TEMPEST, Times Staff Writer

KABUL, Afghanistan—There's a tense little drama being played in the streets of this Central Asian capital these days, and here are some of the main characters and props.

The Trojan, also known as the lonely American. He's clever, provocative, fluent in Russian and Persian. He honed his political skills in the campus elections at USC.

The Fat Russian: He's probably KGB, has a loud, crude laugh and moves in the shadows but dares to no one. But two bodyguards are at his side day and night.

The Ox. He's dark, broad-shouldered Afghan leader, former commander of the dreaded Afghan secret police. But he speaks Persian "sweetly, like a Sufi poet."

—The Bactrian gold: A priceless, breathtaking, 2,000-year-old collection of jewelry and tokens unearthed by Soviet archeologists in 1926 but not publicly seen in Kabul for two years now. It is rumored to have been hidden in the palace of the former khan or spirited away to safety in the Soviet Union.

The Trojan. The Fat Russian. The Ox. The gold. The ingredients for an overwritten spy script?

Welcome to overwrought, over-anxious Kabul, Afghanistan, May, 1988.

The withdrawal of the more than 100,000 Soviet troops from Afghanistan that began May 15 has this city spooked. Kabul, never a stranger to intrigue anyway, is a war zone of propaganda and rumor spread from both East and West.

At the center of the propaganda war is uncertainty about the precarious future of the Soviet-backed Afghan government after all the Soviet troops are gone.

Serious fighting between government troops and the U.S.-backed *mujahideen* rebels is still miles away. Kabul will be the last place that Soviet troops leave when their nine-month withdrawal timetable expires next February.

"The city has been fortified with new concrete bunkers. Elite Afghan commando units in camouflage uniforms are now on city streets. Such solid protection makes a siege by the *mujahideen* a difficult and bloody prospect."

Therefore, U.S. officials are hoping that the Afghan regime will unravel from the inside and remove the necessity of a set-piece battle. The Soviets, of course, want the regime to stand tough.

So the name of the game in Kabul played with equal intensity in the ancient bazaars and the diplomatic cocktail circuit, is to either inflate or deflate the regime's confidence. It is a game that produces some surprising exchanges between the big players, the Soviet Union and the United States.

Americans, both here and in Washington, have publicly opined that the regime is doomed, not likely to last more than a few months after the majority of the

Soviet troops have left. Their opinions are so blatantly expressed that it all has the air of a strategy, a well-informed gamble, perhaps even a bluff.

Smell a Victory

"Our estimate is that the government could splinter and fall of its own weight even before the final Soviet pullout," Robert A. Peck, deputy assistant secretary of state, told a House subcommittee in February. "Once the Soviet protectors are gone, the regime will be unable to project power into the countryside, and its early demise will be inevitable."

Peck is one of a small group of bright, ambitious American diplomats who smell a victory for American policy in this mountainous land.

Other members of the "early demise" school include the U.S. ambassador to Pakistan, Arnold L. Raphael, 45, and the U.S. charge d'affaires here in Kabul, John Glassman, as well as several unnamed officials with the CIA, which has conducted an eight-year, \$2-billion program to supply weapons to the *mujahideen*.

The "early demise" school has its detractors, particularly in the Department of Defense and other Western embassies.

The policy pivots on the early fall of Kabul. It is a clear, short-term objective.

'Vietnam Lesson'

"We want to teach the Russians their Vietnam lesson and get out," said one adherent of that thinking.

The main American in the front-line is Glassman, 44, a Russian-speaking Californian with previous postings in Cuba and Mexico and special assignments in El Salvador and other countries. Tall, balding, given to speaking in staccato bursts, he is the ranking U.S. diplomat here.

Compared to previous envoys here, he has been an especially provocative figure.

"John starts things up," said another Western diplomat. "That's why they brought him in."

Glassman has a graduate degree from Columbia University. But he says he learned all his political and diplomatic skills on the campus of USC, where some of his schoolmates include Dwight D. Chapin, Donald H. Segretti and Gordon C. Strachan, who all later figured in the Watergate scandal.

Within days of his arrival less than a year ago, Glassman had made a splash by getting himself briefly detained by Soviet soldiers when he protested their harassment of a British television crew.

Using his fluent Russian, he constantly needles Soviet and Russian-speaking East European diplomats on the lively Kabul cocktail circuit. He asks them, for example, how they plan to evacuate once the Afghan regime crumbles. He asks if they are worried that the Muslim *mujahideen* rebels will spread their *jihad* (holy war) into Muslim communities in the Soviet republics.

Meanwhile, a Polish adviser to the Afghan government said that his contact in the government has suddenly switched from speaking Russian to English. The same phenomenon was noted by an Austrian adviser.

Despite the bitter differences that exist here, Kabul has continued to enjoy a fairly open exchange between diplomats. In his relatively short time here, Glassman has opened it up even more. Shortly before Christmas, Soviet diplomats began appearing at American cocktail parties.

Initially warned that it was not safe to venture outside the U.S. embassy compound and the grounds of his residence, Glassman now can be seen striding down Chicken Street, the shopping avenue dating back to prewar high days, or chatting up security guards in Persian and Russian in front of the government ministries.

For its part, the large Soviet community—including diplomats, advisers, journalists and soldiers—has countered the American line by stressing the disunity and religious fundamentalism of the *mujahideen*.

In the streets and the universities, the Soviets and their friends concentrate on the female population. More than 80% of the students at Kabul University are women. Compared to the strict isolation of women found in the *mujahideen* communities and in the Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan, the women in Kabul are relatively free.

They are unveiled, wear Western clothes and hold jobs—all immune in the strict atmosphere of the refugee camps. If the Muslim Arabs capture Kabul, the women here are told—probably correctly—that their freedoms will be lost. As a result, they are among the strongest supporters of the regime.

"Because of the threat of the veil, women are naturally drawn to the government," said a diplomat from another Western country, who believes the Americans have underestimated the regime's staying power.

The Soviets and their allies hold their own in the acid repartee of the cocktail circuit.

A common rejoinder to cracks from Western diplomats about the instability of the Kabul regime is to compare some of the more fundamentalist Muslims of the *mujahideen* to the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in Iran.

"One of the more powerful and fundamentalist Afghan rebel leaders, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar of the Ittihad-i Islami (Islamic Party), goes in for special ridicule. As a student leader at Kabul University 20 years ago, Hekmatyar led a campaign to force women students to wear veils. His *mujahideen* group has been one of the principal recipients of CIA-supplied arms."

"If you liked Khomeini," the East Europeans tell the Westerners, "you'll love Hekmatyar."

Conflicts between the constantly feuding *mujahideen* organizations are also highlighted by the Soviets. In much the same way that American diplomats are counting on the Kabul regime to disintegrate, so the Soviets are betting that the rebels

will be at each other's throats before they can form a viable alternative government to the Soviet-backed regime of President Najibullah.

Unlike the Americans' scenario, the Soviets does not necessarily pivot on Kabul. Even if the rebels do manage to take Kabul, the Soviets appear to be preparing a fall-back position.

A hint of this possible strategy could be seen in the northern Afghanistan city of Mazar-i-Sharif this month. Western journalists were invited to the northern province to witness the withdrawal of the first units of Soviet troops.

However, at a luncheon hosted in their honor by a local businessman, they caught a glimpse of one of the more powerful men in Afghanistan, Viktor Polyanchko, in his early 50s, is a tall, strong but slightly heavyset man who wears safari-style leisure suits and travels with two very alert bodyguards.

"Some years from now, when this war is forgotten," a Soviet journalist based in Kabul told a Western reporter later, "will tell you about Viktor Polyanchko."

Of course, the suggestion was that he is director of the Soviet KGB in Afghanistan. A Soviet translator said he is the second-highest ranking official at the Soviet Embassy, although numerous Soviet officials, including Ghegov, is officially listed as the No. 2.

Two American reporters, in an apparently spontaneous gesture of *glasnost* by Sevruk, were invited to attend the private-room luncheon where Polyanchko, joking and laughing much, and the Soviet translator sat at a table with several senior Afghan officials.

Dropping an oblique hint that his Afghan host should provide liquor, Polyanchko first asked if this were a dry province. Then, when his host failed to take the hint, he noted that under the aegis of Soviet leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev, drinking was no longer an approved activity in the Soviet Union. Looking pointedly at the Afghan deputy foreign minister sitting across from him at the table he added:

"Of course, if the deputy foreign minister were to request alcohol, it would become a matter of protocol and we would have to drink."

Suddenly getting the point, one Afghan official, Farouk Karman, who happened to be seated next to him, who jumped up, banging his knees on the table, and ran outside to order liquor. Soon several bottles of vodka and two bottles of Crown Royal, a Canadian blended whiskey, arrived at the table and a round of Soviet-style toasts was made. Unlike other Soviet officials present, Polyanchko did not appear to be concerned about the withdrawal of Soviet troops. Rather, he appeared preoccupied with ensuring that the Soviet connections to the northern provinces would be intact.

Isolated on the other side of the Hindu Kush mountains from Kabul, geographically and ethnically tied to the Soviet Union, the northern provinces have been rumored as a place to which the Soviet-backed government could retreat if Kabul were to fall.

"Our age-old friendship shall continue after the Soviet soldiers, who have fulfilled their international duty, have gone," said Najibullah.

From the Editor:


We had hoped to revert to full-sized print in this issue. However, the "are they or aren't they" debate on the Soviet troop withdrawal, traditional Afghan factionalism & the reconstruction bandwagons provided lots of fodder for the press. A generous sampling is minimized on the following pages.

There is good/bad news & bad/good news. The good/bad news is that the Kabul New Times is no longer "New." Since April the masthead has read The Kabul Times, just as in the old days. The bad/good news is that the ROA Mission's copier broke down so that this issue lacks examples of the "un-new" prose. The daily is now issued by the Alberuni Publishing Company. M. Seddiq Rahpoe is still the Editor.

A reminder: we print what has been reported on Afghanistan; we don't necessarily believe all of it. The reader must distinguish fact from fiction.

Thanks to everyone who sent us items; please keep it up. Let us know what you're doing, what you've seen or heard. Abstracts, book, film & restaurant reviews are welcomed, too.

The deadline for the next issue is 8/15.



EVENTS

"The Afghan Folio: The Photographs of Luke Powell" is on exhibit at The Asia Society, 725 Park Avenue, New York City, through 9/11. (Closed Mondays.)

The Sub-Committee on the Status of Women of the Special Committee of Int'l NGOs on Human Rights will hold an int'l conference on refugee women in Geneva, Switzerland from 11/14-18. The sessions will focus on protection, health, cultural adjustment, employment/development & education.

A symposium on the Regional & Global implications of the Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan will take place on 8/18 at the Australian Nat'l University in Canberra. Amin Saikal organized the conference & presumably will edit the book to be published of the conference papers.

"Herat, City of Art & History, Victim of Conflict" was the theme of an int'l conference held in Paris on 5/3. Sponsored by AFRANE & CEREDAF, the meeting's speakers included Sayed Qassem Reshtia, A.H. Tabibi, Mike Barry, John Baily, Massoud Saljouqi, Olivier Roy, Homayoun Tandar & Allahuiddin Khan. The French Ministry of Culture announced its official decision to hold a large exhibition on Herat at the Musee de l'Homme in Paris in 1990.

Afghanistan was included on the agenda of the 4th annual conference of the Center for Strategic & Int'l Studies. The session took place in Washington, DC, on 6/13.



bulah Masr, the deputy prime minister for the northern provinces, in his toast.

For the Afghan regime itself, the chore of building confidence in the post-Soviet period falls on the broad shoulders of one man. Nicknamed "the Ox" because of his imposing size—perhaps 6-feet-2 and nearly 300 pounds—President Najibullah appears slow to Westerners.

But to the Afghans, he apparently gives a more positive impression. Ethnically, Najibullah, 41, is a Pushtun, a member of the majority population from the southern half of the country where most of the fighting has taken place.

Pushtuns admire size and physical strength. Unlike his predecessor, the mercenary and more effete Habrak Karmal, Najibullah appears to demonstrate some of the graces and complicated subtleties of the Afghan Islamic society.

He has attempted to inculcate the aura of Islam in his government. He quotes authoritatively from the Koran. Unlike the secular Karmal, he attends Friday prayers.

In press conferences, he has unblinkingly fielded questions about the ability of his regime to survive after the Soviets are gone.

At times when another politician might get angry, Najibullah plods steadily ahead. One questioner from Norway asked Najibullah what he thought his chances of survival were, given the fact that three of the previous four Afghan presidents were assassinated and one was in forced exile.

"I am an optimist," he replied, smiling.

"Every day he remains in power after the Soviet withdrawal beginning May 15," one Western diplomat warned, "he gets stronger."

His background as the former commander of the notorious, East German-trained secret police, *khad*, still arouses suspicion.

"It was not for that, the people would love him," said Abdul Ahmad Javed, a former president of Kabul University who is now a professor of Persian language.

"He speaks very nicely sweetly," said Javed, who remained at the university even after many of his colleagues, including some who later became leaders of *moujahedeen* groups, left to protest the Soviet invasion. "He uses beautiful, flowery expressions in *dari*," the Afghan dialect of Persian.

Despite his flowery Persian and his impressive build, Najibullah is also the personification of the regime—and its fall-guy. If one is needed, like others before him—Nguyen Van Thieu in South Vietnam, Ferdinand E. Marcos in the Philippines and Anastasio Somoza in Nicaragua—he has been accused of amassing great wealth in the two years he has served as the Soviet-backed Afghan leader.

The latest story haunting his government involves the fabulous Bactrian gold collection dug up by Soviet archeologists in Sherbagan in 1978.

The collection of 20,000 pieces, ranging from delicately crafted crowns to solid gold bowls, is from the Kushan Dynasty of around 100 BC, centered near the Amu Darya River.

After it was discovered and catalogued, the treasure was displayed to great international acclaim in the National Museum in Kabul. Two years ago, however, the collection was packed up. No Westerner has seen it since. The prestigious French newspaper *Le Monde* recently reported that it had been taken from the country. The government denies that the gold has left Afghanistan.

In the supercharged atmosphere of rumor and plot, intrigue and propaganda that dominates this nervous capital, this affair naturally became the object of delighted speculation among the Western diplomats. One even suggested the plot of a future book.

"The fabulous Bactrian gold is hidden in the basement of the palace of the former khan where the president has put it to pay for his escape," the diplomat suggested mischievously. "When the Soviet regime begins to disintegrate, the guards abandon their posts."

"But several men, Western diplomats perhaps, have been waiting outside. They rush into the vaults and grab armloads of the fabulous gold."

Los Angeles Times

May 31, 1983

Kabul's Critical Situation

The Afghanistan war has transformed the capital, Kabul, into an island which is fully dependent on some foreign countries for its food supply and where rumors are always rife about the critical situation in the city. The latest picture of the real condition in Kabul was depicted by a prominent citizen of Kabul who did not want to be identified.

Describing the life in Kabul, he disclosed that inflation has shaken the people's life as consumer prices soar up. He said that a truck load of newly printed currency notes arrive in Kabul from the Soviet Union everyday. These notes are being used to pay the services of those working for the communist bureaucracy and the soldiers fighting along with the Red Army troops against the

Mujahideen insurgents. Thus, those who are loyal to the Soviet Union get protection against the pinch of inflation, whereas, the ordinary citizens are paying the heavy price of the Soviet incursion into their country.

People from the Muslim areas of the USSR are also being brought to Kabul in large number and being accommodated in the commercial and political life of Kabul. He estimated that nearly 100 people of this category have been appointed to senior posts in the government. Seven thousand Soviet citizens who have disguised themselves as Afghans have control of the business sector in Kabul.

Afghans ready to quit Kabul

Kabul: At the Breshnev Market, a warren of low hovels in central Kabul where Soviet spare parts and machinery are sold, an Afghan merchant said he's leaving the city now that Soviet troops are quitting Afghanistan.

Asked how he would make a living back home in western Afghanistan after a decade of dealing in Soviet hardware, he shrugged.

"We made our money in other ways before the Soviets came," he said. "And we will make it in other ways when they leave."

Many Afghans are thinking about the future now as the Soviets prepare to pull out their 15,000 troops within the next year.

Few of the merchants, farmers, students and government workers having their time in the relatively safe confines of Kabul seem to hold out much hope for the future. Many are looking back to the Soviet-backed Kabul Government.

But an equally small number expect a unified opposition to emerge and take the place of the ruling People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan.

The Mujahideen guerrillas based in Pakistan and the Afghan countryside have vowed to continue their armed struggle against the Kabul Government, though Najib has expressed hopes of forming some kind of new, "interim" administration with their participation.

Most people seem to be thinking about their own lives, rather than politics. Many are looking forward to the day when they can leave Kabul and return to homes in the countryside they abandoned because of the war.

Mohammed Masum, an interpreter for the ruling Party's Committee for Peace, Solidarity and Friendship, estimates that fewer than 20 percent of Afghans are concerned with politics.

He says that even he, a member of Najib's party for the past six months, is ready to cope with whatever political situation takes shape.

"I just want to go to my home as soon as they will let me," he said.

He and his wife fled their village outside Kabul during the early days of the civil war, following the 1978 revolution that brought a socialist government to power.

"I'm not afraid of either side," said Masum. "Now, I interpret for the Government. Maybe later, I will interpret for someone else."

Mohammad Mir, an antique dealer who parks his blue Mercedes outside a cluttered shop on Chicken Street, says he would like to see a re-

turn to Afghanistan by King Mohammed Zahir Shah, who was deposed in 1973.

As he spoke, three Soviets patrolling AK-47 assault rifles peered at the shopping street outside, exuding an awkward mix of authority and discomfort.

The effects of Soviet occupation and socialist government are barely visible in this primitive and impoverished capital, where the brown current of the Kabul River serves as a water source, wash basin and toilet for many residents.

On the dusty streets amid the low mud huts where Kabul's two million residents live, women in full-length silks veils hunch down to sort onions, carrots and greens for sale at their market stalls.

Crowds of shoppers and traders through the narrow walkways lined with open troughs carrying waste water. The smell of the river mingles with the exotic scents of spice shops.

Rocket fire occasionally reaches the capital from surrounding mountains held by the rebels, and car bombs like the one that killed six passers-by on Wednesday have become more frequent.

Western diplomats based in Kabul say the explosions indicate the rebel forces remain active despite the planned Soviet pullout, and will likely try to take Kabul once Najib's troops are left on their own.

But many Afghans say they are tired of war.

"I think if there was a true coalition government, including the king, we would all be happy," said Masum.

Afghans were poor and restless under the monarchy, but some now suggest they didn't know that change would bring only more turmoil.

There were battles and fractious tribes in the past, but the fighting was over issues like land and water — instead of an ideological struggle and foreign involvement that has split Afghanistan for a decade.



SCMP 5/4

Mitchell
The Australian (Sydney)
Cartoonists & Visual Editors

16 Months in Jail And the Story Of a Father's Lie

By SAM ROBERTS

Now, for the first time, Saleh Rohany's two young daughters will learn the truth about why their father suddenly left home in 1986.

He has told them repeatedly ever since that he left their Queens apartment to go to Afghanistan to fight the Russians. His daughters, then 8 and 10 years old, believed him. After all, the Russians had killed their grandmother — Mr. Rohany's mother — and their 3½-year-old sister during the invasion that drove the family into Pakistan.

In fact, however, Mr. Rohany was never farther away than update New York.

He was in prison, serving a 2½- to 7-year term, for a crime he insisted he had not committed. Last November, after 16 months, a state appeals court reversed his conviction.

Friends and customers of Mr. Rohany's first clothing and jewelry store on Broadway in Astoria assumed, however, that his guilt had been affirmed, but that he had gotten early parole. Now he wants them to know what really happened, even if it means his daughters will finally find out the truth, too.

"This was my first lie all my life," he said.

Mr. Rohany, who is 43 years old, was a provincial agricultural official before seeking refuge here. In a city of immigrants, he was prosecuted, in part, because he was unfamiliar with his adopted country's legal system or language. He was, his lawyer says, the victim of a skeptical insurance company that understood the system better than he did and, perhaps, of the Queens District Attorney's failure to exercise sufficient discretion.

He was, his lawyer insists, the victim of a skeptical insurance company.

After working for an importer, Mr. Rohany opened his own store. On Oct. 1, 1984, he rented a second store on a busier block of Hillside Avenue in Jamaica. Two months later, he arrived to find that the new store had burned down. More than 7,000 items, worth an estimated \$75,000, were destroyed.

"I talk to insurance broker," Mr. Rohany said. "He says, 'Rohany, don't worry.'"

But he worried when the insurance company wouldn't pay. He later told the police in desperation, "God is my insurance" — which prosecutors later construed as a ploy to imply that he had no other insurance. On April 30, 1985, he was arrested for arson, reckless endangerment, insurance fraud, falsifying business records and attempted grand larceny.

"I am thinking, why arrest me? I have lost my business," Mr. Rohany said.

"We reviewed the facts, presented them to a grand jury, they brought an indictment, and the judge found sufficient evidence to proceed," said Gary S. Fidel, an assistant prosecutor who handled the case on appeal.

For two months, Mr. Rohany couldn't make bail but pleaded with his wife, as he did again during his imprisonment, not to go on welfare. For a brief period, she had no choice. "This is a shame for me," he said.

At the trial, prosecution witnesses doubted that the large inventory that Mr. Rohany claimed was there could have so little residue after a fire. The prosecutor said Mr. Rohany "came over from a foreign country" and "got greedy." He was convicted. The judge dismissed the arson and reckless endangerment charges for insufficient evidence, but upheld the other charges.

Mr. Rohany's probation report described him, in part, as "a basically law-abiding person, concerned for his family, who may have been 'in over his head' when it came to running

a business. He appears to have been very shaken up by his arrest and the subsequent legal proceedings, and it is very likely that they will serve as deterrents from any further legal involvement."

He was imprisoned; both sides appealed the split decision.

Irma B. Ascher, senior supervising attorney of the Legal Aid Society's Criminal Appeals Bureau, argued his case before the Appellate Division last Nov. 19. Within two weeks, the court ruled that prosecutors "never directly connected the defendant with the fire itself or with the means to start it." The court added, "Nor were they able to establish a cause of the fire." Mr. Rohany was released, his faith in the system restored by a committed lawyer.

"This is the best justice," he said. "This is the best justice. I don't want to blame the District Attorney, because this is his job. Everybody makes a mistake. I just don't want to talk about this one." However, he is still suing the insurance company and the state.

Once the Russians leave Afghanistan, he hopes to return to help his countrymen. Meanwhile, he said, "I want to tell my daughters about justice." He hopes they'll understand.

His cramped store on Broadway bears only one hint of his encounter with the American justice system. Mr. Rohany has prominently posted a "No Smoking" sign. This time, he has no fire insurance. "I'm afraid to," he said.

NYT 6/23

By JOHN KIFNER

Special to The New York Times

From Trauma of War, A New Afghan Society?

An important unknown factor is the effect on Afghan society of more than eight years of war. During the war, people from isolated mountain valleys joined together to fight the Soviet troops and their Afghan Government allies, or trekked through strange territory, as five million Afghans have, to become refugees.

Some experts on Afghanistan contend that the experience will break down traditional ways and divisions, noting in particular that several of the guerrilla commanders in the field have emerged as leaders through a kind of meritocracy rather than through family ties, the traditional route to authority.

"The experience of war and exile holds the makings of a real Afghanistan for the first time," argues G. Whitney Azoy, a Fulbright scholar winding up a tour here and the author of a book on *buzkashi*, the Afghan national sport, in which horsemen vie to pick up the headless body of a calf and drop it in a goal zone.

"Out of this trauma, there is a new sense of nationalism, of common experience, common cause, exposure to outside world," Dr. Azoy said. "There's a whole generation of folks in their 30's running organizations in Afghanistan who have grown up with a new sense of national identity."

United They Stand: New Leaders Emerge

The increasing power of the field commanders is bringing into prominence men like Ismail Khan, the commander of the Herat area; the west's Abdul Haq, the commander for the region around Kabul, who is said to have built an underground network in the capital, and Ahmad Shah Massoud, who leads a loose alliance of commanders in seven northeastern provinces. Mr. Khan and Mr. Haq belong to a more moderate fundamentalist faction led by Yunis Khalis, which split from

Mr. Hehmatyar's group. Mr. Massoud belongs to the fundamentalist Islamic Society, led by a religious scholar, Burhanuddin Rabbani.

Last July, in a remote area of Ghor Province, Mr. Khan was chairman at a meeting of several hundred commanders from the western provinces, according to diplomats. A communiqué issued by the group called for improved military coordination and political unity while criticizing the Peshawar-based leaders for failing to work together.

Mr. Massoud is perhaps the most highly regarded of the commanders because of his innovative organization and because he has defeated Soviet troops in his area. He has built an administrative structure in his territory, financing it by imposing taxes on lapis lazuli mines, and has established military schools to train uniformed troops who can be sent to other areas. He bans smoking at his training camps, a sharp break with tradition in a country where men smoke heavily.

The Rebel Alliance: Disenchantment Grows

The rebel alliance in Peshawar is to a large extent the creation of the Pakistani military intelligence service, which channels American arms and other aid to the guerrillas. The Pakistanis require refugees to register with one of the seven parties before they are given aid.

In addition to the three fundamentalist parties, there is one other fundamentalist group, funded by Saudi Arabia, and three other parties loosely defined as Islamic traditionalist groups. These groups are made up of Sunni Moslems, members of the majority faith. There are also some Shiite Moslem guerrilla parties, mostly among the ethnic Shites known as Hazars in the center of the country; some of these groups are believed to receive weapons from the Shiite regime in Iran led by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Intellectuals, are open in their criticism of the seven main parties, saying the groups have formed an alliance in name only and are riddled with greed and corruption despite success in the field.

"The parties as fighting groups did the job, but in almost nine years of war, they have never succeeded in achieving unity," said Naim Majrooh, director of the Afghan Information Center. The center's founder, Bahaudin Majrooh, Mr. Majrooh's father, was gunned down in a vendetta that other groups say was carried out by Mr. Hehmatyar's party.

"The seven of them sitting in a room came up with the idea, cannot impose a government on the people of Afghanistan," Mr. Majrooh added.


"They're a fractious lot, with different philosophies, ideologies and goals, but partially like each other," said a Western diplomat who follows the groups closely.

A Fundamentalist Chief Who Inspires Fear

Mr. Hehmatyar inspires fear among many other rebel leaders. He has built his tightly disciplined, loyal group along Leninist lines, giving him an organizational advantage over the other parties.

He has been regarded as a particular favorite of the Pakistani intelligence services, and thus, by extension, is often thought to be sponsored by the Americans.

He came here 15 years ago when he was exiled for fundamentalist protests against the King at Kabul University. People who went to the university at the time say they remember Mr. Hehmatyar's followers throwing acid at women students who did not wear veils, and even shooting at the legs of



women who were wearing skirts rather than traditional garb. Mr. Hehmatyar did not, however, receive a traditional Afghan religious education. He formulated his messianic political views independently, somewhat along the lines of the Moslem Brotherhood, an underground organization in Egypt.

Mr. Hehmatyar has received large supplies of weapons, and his critics in other parties contend that instead of using them to fight the Soviet troops he has been hoarding them to gain a military edge over rival parties.

"Hehmatyar knows the real fight is still ahead," a Pakistani journalist said.

The prospect of the guerrilla alliance tearing itself apart in bloodshed has resulted in a certain lukewarm enthusiasm for the return of the King, particularly among the handful of more modern-thinking Afghans in exile in the West. The King is, however, fiercely opposed by Mr. Hehmatyar, among others, and is disliked by the Pakistanis.

"It shames me to admit it, for I demonstrated against him when I was a young man, but the King should come back," a prominent Afghan journalist said. "This alliance is no alliance. He is the only hope."

"In my opinion, Zahir Shah did not serve the Afghan people when he was King," said Lalomhammed. The guerrilla commander belongs to a traditionalist group, the National Islamic Front for Afghanistan, led by Sayed Ahmed Gailani.

"But in this time, he is necessary because of Gulbuddin," the commander said, referring to Mr. Hehmatyar. "I think if Zahir Shah came back, most of the people of Afghanistan would support him."

— NYT 6/12

Afghan resistance:

MODERATES LOOK TO EXTEND POWER BASE

THE STREETS of Alikheyl are littered with arms, some captured when the resistance seized the garrison two weeks ago and some brought in from Pakistan.

Unable to decide how to distribute them, commanders from the seven-party resistance alliance jealously guard piles of missiles and Kalashnikovs. A loud-speaker warns people to keep away from the weapons.

This is symptomatic of the problems of a resistance movement which counts amongst the best-equipped but least unified in history.

The very tenacity and independence of the Afghan guerrillas which ensured that the Soviet army could never defeat them, now threatens the future of the resistance alliance.

Reports come in daily of more posts falling to the resistance and Afghan troops defecting. Yet the last thing the resistance leaders seem ready for is victory. Even as the first Soviet troops left

Afghanistan, the fragile seven-party alliance was threatening to shatter.

An important date is June 15 when the term of the fundamentalist leader, Mr Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, as official spokesman of the alliance, comes to an end.

It is widely thought that he will refuse to hand the post over to the moderate Mr Pir Gailani, in which case a split between the three "moderate" and four "fundamentalist" parties is inevitable.

According to Mr Hamid Karzay, spokesman for the moderate Afghan National Liberation Front, a statement has already been prepared, announcing the party's defection. At issue is whether the new Afghanistan should be a fundamentalist Islamic republic as favoured by Mr Hekmatyar, or the traditional royalist state desired by the moderates.

Some moderates have long suspected the motives of Mr Hekmatyar, leader of the fundamentalist

Hezb-i-Islami.

Mr Karzay says no-one agrees with Mr Hekmatyar. "Until now we've said nothing because of the pressure put on us by Pakistan to keep the alliance together. But the time has come for us to speak out."

Two years ago Mr Hekmatyar was receiving 40 per cent of the US, Saudi and Chinese arms distributed by the Pakistan government, while ANLF received only 4 per cent. This largesse earned him many supporters, their allegiance often vanishing once they had crossed the border.

Now most of the arms have been shifted inside Afghanistan, to comply with the Geneva accord, Mr Hekmatyar's influence may be waning; his party

has few good field commanders, and in a country where ancestry is all-important, an increasing number of Afghans are asking of Mr Hekmatyar: "Who is his father?"

In the last nine years of fighting no unifying political leader has emerged. Disillusioned by both the personal ambitions and luxurious lifestyles of the Peshawar-based leaders, which contrast sharply with the often appalling conditions in the refugee camps, people are once more turning to their tribal leaders for guidance.

Meetings have been taking place both inside refugee camps and inside Afghanistan, some demanding a return of ex-king Zahir Shah, deposed in 1973.

Mr Karzay maintains that the king is not loved by the people but he is seen as the only person who can give them the security they so desperately need. Many commanders have joined in the call for the return of the king. A recent meeting of commanders and tribal elders from 11 provinces sent an influential tribal leader to discuss terms with Zahir Shah in Rome.

Royalist commanders are planning a Loi Jirga (a traditional Afghan decision-making forum comprising tribal elders, religious leaders, scholars and politicians) to be held in the royalist stronghold of Kandahar.

The seven-party group is more and more an alliance in name only. While Mr Hekmatyar holds press conferences in the name of the alliance to talk about an interim government, the three moderate parties say they reject the idea.

They feel that the formation of a government which has not been sanctioned by the majority of Afghans would amount to a division of the country, with one government in Kabul recognised by the Eastern bloc, and another in the south.

An unknown factor is how the Jamiat Party, which belongs in the fundamentalist camp but is considered more pragmatic than Mr Hekmatyar's group, would react to a split in the alliance.

Recently its leader, Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani, has adopted a markedly softer approach, saying he will not oppose the king militarily and sees no point in attacking the departing Soviet forces.

Christina Lamb in the Financial Times 6/4

ISLAMABAD: A moderate faction in the Afghan seven-party Mujahideen alliance says it will give rebel commanders a greater role when its leader takes over as head of the resistance on June 15.

The moderate National Islamic Front of Afghanistan (NIFA), led by Sayyed Ahmed Gailani - who becomes head of the Peshawar-based alliance in a routine rotation - believes it should acquire a popular base, ensured by opening up the door to the rebel commanders who have been doing the actual fighting for the past nine years.

"We must count on them for the future and seek their advice," a NIFA spokesman said, adding that Mr Gailani was ready to leave the alliance and join the guerrillas on the ground if his demands were not met.

The moderates acknowledge that the attainment of their goals largely depends on Pakistan, and especially President Zia ul-Haq, who backs the fundamentalist Hezb-i-Islami faction led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.

Mr Gailani recognises the uncertainties of his position and the influence wielded by Pakistan, which supports the rebels politically and materially.

General Zia gave Mr Gailani an apparently warm welcome at a reception in the Italian embassy in Islamabad, signalling "a certain understanding" between the two men, diplomatic sources said.

Mr Gailani's efforts to

give the rebel commanders more say would, however, depend on how much support they were ready to give him, observers said.

The moderates and the highest-ranking rebel commanders - including Ahmed Shah Massoud and Ismail Khan of Jamiat-i-Islami, Abdul Haq and Amin Wardak of the moderate Hezb-i-Islami faction led by Yunus Khales, and Mr Hekmatyar's fundamentalists - are divided on how or even if to take Kabul, on whether or not to attack Soviet troops pulling out of Afghanistan and on the formation of a provisional government in "liberated territory".

The idea of a government in "liberated territory", supported by Islamabad, has been rejected by the moderates.

An attack on Kabul is opposed by commanders but favoured by radical Pakistan-backed leaders.

Abdul Haq, the Hezb-i-Islami (Khales faction) leader of guerrilla operations in Kabul, says this would be the very last thing to do as "we must protect the population and not destroy the capital".

As for attacking Soviet troops, who began withdrawing on May 15, again there were divisions, observers said.

Commander Massoud, who last week took control of the entire Panjshir valley north of Kabul which opens out on to the strategic Salang highway, is reported to have agreed for the moment not to attack Soviet troops returning home, Western diplomats said. SCMP 6/9



Sayyed Ahmed Gailani

Soviet troops abused drugs, RAND reports

By Saul Rubin
STAFF WRITER

Soviet troops in Afghanistan suffered from widespread drug and alcohol abuse, diseases caused by poor hygiene, desertions and brutal infighting, according to a report released Monday by the Santa Monica-based RAND Corp.

These problems contributed greatly to the Soviet Union's decision to withdraw troops from Afghanistan after an unsuccessful, eight-year effort to defeat Afghan guerrilla forces, said the report's author, Alexander Alexiev.

The Soviet Army had all kinds of problems, exacerbated by the fact that this is a poor place that is not endowed with modern amenities," Alexiev said. "Low morale and motivation were two of the major reasons that the Soviet performance was lackluster, to say the least."

Alexiev based his findings on interviews with Afghan guerrilla leaders and 35 former Soviet servicemen who fought in Afghanistan, including prisoners of war and defectors.

The report, conducted for the U.S. Army, is the first detailed examination of Soviet armed forces in post-World War II combat that relies upon firsthand information, RAND officials said.

While Alexiev said that some observers draw comparisons between the Soviet Union's role in Afghanistan and U.S. involvement in Vietnam, he sees differences in the two wars.

The U.S. withdrawal was due more to political pressure at home, Alexiev said.

"In the Soviet case, what happened first was the realization that they could not win militarily," Alexiev said. "It was a difficult decision and a major reversal of Soviet policy. For the first time they have essentially admitted defeat."

The interviews conducted for the report revealed that more than 50 percent of the Soviet Army regularly used drugs, including hashish, heroin, opium and marijuana.

Most of the former soldiers said that drugs were popular because they were cheap and easily available, unlike vodka, the report states.

But one soldier indicated to RAND researchers how Russian troops showed great inventiveness in finding alcoholic substitutes.

Shoe polish and bread

"They also drank truck antifreeze, glue and brake fluid," a soldier says in the report. "They would also take shoe polish and

smear it on a piece of bread and leave it in the sun until the alcohol separates from the shoe polish."

Drug and alcohol abuse was so widespread in the army that it is likely to have a negative effect on Soviet society long after the troops withdrawal.

A lack of running water created a "dismal health situation" in many units, the report states, causing outbreaks of infectious diseases such as hepatitis, malaria and typhus to reach near epidemic proportions.

These poor conditions led to frequent desertions and "open and even organized insubordination."

In addition, the harsh treatment of first-year soldiers by their more experienced peers undermined discipline within units, the report said. Older soldiers frequently beat and robbed younger recruits and demanded menial tasks from them.

This treatment led to some suicides, the report states.

In addition, the authors say Soviet troops were guilty of officially sanctioned reprisals and brutal acts against civilian populations.

"We were struck by our own cruelty in Afghanistan," one soldier told RAND researchers. "We executed innocent peasants. If one of ours was killed or wounded, we would kill women, children, and old people as revenge. We killed everything, even the animals."

Despite the disease and abuses, the Soviets improved upon their combat abilities in Afghanistan before 1986. But the addition of anti-aircraft weapons to the guerrilla forces neutralized the Soviet's air superiority.

The Outlook 5/24

Secret Soviet Party Document Said to Admit Afghan Errors

By BILL KELLER
Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, June 16 — The leadership of the Soviet Communist Party has issued a secret circular admitting a series of errors and misjudgments leading to the Soviet military move into Afghanistan, according to people familiar with the document.

The circular, which was read aloud to party members, strongly implies but does not state explicitly that the original decision to send Soviet troops was wrong, according to the people who discussed it.

Although some Soviet journalists have argued that the 1979 decision to introduce troops was a mistake, Soviet officials have continued to defend the move in public.

The document reportedly sides with critics who say the Soviet leadership erred fundamentally in believing that a tribal, Islamic country like Afghanistan was ready to make the transition to socialism. . . .

What about Pakhtunistan?

NATIONAL frontiers are one thing, tribal loyalties quite another, in the wild mountain country where Pakistan and Afghanistan meet. The Pakistanis are pleased with the Afghan peace agreement that takes effect this Sunday and will send home the Russian troops across the border. They hope the 3 1/2 million Afghan refugees now on their side of it will start to go home too. They would also like to clear up the problem of the Pathans on both sides of the frontier.

The British, when they ran the area, constantly fought and admired the group of warlike tribes which call themselves Pashtun, or maybe Pakhtun. In the mid-eighteenth century these people had ruled an area stretching across the mountains and down to the Indus river, in a loose confederacy that they called Afghanistan. In 1893 the British, to frustrate the Russians, incorporated into the Indian empire the lands east of the Khyber pass. Thus they divided the Pathan tribes along a line named after Sir Mortimer Durand, who mapped it. The Pakistanis say this line was accepted by the tribesmen who joined their new state in 1947. The Afghans, who say the chiefs were bribed, have never acknowledged the Durand line as a frontier.

Pathans are Afghanistan's largest ethnic group, forming almost half of its (prevailing) population of 15m. There are even more of them in Pakistan, and neither lot pays much attention to the border. Sporadically they claim self-determination within their own Pakhtunistan. When the Afghans want to upset the Pakistanis, they encourage this Pathan claim. The communist government in Kabul did so most recently in 1975, summoning tribal chiefs in both countries to call for Pathan unity under Afghan sovereignty. (For good measure it also encouraged Pakistan's Baluch separatists.)

The Pakistanis play dirty tricks in return. Already in the mid-1970s, they were backing the Russian invasion, they were backing Afghan guerrillas, starting the political careers of Mr Gulbuddin Hekmatyar,

now spokesman for the fragile Afghan resistance coalition, and Mr Ahmad Shah Massoud, a renowned guerrilla commander. The Pakistanis tend to favour the Islamic fundamentalist resistance factions over the pro-western traditionalists, mainly because they reject the idea of Pakhtunistan.

The Pakistanis now claim that the peace agreement, which bans interference across Afghanistan's "internationally recognised border", implies Afghan acceptance that the frontier lies on the old Durand line. The Kabul government tried at the last minute to have those words struck out, but failed.

Within Pakistan, Pathan separatism receded with the death in January of Khan Abdul Ghafar Khan, the so-called "Frontier Gandhi" who had campaigned (with occasional backing from India) for 40 years for Pathan autonomy. While the war lasted, Pathans tended to huddle up to is-



lamic Pakistan for protection against the communists. Now that the Russians are going home, Pakhtunistan may come into fashion again. Its cause will grow stronger still if Pathan nationalists win control of the new government that is to emerge in Kabul.

Party members interviewed this week declined to provide details of the circular or to be identified by name, saying they had been warned of disciplinary action for violating secrecy.

Praise for Najibullah

They said the main point of the document was that Soviet leaders in 1979 had made their decision without fully understanding Afghanistan.

The new party line does not go nearly as far as some Soviet analysts would like, however. The document reportedly does not admit that the Soviet Union played a role in the coup that deposed the Afghan leader Hafizullah Amin in December 1979, setting off the crisis that the Soviet Union said it was seeking to end by sending in troops.

The document is said to have nothing but praise for Najibullah, the Afghan leader since 1986, although some Soviet experts on Afghanistan fault him for alienating the Moslem population and mismanaging the economy.

It also reportedly includes no criticism of the Soviet military for what some analysts here say was inadequate preparation for the war.

THE NEW YORK TIMES

JUNE 17, 1988

refugees need help and soon

BY JANE THOMAS
Special to THE ECONOMIST
OTTAWA

ASHMED SAEED KHADR of Ottawa recently spent several months deep in northern Afghanistan, trying to arrange medical and other humanitarian help for the millions of Afghans trapped by the crisis in their country.

These are the rural refugees whose homes, villages or crops have been destroyed by the Soviet bombing or scorched-earth tactics. They have little choice but to stay in the mountains or desert and try to survive as best they can.

The distance to the Iranian or Pakistani border is 1,000 kilometres or one month's very hard walk in the very best of conditions. Mountains, in some places twice as high as the Canadian Rockies, and corridors of heavy Soviet jet and helicopter-gunship patrol, make the escape routes treacherous.

Unlike the refugees in Pakistan, who get at least minimal help from one source or another, the refugees within Afghanistan get no assistance from any government. No independent international relief agency is allowed in by the Afghan or Soviet governments. Western doctors or relief workers who enter Afghanistan do so secretly and at great risk. The only way to provide help is with the protection of the mujaheddin freedom fighters.

Mr. Khadr, a trained engineer, represents four of the 60 humanitarian agencies working with the refugees in Pakistan, including Human Concern International, the only Canadian one on the scene.

Coinciding with the latest round of peace talks in Geneva, the refugee crisis is reaching a high point. According to the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, 5.5 million Afghans have fled their country, 3.3 million to Pakistan and 2.2 million to Iran. That's more refugees than have left any other country in history.

The Afghan figure is now:

- Five times greater than the Southeast Asian "boat people" at their peak in 1978.
- Four times all the refugees from Central America combined.
- Equal to the combined populations of Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta.

The tragedy is staggering in other terms as well. Afghanistan's population in 1978 was estimated at about 15 million. A study recently released by Gallup Pakistan, the United Nations High Commission and the French Government indicates that, since the 1978 coup that led to the Soviet invasion of 1978, 1.24 million Afghans have died. Seventy per cent of 1,300 families of refugees interviewed for the study said their irrigation systems had been destroyed. Other sources show 300,000 orphans and thousands of widows. Nearly 50 per cent of the population has died or fled the country.

About 2 million people remain in a population that has been rearranged by aerial bombing and famine. Hardest hit is the northern half of the country. The closer to the Soviet border, the worse the conditions. It's also the most difficult area to escape from and the hardest for aid to reach.

When the Afghans go home

ALMOST before the ink was dry, the signatories to the Afghan peace treaty were quarrelling about what it meant. But no one disagrees that the millions of Afghans who have fled the country should be encouraged to go home. In the end the agreement will be judged not only by what happens to the arms supplies, or even by who runs the country, but by how many refugees it brings back.

This is a daunting test. The war has uprooted nearly two-thirds of Afghanistan's population, 15.7m in 1979. About 392m people have fled to Pakistan (3.2m refugees registered by the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees—UNHCR—plus perhaps 200,000–300,000 unregistered ones); 219m more have gone to Iran, according to the Iranians. Perhaps 3m people inside Afghanistan have moved to the cities or the mountains to escape the fighting.

So about 9m people need to be resettled. Thousands of men are said to have gone back already, but they may have returned to fight. As for the rest of the refugees, the accepted wisdom is that few will go back while the communists hold power in Kabul, if only because that means there will be more fighting. But if, as the Afghan communist party chief, Mr. Najibullah, once admitted, the guerrillas control 80%

of the country, refugees may start returning to those parts of Afghanistan.

How are postwar Afghans to be fed and housed? The country was once self-sufficient in food, but to deny the guerrillas support the Russians and their allies in Kabul depopulated much of the countryside. They bombed villages, irrigation canals and food stores. Food will probably have to be doled out to returning families for the first year, and they will have to be provided with new farming implements (the ground may have become too hard to be worked by the old wooden ploughs), draft animals and basic health services. For their homes they will need roofing material (they can probably manage the walls themselves). Some 3m Afghans now depend for their food on the Russians, who say they provide economic aid to Afghanistan worth \$220m a year. Their Afghan dependents will have to be looked after for a while after the Russians leave.

How much it will cost to help the Afghans return and survive is anyone's guess. One figure tossed around in aid circles is a total of \$500m over five years. The UNHCR has started by trying to work out what a theoretical group of 250,000 returning Afghans would need. The commissioner, Mr. Jean-Pierre Hocke, does not think that money will be a problem. But the only prompt offer was £10m (\$19m) from Britain.

The United Nations secretary-general may soon appoint an official to coordinate aid-giving. The UNHCR will deal with repatriation, but longer-term help should come from the UN Development Programme and the World Food Programme. The trickiest bit will be deciding who will distribute aid inside Afghanistan (look at Ethiopia's mess). The UNHCR works through central governments where possible, unless they divert the aid to their own use. Would the present Afghan government qualify? Nobody but Mr. Najibullah would like that. The Pakistan-based resistance alliance is an obvious channel—but some of its military commanders in the field are likely to have a better knowledge of what is needed.

It would help if western countries could persuade their own Afghan exiles to go home. Many of them are educated people. Involving them in aid administration might be a good way of getting them back. Fundamentalists in the resistance would object: aid makes valuable patronage at a time when Afghan politics will be at its most fluid, and the fundamentalists would not want it in the hands of western-minded people. The difficulties facing the country ought to persuade Afghans to sink most of their differences. But reasonableness is not an Afghan virtue.

THE ECONOMIST APRIL 23 1988

The scorched Afghan earth

AFGHANISTAN grew enough to feed itself before the Russians came. Returning the country to that happy state will not be easy, and is made all the harder because nobody knows just how much damage the war has caused. A remarkable agricultural survey of Afghanistan published this week helps to answer that question.

Sixty-eight mujaheddin guerrillas, trained to ask sensible questions, set out on foot from Pakistan with pens and forms, a calculator and some money. They left their guns behind, and they did not carry maps or compasses lest they be taken for spies. They avoided the fifth of the country in communist hands (the cities, main roads and surroundings). Even so, some got into trouble and one landed in jail.


Half the data they collected was rejected as unreliable; the rest, drawn from every province, represents the experience of 1% of Afghan farm households. The consultants employed by the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan, which thought up the idea, reckon that this is enough to give a reasonable picture of the state of farming in the country.

If that is so, agricultural output last year was a third of what it was in 1978, the year before the Russians came in. A third of the farms have been abandoned. Yields have fallen by up to a half, and the area cultivated by individual farms has shrunk by about a third. The Afghan farmer has 70% fewer sheep and goats than in 1978 and 40% fewer draught oxen. Many of these animals were killed, and some have been sold to raise money for food or flight.

The farmers' worst year was 1985. The following year the United States began supplying Stinger anti-aircraft missiles to the guerrillas, and these, it seems, gave the farmers a remarkable respite from air raids (see chart). All the same, the farmers' traditional enemies, birds and rats, get a frequent mention in the survey. Sometimes they are considered more of a nuisance than air raids.

The consultants who put the report together say they have much more information tucked away in their computer. Postwar Afghanistan will need a lot of help. The farmers surveyed say they want fertiliser, credit and expert advice on animal diseases. They will also need information on plant breeding, soil treatment and mechanical tools (tractors will only be helpful if they come with access to spare parts). When the aid money starts to arrive, this survey, the most comprehensive ever carried out in Afghanistan in war or peace, will be invaluable in pointing it in the right directions.

% of farmers in Afghanistan reporting:



SOURCE: AGRAYATRA
THE ECONOMIST JUNE 4 1988

THE GLOBE AND MAIL
TUESDAY APRIL 5, 1988

Afghan refugees not eager for home

From Richard Evans in Hangu, Pakistan

AS THE Soviet Union's armed forces withdraw from Afghanistan and mujahideen leaders talk hopefully of the imminent collapse of the Kabul regime, few of the estimated 3.5 million Afghan refugees living in Pakistan appear

ready to go home soon.

Many say they do not expect to return to Afghanistan for two or three years, and some may never leave Pakistan. Thousands of new refugees recently streamed across the border from near Kandahar, the scene of an artillery duel between Soviet and mujahideen forces.

Hangu is one of the refugee camps in the tribal zone of Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province, 30 miles from the Afghan border. Some 200,000 refugees live here. When Soviet planes bomb mujahideen positions on the other side of the border, you can hear the explosions in Hangu. It is a warning that the way home is not yet safe.

"God knows when we will return," says Abdullah Khan, who has been in the camp since 1980.

"We are not going to go while there is still fighting and until all the land-mines have been cleared away." The subject of mines comes up frequently in discussions with the refugees. Many have relatives who have lost feet or legs or suffered worse injuries. Western diplomats estimate that there may be as many as 5 million Soviet mines laid in Afghanistan.

"There will be people being blown up for the next 20 years," one envoy said.

The refugees do not see the Russian withdrawal as heralding the end of the conflict in Afghanistan. Some show outright scorn for the leaders of the seven-party mujahideen alliance. "Not a single leader has been injured in the war," says Hajib Ghajlan, a farmer, who has lived in the camp with his family for the past five years. "They live in air-condi-

tioned houses and drive nice cars. Now they are fighting over who will be the new king. I will not go back until it is safe once more."

Pakistani authorities and mujahideen groups reported a trickle of refugees returning to Afghanistan in the weeks after last month's signing of the Geneva accords. But that trickle has dried up following fighting throughout Afghanistan's eastern border provinces.

It is a measure of the refugees' unwillingness to return to Afghanistan that they stay on in such wretched conditions. Some seek to better their lot, pooling resources with friends and family to start small illegal businesses. A few have made fortunes smuggling guns and heroin.

There are also other, more mundane, enticements in Pakistan. Many Afghans from the re-

note valleys of the Hindu Kush have had their first taste of running water, electricity and public transport in Pakistan. "The expectations of many of the refugees are now far higher than ever before," says Yusef Orakzai, who owns the land near Peshawar on which the Nasir Bagh refugee camp is situated. "They feel they have nothing to return to. Today, I have a quarter of a million refugees living on my land. When the war is finished I may have nearly as many."

The Independent 5/28

Afghans to pay the price for accords

AMIN SAIKAL explains why Moscow has scored a diplomatic coup in the proposed accords to settle the Afghan war.

THE Geneva accords on Afghanistan, reached between the Soviet-protected regime of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) and the Government of Pakistan and supported by the USSR and the United States, provide for a Soviet troop withdrawal, but not a viable settlement of the Afghan problem.

The Afghan Islamic resistance forces, the Mujahideen, have already rejected the accords and vowed to forge on with their struggle for a final victory against the PDPA regime. This is because the accords are essentially designed to enable the Soviet Union to cut its losses and pull out its troops largely on its own terms.

The accords are a recipe for the "Afghanisation" of the war. They supply a face-saving mechanism, enabling Moscow to present its embarrassing military pullout as an "honourable" withdrawal without obliging it to abandon the original goal of its invasion, namely, to ensure the long-term survival of its surrogate regime and Soviet influence in Afghan politics. In this respect, they are rare accords of their kind: "peace accords" which do not make provision even for a ceasefire, let alone for peace.

Under the provisions of the accords, the Soviet Union will be required to withdraw its estimated 120,000 uniformed troops within nine months from mid-May 1988. This will be in return for several important things.

First, the PDPA regime will be granted greater international recognition through Pakistan's signing of the accords, and with Moscow and Washington acting as the co-guarantors.

Second, Moscow will be allowed to maintain its general support for the PDPA, involving the supply of arms and other logistic support. It will also be permitted to retain its specific entitlements under various Afghan-Soviet treaties, and to treat Afghanistan as part of the Soviet sphere of influence.

Of all these treaties, the one crucial to

Moscow is the Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation, signed in December, 1978. Under this treaty, the Soviet Union can claim a right to intervene militarily in Afghanistan should it be invited to do so. Moscow has often cited this treaty to justify its invasion of December, 1979.

Third, the Soviets will be allowed to retain several advanced bases in Afghanistan, particularly those in Bagram (just outside Kabul), Shindand (in the west) and Kandahar, from where the Soviets have reportedly been flying reconnaissance missions over Iran, Pakistan and across the Persian Gulf coastline. Similarly, the Soviets will hold their signals intelligence (SIGINT) sites, enabling them to intercept Chinese, Pakistani and Iranian signals and to monitor troop movements along the Afghan border and possibly beyond.

Fourth, and most importantly, the PDPA

role in a "coalition government of national reconciliation" headed by PDPA cadres whom the Mujahideen have long denounced.

The accords make provision for the return of the estimated five million Afghan refugees (more than three million in Pakistan and about two million in Iran). And Washington has reserved the right to continue its supply of arms to the Mujahideen as long as Moscow continues to do the same for the PDPA regime.

These elements, however, may prove meaningless in the light of the refusal in the past of a majority of the refugees to return under either a PDPA or PDPA-led government, and in view of Islamabad's non-interference agreement with Kabul, which would legally bind Pakistan notwithstanding any reservation by the US.

Until now, Pakistan has served as a



The advance guard ... Soviets pulling out of Afghanistan in 1986.

will have a non-interference agreement with Pakistan, obliging the latter to curb its support for the resistance.

As for the Mujahideen, whose continued popularity and success have been largely responsible for the Soviet decision to withdraw its forces, the accords have little to offer. They neither meet the internationally-backed demand for the right of the Afghan people to self-determination, nor establish any procedure for such a right to be realised during or after the Soviet withdrawal.

Instead, they offer the Mujahideen only one option apart from the continuation of military struggle: to accept a subordinate

conduit for supply of most of the outside arms reaching the resistance. If it continued to do this, it would be in violation of the non-interference agreement — an interpretation upon which Moscow would most likely insist. This does not augur well for President Zia's declaration last week that "now all of Pakistan's doubts [about signing the accords] have been removed" and that the Afghan refugees would be able to return with "honour" within six months of Soviet withdrawal.

It appears that Islamabad and Washington have based their support for the accords on two main assumptions. The first is that

the PDPA regime will not have the necessary internal cohesion and external operating capacity to survive the Soviet withdrawal for very long, irrespective of the extent of Soviet indirect help.

The second is that the Mujahideen have already stockpiled a considerable amount of arms inside Afghanistan, and even with reduced clandestine aid could still cause the fall of the regime if the latter didn't disintegrate before a Mujahideen onslaught. This, indeed, may well prove to be the case; but Moscow seems to be actuated by a different view, which may have underscored its resolve to secure the Geneva accords in their present form.

This view is that the Soviet withdrawal could lead to favourable consequences in two areas. First, it could prompt a greater degree of unity within the PDPA regime, and make it fight for its survival more effectively, aided by unlimited Soviet logistic support and firepower.

Second, it would remove a major factor which thus far may have enforced a degree of unity within the heterogeneous resistance movement. There can be no certainty that in the wake of Soviet withdrawal some ambitious opposition elements will not either defect to the regime or start fighting one another in their individual quest for power, enabling even a weak and widely detested PDPA regime to survive in Kabul.

The Geneva accords fail to address the central cause of the Afghan problem: the illegitimacy of the PDPA regime and the Soviet resolve to continue backing it. They contain nothing to help the Afghan people determine their future free from outside interference and attain peace and stability as rapidly as possible. By recognising Soviet interests while ignoring the legitimate needs of the Afghan people, they sanction the continuation of bloodshed and suffering in Afghanistan.

Although the Mujahideen in the long-run are likely to succeed, the Afghans in the meantime will have to pay a heavy price. Given the permeability of the borders between Afghanistan and Pakistan, no Pakistan Government will be able to isolate itself from the traumas of continued internal strife in Afghanistan. Similarly, the US, in acting as guarantor for so flawed a set of accords, may find that it has bitten off far more than it wishes to chew.

Dr Amin Saikal is a senior lecturer in political science at the Australian National University.

[This was sent from Australia but, unfortunately, not identified]

U.N. Teams Will Enter Afghan Areas

By PAUL LEWIS
Special to The New York Times

UNITED NATIONS, June 15 — The first teams of United Nations aid and development experts are expected to enter Afghanistan next month to begin rebuilding the economy and caring for returning refugees, the coordinator of relief operations says.

The official, Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan, said in an interview this week that the teams would head first for relatively peaceful areas of the country where fighting has stopped. Their first task will be to rebuild villages and revive agriculture to encourage the return of refugees.

"We will go first to these peace zones and get life going again properly with the help of people still there so that gradually refugees will be attracted back," he said.

Will Set Up 'Peace Zones'

Prince Sadruddin, an Iranian who lives in Geneva, has held many positions at the United Nations, including that of High Commissioner for Refugees. He is the son of the late Aga Khan and the uncle of the present Aga Khan, the spiritual leader of the 15 million Ismaili Moslems. His appointment followed American demands that Secretary General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar appoint a single coordinator for Afghan relief efforts to prevent duplication or quarrels between United Nations agencies over their areas of responsibility.

The Prince said he planned to establish such "peace zones" in areas controlled by the Marxist Government of President Najibullah and those controlled by the United States-backed guerrillas who have been trying to overthrow it.

But he emphasized that the United Nations planned to channel its assistance directly to needy people through village councils, religious leaders and humanitarian organizations and would not allow its aid to be used for political ends by either side in the eight-year-old conflict.

Prince Sadruddin said that when he entered the area, he would find both the Najibullah Government and the guerrilla leaders assured him they would let United Nations aid and relief agencies operate freely in areas they control and would not try take advantage of them.

In Teheran, which he also visited, Prince Sadruddin said Iranian leaders told him they would let United Nations officials enter Afghanistan through Iran if they wished. Iran, like the guerrillas, has not accepted the Geneva accords in May under which the Soviet Union agreed to withdraw the troops it sent to support the Kabul regime.

Confident of 'a Good Start'

"There was a lot of nervousness at first about whether the Geneva agreements would hold and whether the United Nations would be able to start reconstruction work," Prince Sadruddin said. "But all parties say they want the relief operations to be a success so I'm really confident now we can get off to a good start." Despite the Soviet withdrawal, however, there is some expectation that the Afghan fighting will end soon.

Prince Sadruddin was speaking after initial talks with prospective donors to the appeal by the United Nations for \$1.1 billion in economic assistance for Afghanistan.

The aid program for Afghanistan, which will be spread out over 18 months, is about equally divided between emergency food and rehabilitation assistance for returning refugees

and development aid intended to get the country's largely agricultural economy working again.

It will be carried out by several United Nations relief and development agencies, including the World Health Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization, the United Nations Relief for Children, the United Nations Children's Fund and the United Nations Development Program.

\$25 Million Is Pledged

At a meeting on Tuesday, countries that included Japan, Finland, Switzerland, Denmark and the Netherlands pledged a total of about \$25 million in new aid to Afghanistan. Many other countries, including the Soviet Union and the United States, said they also hoped to contribute.

Speaking for the United States, an Assistant Secretary of State, Richard S. Williamson, said the Reagan Admin-

istration would provide \$119 million in economic and food assistance to Afghanistan this year as it did last, primarily through the World Food Program, despite budgetary difficulties. If possible, the Administration will "augment this large program particularly with increased food contributions," Mr. Williamson said.

Prince Sadruddin said he had also asked Canada to put its United Nations development plan for Afghanistan on the agenda of the annual summit meeting of the seven major non-Communist industrial powers. The meeting begins in Toronto on Sunday.

A major difficulty facing relief and aid officials are the huge quantities of land mines scattered around the Afghan countryside by the two sides, Prince Sadruddin said.

Just how difficult a task the United

Nations faces in getting rural life back to normal in Afghanistan is underlined by a report on Afghan agriculture published by a Swedish humanitarian organization, the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan.

On the basis of a survey of farms carried out by a team of 88 specialists trained in guerrilla warfare, the Swedish committee estimates that agricultural output last year was about a third of what it was in 1978, the year before the Soviet Union sent in its forces to shore up the Kabul regime.

The committee says that a third of all farms have been abandoned and that crop yields have dropped by about half. It estimates that on average an Afghan farmer has 70 percent fewer sheep and goats than in 1978 and 40 percent fewer draft oxen.

NYT 6/18

(See also pp. 35-36)

moment of truth

By Diego Cordovez, The Washington Post

We are being besieged by news analyses that advance the notion that the Afghan people will be unable to agree among themselves and will consequently plunge into a renewed civil war. Why should it necessarily be so? I believe that those predictions underestimate the Afghans, as numerous have so many times in the past underestimated other people of the Third World.

The Geneva accords make sense for the Soviets, for the Americans and for the Afghans. As the Soviets see the accords go into effect, the Afghans, weary of the war and the suffering, will realize that the settlement makes a lot of sense: its fundamental purpose is to allow the Afghan people once again to live together in peace.

The United States and Pakistan consistently maintained throughout the negotiations that the withdrawal of troops should be the mainspring of the peace process. The underlying premise was that the crisis began when Soviet troops entered Afghanistan and that their departure would bring about the resolution of all the connected issues and problems. As a matter of fact, the Geneva negotiations acquired some credibility only when I submitted, early in 1980, the proposal for a settlement that contained in black and white a stipulation of complete withdrawal within a specific time frame to be agreed.

Moreover, the United States and Pakistan rejected throughout last year the Soviet position that made the establishment of a broad-based government a precondition to a withdrawal time frame the only question that remained unresolved in the documents.

The Soviet Union eventually agreed that, once a time frame was defined, all the "would fall into place," which is what the United States and Pakistan repeatedly asserted. Otherwise there would have been no settlement.

The Mujaheddin did not take part in the negotiations because the members of the UN General Assembly accepted the credentials of the government that had come into being in Kabul in December 1979. I strongly suspect, however, that any representative of the Afghan refugees would also have taken the position that the key to a political solution was an agreed timetable for the withdrawal of Soviet troops.

Since they left their homeland, the refugees had always spoken with one voice in this regard. And when a formal commitment to withdraw became fairly certain, just before the last round of negotiations, the alliance of Mujaheddin issued a propo-

sal for an interim government which contained a formal undertaking to sign the Geneva accords.

In the event, the participants in the negotiations did acknowledge that the establishment of a broad-based government is an essential, but still missing, part of a comprehensive settlement. In a joint statement issued when the accords were concluded, they undertook to promote a process to that end, stressing that it should involve all segments of Afghan society both inside and outside the country.

The underlying rationale is that, as the Geneva accords enter into force, the Afghans will work toward a national compact among existing political forces. While recognizing that only the Afghans and they alone can decide their own future, we all agreed to facilitate such efforts, which were seen as an extension of the diplomatic process that produced the accords. It had indeed become increasingly clear at Geneva that a concerted approach in this context would be needed to achieve a rational solution.

A Spanish philosopher, Miguel de Unamuno, used to say that nothing unites a people more than its traditions. The Afghans have rich traditions, and at this crucial juncture, they will undoubtedly rely on their pragmatism to set in motion practical processes based upon systems of consultation and consensus that have served them well in the past.

It is true that fighting is also a part of the Afghan tradition, but it cannot be ultimately to be settled through discourse and negotiation.

Many Afghans regret that there has been a gradual departure from traditional methods of governance and decision-making. They believe that therein lies the essence of the present situation. Thus the first and immediate step will presumably involve intense consultations.

Before the conclusion of the negotiations, a wise Afghan told me that "not all those who are outside the country are good, and not all those who are inside are bad."

Good Afghans in Pakistan, in Afghanistan and elsewhere should try, he said, to find the areas in which they can unite. The signing of the Geneva accords would undoubtedly provide impetus to such efforts because the strong doubts that many still had about the withdrawal would be dispelled. They must not only try, as my Afghan friend said, but they must now do it.

The European Community stated last year that the future government of Afgha-

nistan must be one whose credibility cannot be challenged. This, however, can be accomplished only if the consultations within the alliance of the Mujaheddin are broadened to include other components of the Afghan nation. I have reason to believe that such efforts are already under way, that new channels of communication are being opened, that specific plans and proposals are being developed.

But more is needed. The commanders in the field must be consulted. They are entitled to it, and their opinion is crucial. Political and other leaders, who are not now part of the alliance but who have a constituency of their own, as well as refugee elders, must be consulted. Prominent Afghans such as former holders of office or other elites must be part of the process.

It has been increasingly recognized that the ruling Government Party, which has existed since 1965 as an organized party, cannot be excluded from the Afghan political mosaic. In the view of many Afghans, the former king has a role to play in this process.

The traditional Afghan method of decision-making is the convening of a *loya jirga*, a grand assembly. The obvious next step. It may not, however, prove possible in the present circumstances to observe all the traditional formalities.

Still, the Afghans are ingenious and resourceful. A *jirga* — a similar, but more limited, institution — in a generally acceptable neutral location, might be an alternative.

Obviously, fighting will not end overnight. The implementation of the settlement will, however, change many things. By August 15, one half of the troops are required to have returned to the Soviet Union. If by that date consultations and other traditional processes have not moved significantly ahead, the modalities of the withdrawal, as I understand them, will bring about an entirely different situation.

The movement of the refugees — perhaps literally walking toward their villages — will in itself have the effect of abating hostilities.

In the heat of midsummer, the Afghan people will face, once again in their history, a moment of truth. It will then be within their reach to turn into a concrete reality the historic opportunity for peace presented by the Geneva accords.

Diego Cordovez, Undersecretary General of the United Nations, negotiated the Afghan accords.

HK Standard 5/11

Stallone's 'Rambo III,' Globe-Trotting Cowboy For the 80's Audience

By JANET MASLIN

"The first was for himself," say the ads for "Rambo III." "The second was for his country. This time is for his friend." And the next may be for returning an overdue library book, but whatever John Rambo's reason for raising hell, there's one point that should never be misunderstood: John Rambo does not do these things because he enjoys them. He does not take any personal satisfaction in (to use just one small example) attaching a rope and a large rock to an adversary, then pulling the pin on a grenade so that it will explode as the man falls into an underground cave.

Fun for Rambo? Not at all. Rambo is revealed as a long-suffering, deeply religious person who would much rather be repairing the roof of a Thai monastery, which is what he's seen doing at the beginning of "Rambo III." However, "Rambo III" has a prologue of sorts, so that before the credits have even finished rolling Rambo is seen sweating, quivering and sneering his way through a stick-fighting match with a Thai opponent, as hundreds of local fans make bets and cheer.

Even so, that for a little extra money, Rambo explains modestly to his old friend Colonel Trautman (Richard Crenna), who has come to the attention for another one-man war, this time in Afghanistan. As Trautman quickly notes, and Rambo is far too self-effacing to mention, he gives the money he inevitably wins in such contests to the monks.

So "Rambo III," which opens today at the Criterion and other theaters, has a messianic streak, a pious tone and a bad tendency toward false modesty. But it also has a lot more. Even those who question Rambo's methods and his motives will have no choice but to acknowledge his very real accomplishments, along with those of Sylvester Stallone, who this time seems to know exactly what the global action-film audience would like to see. Mr. Stallone's Rambo pumped his way to body-building perfection, has written (with Sheldon Lettich) for himself the latter-day Vietnam version of the John Wayne role, and forcefully re-invented the western to accommodate the character's munitions-mad, avenging-angel style.

Even though some parts of "Rambo III" are goofily idiosyncratic, the best of it is tried-and-true cowboy material, complete with cavalry charge. And modern special-effects technology, a huge budget and Mr. Stallone's own derring-do have conspired to let the film pack a wallop that no traditional western or war film could match. Everything here is larger than life, from Rambo's barrel-sized neck to the extent of his wild-man bravado. When the lone Trautman and Rambo are cornered at the end of the film, their backs literally to the wall as an unbelievably large army of Soviet tanks and soldiers demand their surrender, Rambo's reply (unprintable here) has a real, if censored, grandeur. In every corner of the globe where "Rambo III" is seen, this moment is guaranteed to bring down the house.

"Rambo III" is dedicated "to the gallant people of Afghanistan," and it clearly intends that its politics be taken seriously. The plot sends Rambo into Afghanistan on a rescue mission after Trautman, who has been educating Afghan freedom fighters in the ways of Stinger missiles and is taken prisoner by a smirking, strutting Soviet colonel (Marc de Jonge). This casts Trautman in the unenviable role of political mouthpiece, as he lectures the colonel about Soviet foreign policy. And it makes the Afghan fighters, who are this film's noble Indians, entirely one-dimensional. "What we must do is stop this killing of our women and children," one fighter earnestly explains. And the film, for all its grandstanding, never goes any deeper.

Mr. Stallone has by now made Rambo parody-proof, since the character is every bit as laughable as he is grandiose; that's part of the fun. Rambo's self-importance, weight-of-the-world manner and his taste for political posturing would make him genuinely silly were they not counterbalanced by Mr. Stallone's startling, energetic physical presence and the film's stabs at self-mocking humor. ("That was close, John!" declares Trautman with supreme understatement as yet another explosion explodes nearby incinerate them.)

Still, the dialogue tends to be more inadvertently comical than neces-



Sylvester Stallone is back as the action-film hero in "Rambo III," which opens today at the Criterion.

sary, laced with heavy sadism and predictable turns of phrase ("You've tried my patience long enough!"). The lines that are meant to stand out: "Who do you think this man is? God?" "No, God would have mercy. He won't!" are often less memorable than the ones that aren't.

Released French journalist speaks of his Kabul ordeal

PARIS: French photo-journalist Alain Guillo arrived in Paris yesterday, a day after he was released from nine months imprisonment in Afghanistan.

Mr. Guillo arrived on an Air France flight from New Delhi.

He told reporters in Paris that his detention was "nine months of complete isolation," except for occasional visits from the French charge d'affaires.

"But it was nothing compared to the others..." he said. "Their life is a real hell. They have no contact with their families. They are cut from the world."

Mr. Guillo said foreign prisoners in Afghanistan constitute "a fishpond maintained by the Afghan government and from which it lets out hostages from time to time."

After his brief remarks, Mr. Guillo was taken into seclusion. The head of the Association of Friends of Alain Guillo, which worked to free him, said Mr. Guillo would give a news conference tomorrow.

Before leaving New Delhi, Mr. Guillo said he would like to return to Afghanistan.

"I would like to go back (to Afghanistan), if possible" to help cover the events in that war-torn country, Mr. Guillo insisted in a newspaper interview.

Mr. Guillo, 45, arrived in New Delhi on Saturday and departed 6½ hours later for Paris. He told reporters in New Delhi that "I wasn't treated too bad, but I was morally brutalized. For the first four months, I had no newspapers, books or paper. I was always under surveillance and deprived of fundamental rights."

Mr. Guillo was released in Kabul, the Afghan capital, on Saturday after Gilbert Perol, secretary general of the French Foreign Ministry, presented a letter from French President Francois Mitterrand to Afghan leader Najibullah.

A senior French official in Kabul said no conditions were attached to Mr. Guillo's release.

Mr. Guillo told the Indian news conference that he had no idea his release was imminent. He said he was captured on August 28 by Afghan security police after he had gone into Afghanistan with Mujahideen

rebels. He said, however, that his arrest was not announced until September.

"For 15 days, they hesitated between killing me on the spot and arresting me," Mr. Guillo said of the Afghan police. "They would have blamed the killing on the Mujahideen."

Mr. Guillo said he thought his release was due to the summit which began yesterday between US President Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, as well as to French intervention.

He said his trial on January 4 was "pure comedy and a travesty of justice." Mr. Guillo was convicted of "espionage and subversive activities" at the trial and sentenced to 10 years in prison.

He said that at one point, he was in a cell with 65 other people, most of them Iranians and Pakistanis. He was later shifted to the Central Jail in Kabul, where he was first under custody of the secret police and later the regular police.

Also imprisoned in Kabul is Fausto Biloslavo, an Italian who worked for the Albatross News Agency.

A One-Man War In Afghanistan

RAMBO III, directed by Peter Macdonald, screenplay by Sylvester Stallone and Sheldon Lettich, from the novel by David Morrell, director of photography, John Stanner; edited by James Symons, Andrew London, O. Nicholas Brown, Edward A. Warchucka; music by Jerry Goldsmith, production designer, Bill Kenney, produced by Buzz Feitenhans, released by Tri-Star Pictures, At the Loews 84th Street Six, Broadway at 84th Street, Criterion Center, Broadway at 45th Street, and other theaters. Running time, 104 minutes. This film is rated R.

NLT 5/25

Najibullah releases Italian journalist

ISLAMABAD: Afghan President Najibullah on Wednesday ordered the release of jailed Italian journalist Fausto Biloslavo, official Kabul Radio said.

The radio, monitored in Islamabad, said Mr. Najibullah ordered Mr. Biloslavo's release after receiving an appeal from Italian President Francesco Cossiga.

He had sent a message to Mr. Cossiga telling him of the decision following a visit to Kabul by Italian Foreign Ministry official Bruno Bottai.

Mr. Bottai arrived in Kabul on Tuesday to seek the release of Mr. Biloslavo, jailed for seven years last March on charges of spying and entering the country illegally.

Earlier, the Italian Foreign Ministry said in Rome Mr. Najibullah had pardoned Mr. Biloslavo who could be released any time.

Ministry officials said as soon as Mr. Biloslavo was freed he would return to Italy on the same special plane that took Mr. Bottai to Kabul and which was waiting at the airport.

Mr. Biloslavo's mother told reporters in Trieste, north-eastern Italy, that she expected her son to fly to Rome and would travel to the capital as soon as she heard of his release. "But I have to more precise information," she added.

Mr. Biloslavo, a 26-year-old freelance reporter for the Milan-based Albatross news agency, was imprisoned with French journalist Alain Guillo.

— Reuter

HK Standard 6/3



Alain Guillo

ARTS

By SANDRA MALER

EMMA Sergeant, the daughter of a wealthy British financier, is emerging as one of Britain's most talented young painters with an exotic collection of portraits of Afghan rebel tribesmen in Pakistan.

"I was sitting in Australia, painting landscapes in the winter of 1984 and I thought 'I'd love to paint the Afghans.' It just came to me out of the blue because they are such a noble people," Sergeant said.

Sergeant, 28, has been hailed by critics as the latest thing to happen to British portraiture in two decades.

She first went to Pakistan in 1984 to raise money for the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (Unicef), painting Afghan guerrillas who have been fighting the Soviet-backed Kabul government since 1979. The pictures were sold in aid of Unicef.

She returned to Pakistan, where there are an estimated three million Afghan refugees in 1986 - this time raising funds for a French charity, Médecins du Monde.

"It was very interesting seeing these people two years more in exile and it wasn't very good. All the pride had gone. There was a sense of

hopelessness and it was very much each man for himself," she said.

Sergeant was given a studio by one of the guerrilla groups, based close to the border with Afghanistan, and travelled among the tribes in the North West Frontier Province, painting about six portraits a day.

"The Afghans look very biblical. They have these wonderful turbans and hawkish features and a lot of them have these bright green eyes or blue eyes with blond hair," she said.

As she travelled among the tribes, Sergeant said the first day was always the crucial one. "If you really mess up on your first day and produce a really horrible picture, they are shrewd enough to know that there was no likeness there at all."

She said the Afghans were always very friendly and cordial, though at times perhaps a bit bewildered by her presence.

"One day I was in a Mujahedeen hotel and you sit on the table because there are no chairs. So I was squatting down on the table while a friend went to get some models and I asked my translator what was all this row going on around me.

"He was a very distinguished nice boy and he said: 'Actually I hate to tell you this but they can't decide

whether you're a man or woman,'" she said.

"I could understand because all the men wear khol (make-up) under their eyes and have long hair. Then I knew what they had decided because they called me 'Sir' all afternoon," she added.

In another incident, an Afghan woman who was being painted by Sergeant asked the interpreter: "Why is she taking so long to photograph me?" The woman had heard of cameras but had never seen one.

"The first lot of pictures I did was very romantic and the men were more dramatic and warrior-like. In this last lot, the men were sadder, older. I did some of the models again and there was a much more poignant feeling about them. They were less proud people," she said.

"The widow's face comes through, the death in the family, the constant boredom and hard work in their lives. Now of course the poor Afghan women have more independence. So many men are gone they've been left in control of the family and have had to make provisions for themselves.

"I found them more cheeky this time. Men were a pushover but the women wanted money and the rate they were asking was the going rate for a nude model in

London - £3 (about HK\$43) an hour," she said.

Sergeant has also painted African warriors during a "painting safari" with her mother.

Her latest exhibition, in an art gallery on elegant Bond Street, is entitled *Faces From Four Continents*.

It consists of 104 paintings and sketches of African tribesmen and Afghan warriors, as well as portraits and landscapes from Britain and Australia, where she went "to get back to nature." Their prices ranged between £500 and £700 (about HK\$7,300 to HK\$10,200).

Sergeant said she had devised a new method of mixing gouache and watercolour, which is more manageable when travelling than oils.

"Using gouache or watercolour has introduced more colour and freedom into my work," she said.

Sergeant started painting when she was very young and says she was encouraged by her mother, who is also a painter, and her father "whom I suspect might be colour-blind because he used to frame everything I did."

She studied painting at the Slade art school in London and won the Imperial Tobacco Portrait Award, organised by the National Portrait Gallery, when she was 21.

Reuter

Singapore Is Riding Crest of Rug Trade

By NICK B. WILLIAMS Jr., Times Staff Writer

SINGAPORE—"This war in Afghanistan is a terrible, terrible thing," declared the merchant of Oriental carpets, running his hand over the smooth weave of a dark red Turkoman hatchli. "Terrible—but a blessing in disguise."

In Afghanistan, less than a year after the Iranian revolution began, Soviet troops invaded to support a Marxist regime, opening another crack in the market. Soviet offensives drove more than 2 million Afghan refugees into Pakistan's Northwest Frontier area, and now supporters of the *mujahedeen* resistance, hungry for money to buy guns, are sweeping their country clean of carpets.

Rajendra described a visit to the refugee camps where the trading is done.

"There's a fixed date when the buyers will be in the camps, about once every six weeks. Maybe 80 horse carts will come in, full of carpets. The roads will be jammed

for two days.

"The collector, the man who brings them in, has a sheet of paper with the name of the family that's selling the carpet and the price they want. We don't bargain. You couldn't bargain. Some of these carpets take a year to make and they're asking just a hundred [Singapore] dollars [about \$50 in U.S. currency]."

"They have faith that we'll buy at a fair price, and the collectors go to the ends of the country and beyond to get the carpets. These are mainly tribal rugs, ancient designs, and some that show up in the Pakistani camps have come from the hinterlands of Russia and China. Who knows how they get them?"

Another major postwar element in Oriental carpets is Pakistan. After a checkered start in the 1940s and 1950s, the nationalized Pakistani industry is turning out many first-quality rugs. According to Rajendra, the average Pakistani carpet is probably superior to its Iranian counterpart, but the Iranian rugs still command higher prices because of the Persian tradition. It was another story in the 1940s.

Pakistan could not afford to import fine wools at the beginning, Rajendra recalled, "so they unraveled army socks and used them. Those rugs smelled terrible!"

Los Angeles Times

January 26, 1988



Emma Sergeant with an exotic collection of portraits of Afghan rebel tribesmen in Pakistan.

Estalif pottery produced in exile

A young Afghan refugee has opened a pottery factory in Peshawar to revive the traditional handy craft of his home town.

Abdul Qadir Hakim, an artist, has opened a pottery making factory in the University Town of Peshawar to give Afghan refugees and foreigners Estalif potteries. Estalif is a town 40 kilometers North of Kabul. It is located on a high ground West of the famous Kabul-Salang road. . .

Out of a population of 20,000 in Estalif, 200 men and women were busy making pots. These people had a happy life in their beautiful town.

The clay was brought from a nearby mountain. Some other items needed in preparing the paint were purchased from Kabul.

The April coup of 1978 and then the Soviet invasion of 1979 disrupted the life of the peaceful potters. Heavy bombings in the fall of 1983 and the Spring of 1984 devastated the historic town and killed many of its inhabitants. Now only two

persons are working in the town to produce pots probably trying not to let down the town which is part of their history.

Waisuddin, the Chief potter in Peshawar said that he can make 100 pots per day. He admitted that he was only 30% successful in his first baking of pottery. The reason for this, according to Waisuddin, was lack of knowledge about the local material.

He said the clay used by him is brought from Badakhsh outside Peshawar, paint is brought from the market and some materials used in the paint is brought from Takhar province in Afghanistan.

When the pots are made and dried they are painted.

The painted pots are put inside the oven and for five long hours wood is burned. The temperature of the oven reaches 1190 centigrade. After 24 hours the oven is opened and the pots are ready for use.

The Estalif Pottery Firm is making jugs, plates, ashtrays, bowls, flower pots, water pipes and trays.

It was famous in Afghanistan that the food tastes better in Estalif pots. Now the refugees can enjoy their food in the Estalif pots in Pakistan.

Afghan News 6/15

Soviets steal Afghan gold

THERE are definite plans by Russians to remove to the Soviet Union the Bactrian gold treasures found by a joint Afghan-Soviet team in 1978 from Tola Taipa site near Taj Kurghan in Samangan province.

Doubtful of the survival

of the Communist regime after their troops withdrawal, the Soviets want to take valuable property of an historic nature.

It is believed that a great number of historical items belonging to the National Museum in Kabul have been taken to the Soviet Union.

Afghan News 6/15

RECENT PUBLICATIONS

"Why the Afghans Fight" by Robert Kaplan, READERS' DIGEST, May 1988. Pp 128-132.

"One Man's Sentence in an Afghan Hell" by Fausto Biloslavo in INSIGHT, 7/4/88. Pp 8-16. The Italian journalist's account of his imprisonment in Afghanistan.

"Afghanistan: The Accords" by Rosanne Klass appeared in the Summer issue of FOREIGN AFFAIRS. Pp. 922-945.

The June issue of SOLDIER OF FORTUNE has articles on "Rambo in Afghanistan" by G. B. Crouse & "Direct Hit on Nari" by Bruce Richardson.

THE CAPRETS OF AFGHANISTAN by R.D. Parsons is the 3rd volume in a series on Oriental Rugs published by the Antique Collectors Club, 5 Church St., Woodbridge, Suffolk, England IP12 1DS. 157 pp., illus. ISBN 1-85149-158-2.

"A NATION IS DYING": Afghanistan under the Soviets 1979-1987 by Jeri Laber & Barnett Rubin was published by Northwestern University Press & Helsinki Watch, 1988. (See p.33.)

"Teaching Afghan Medics on Their Own Turf" by Ryan Ver Berkmoes appeared in the January issue of AMERICAN MEDICAL NEWS.

Aarhus University Press, DK-8000 Aarhus C, Denmark, offers two books on Afghanistan: NURISTANI BUILDINGS by Lennart Edelberg, 1984. 224 pp., quarto, color plates, hard cover. 220 Danish kroner; & CONTRIBUTIONS TO ISLAMIC STUDIES: IRAN, AFGHANISTAN & PAKISTAN, edited by Christel Braae & Klaus Ferdinand, 1987. 154 pp., paper. 61 DKK.

A large, 4-color map of Kabul Province has been prepared by the Council of the North for Jamiat-e-Islami, G.P.O. Box 351, Peshawar, Pakistan. The scale is 1/100,000. Points of interest are in Farsi but the Legend, of which item #30 is "isolated trees," is in Farsi & English.

"An historic moment" by Annick Billard, an article about the Geneva accords, is in the May issue of REFUGEES. The same issue also carried a summary of a press conference held by UNHCR High Commissioner for Refugees Jean Pierre Hocké on 4/14 in Geneva.

An article on the army in Afghanistan since 1919 by Louis Dupree appears in Vol. II, Fascicle 5 of the ENCYCLOPAEDIA IRANICA, edited by Ehsan Yarshatar, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986. Pp.514-517.

The April 1988 issue of the AFGHAN MUJAHIDEEN MEDICAL JOURNAL, Vol. 2, #2, (P.O. Box 910 Civic Square, Canberra ACT 2608, Australia) has articles & news items about medical aid activities & organizations.

THE SOVIET UNION & ASIA by Harish Kapur will be published in August by Columbia University Press (136 So. Broadway, Irvington, NY 10533). 220 pp. \$35.

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN, published by Afghanistan Today Publishers, Kabul, in December, is now available from the ROA UN Mission, 866 UN Plaza, New York, NY 10017.

An article by Henry Kriegel, "Afghanistan: Has Reagan Sold Out the Mujahideen?" is in the Summer issue of INT'L FREEDOM REVIEW, Vol.1, #4, pp. 3-20. The quarterly is available from the Int'l Freedom Fda., 200 G St., NE., Suite 300, Washington, DC 20002 for \$15/year (\$25 in Europe & Asia).

HERAT. THE ISLAMIC CITY. A STUDY IN URBAN CONSERVATION, an Occasional Paper of the Scandinavian Institute of Afghan Studies, was published in London by the Curzon Press.

#5 in the Central Asian Survey's Incidental Papers Series is CHILDREN IN WAR. DRAWINGS FROM AFGHAN REFUGEE CAMPS.

The JOURNAL OF ETHNO-PHARMACOLOGY, (Elsevier Scientific Publishers Ireland Ltd.) issued a report on "Drugs & Medicinal Plants Used in Traditional Medicine of Afghanistan" by Shafiq Younos, Jacques Fleurentin, Dominique Notter, Guy Mazars, Francois Mortier & J.-M. Pelt. 45 pp.

Cont. from p. 33

ruling "Parchami" party. Like the government it replaced—the kingdom of Zaber Shah, who ruled (in name, at least) from 1933-73—the mostly Western-educated Parchamis want to modernize the country's technological and agricultural base.

Despite the title of this book, auguries are good for Afghanistan this year. While the nation's people are still paying for their leaders' war with food shortages and other

hardships, a coalition has formed in recent months to pressure the Parchamis to share power with King Zaber Shah and the *moujaheden*. This time, the coalition's supporters—the Soviet Union, the United States, Pakistan and possibly the *moujaheden*'s more moderate factions—are too numerous and powerful to ignore.

by ALEX RAKSIN

LA Times 5/22

EVENTS...Continued from p. 1.

Siddiq Noorzoy spoke on "Afghanistan: Issues & Problems in Post-War Reconstruction" at the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at Berkeley on 3/10.

Jamila Masumi gave a demonstration on Afghan rug making during CITYLORE 88 at the Central Park Bandshell on 6/5.

Barnett Rubin addressed the Green Parliamentary Hearing on Afghanistan in Bonn, FRG on 6/14. His topic was "The Geneva Accords on Afghanistan: Their Meaning for the Afghans & the World."

Louis Dupree spoke on the preconditions of modernization in Afghanistan at the annual meeting of the American Historical Assn. in December. In January he participated in the Crises in World Affairs seminar series at the University of Delaware. His topic was "Gorbachev's Bleeding Wound in Afghanistan: Is There a Tourniquet?"

RESTAURANT NOTES

Now there is more in Portland, Maine, than lobsters & L.L. Bean. M. Abraham Habibzai, an artist & photographer, has opened the AFGHAN RESTAURANT at 629 Congress St. (207 -761-0985). His lunch menu features chicken palaw, caraie, chaply kabob, bolani & sambosa at \$3.81 each. Borani banjan, karam & sabzi are on hand for 95¢ each. The dinner menu features qabeli, nareng & kebab palaws, caraie & mantu but the price rises to \$6.67. Since the prices are so reasonable, you might want to have a portrait painted or a group photograph taken while you dine. Portland residents report that the food at the AFGHAN RESTAURANT is wonderful. Mr. Habibzai can also be reached at (207) 773-3431.



British donation for Afghans

On 14 April 1988, the British Government approved a £ 10 million (US\$ 18.6 million) contribution for the relief and reintegration of Afghan refugees in their country of origin. This amount, which is conditional upon satisfactory co-ordinated international arrangements for the refugees' reintegration, will be donated to UNHCR, other international organizations, and British non-governmental organizations involved in the relief and reintegration programme.

REFUGEES - May 1988



Drawings from the menu.


AFGHANS LEARN A NEW KIND OF SHOOTING

Bruce Richardson's photo workshop for Afghan freedom fighters was set up to train mujahideen in the use of 35mm equipment so they can record their war from the front lines. This photo record is then made available to Western media

sources and governmental agencies for timely, accurate news about that conflict.

This series of photos, taken by a mujahid in Nangarhar, tells its own story. From left to right: A Soviet Mi-24 Hind-D helicopter gunship makes a low straf-

ing run and fires its rockets into an Afghan village. The helicopter is shot down by mujahideen forces with a U.S.-supplied Stinger anti-aircraft missile, leaving only charred wreckage on the ground where it fell.



SOLDIER OF FORTUNE JUNE 88

BOOK REVIEWS

THE SECURITY OF SOUTH ASIA: AMERICAN AND ASIAN PERSPECTIVES, Stephen Philip Cohen, ed., Urbana, Univ. of Illinois Press, 1987. 290 pp.

This collection of essays by fifteen well-known scholars and officials from India, Pakistan and the United States is notable because of its deliberate attempt "to encourage new thinking" by having three different nationals contribute chapters on each country and on the problems of South Asia as a whole. Thus, there are different perspectives provided on India by Leo Rose (USA), Brig. Noor A. Husain (Ret.) (Pakistan) and P.R. Chari (India); on Pakistan, by W. Howard Wriggins (USA), Lt. Gen. Eric A. Vas (Ret.) (India) and M.B. Naqvi (Pakistan), and so on.

The resulting analyses are interesting, but could have been more policy-relevant and thought-provoking had the themes and issues been defined more sharply. The three role-players do not always come to grips with the same issues. For example, Rose examines the economic and ethnic migrant aspects of India's policy, while Husain and Chari treat the strategic and security dimensions; and whereas Husain provides an overview that examines India's approach not only to Pakistan but also to the USSR, the US and China, Chari focuses primarily on India's Pakistan problem. As a result, comparisons are difficult to make.

Nor were the central issues affecting the security and stability of South Asia confronted directly and systematically. The piece by K. Subrahmanyam, former Director of the Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses in New Delhi, comes closest to framing the problems and offering suggestions for overcoming them. He thinks Kashmir is the only contentious issue between India and Pakistan and that a solution would be possible along lines of the status quo, if the parties were really serious - which they apparently are not. R.R. Subramanian, an Indian physicist, whose essay is one of three on the subject of domestic determinants of foreign policy, offers a thoughtful analysis of the influences shaping US policy, in particular, showing the connection between conventional arms and the nuclear dimension, and how the relationship between them in US policy toward Pakistan underwent change during the Carter and Reagan administrations.

An opportunity was lost to have each party address vital questions: What is it in the conditions set by India and Pakistan for a comprehensive settlement that is not acceptable to the other? Given present attitudes, is nuclear proliferation likely in the 1990s? Would proliferation enhance or undermine deterrence? What is the relationship between the aims and ambitions of the regional actors and the intrusive activities and assistance not only of the United States but also of the Soviet Union and, to a much lesser extent, China?

The lack of systematic attention to Afghanistan is surprising. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, more than anything else, contributed to the intensification of Indo-Pakistani tensions, the resumption of large scale US military assistance to Pakistan, the return of the US-Soviet Cold War rivalry to South Asia, and the renewed exercise of influence by the regional actors over the superpowers. Yet the issue is treated only in passing. Jagat Mehta, still the diplomat even though now retired, treats the Russians with kid gloves, explaining their murderous invasion and subsequent campaigns of tribal genocide as stemming from an "impetuous, defensive anxiety about the potential dangers" that inhered in the desire of Hafizullah Amin to "wriggle free of his dependence on the USSR." One wonders how Mehta would explain Gorbachev's apparent readiness to withdraw Soviet troops completely from Afghanistan, though Moscow has far greater reason for "anxiety" today than it had in December 1979.

Selig Harrison engages in his usual Pak-bashing and considers "American over-identification with the Zia ul-Haq regime" as indicative of Washington's "conscious desire to support the rise of military regimes as a means of getting concrete US military benefits." Specifically, he avers that Washington thinks of Zia as a "possiblepartner" in the Gulf and "in the ongoing task of monitoring Soviet submarine activity in the northern Indian Ocean." In this writer's opinion, neither had much to do with the motives or aims that generated renewed US military aid to Pakistan in the 1980s. Should Moscow withdraw militarily from Afghanistan and permit an independent, noncommunist, nonaligned regime to be reestablished in Kabul, the US-Pakistani military relationship would be pared significantly in the years that follow; opposition to Soviet expansion, not a penchant for military dictatorships, best explains US policy in this instance.

There is little on Soviet policy in the region or on how it has affected the policies and perceptions of the key actors. The essays were, unfortunately, not written recently enough to have taken into consideration the potentially important major improvement in US-Indian relations under the Reagan administration. Ethnic tensions also call for greater attention, since they are the tinder that could consume halting efforts to end the Indo-Pakistani conflict and promote regional cooperation.


A final thought. One wishes that Prof. Cohen, as the convener of the conference on which the essays in this book are based, had used the occasion to bring more younger scholars to the attention of the field. Their contributions to useful works such as this one should be encouraged; for new ideas are needed as South Asia moves into what is likely to be a difficult decade.

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PAYĀM-I SANGAR #19 & PAYĀM-I BANUWĀN-I ISLAM #12 ("Message of the Redoubt" & "Message of the Women of Islam"), publications of the Harakat-i Islāmī-yi Afghanistan. Available from Harakat-i Islāmī-yi Afghanistan, Nomayendag-y-Shorai-Welayaty-Kabul, P.O. Box 337, Peshawar.

These periodicals have been published during the past two years. They proclaim themselves as available in Afghanistan and as prepared by the Writers Committee of the HIA's Kabul District Committee. They are mimeographed, the pages being typescript relieved by vignettes of hand drawing and calligraphy. Both proclaim the message of holy war and fundamentalism and they bring more than a little of the breath of Iran to the resistance scene.

This issue of Payām-i Sangar is headed by a sketch of a mosque and a quote from the Quran 8:40: "Fight against them until there is no more discord!" The articles alternate between religious instruction and anti-Soviet rhetoric. A leisurely commentary on Quran 26:69 ("Surely we will guide Our paths those who strive [jāhadu] after Us; truly Allah is with the good") naturally focuses on the subject of jihād. The article "What do you know about Russia" provides some highly relevant discussion of the USSR and the Eastern European satellites. It is reinforced with a quote from Ayatollah Mohsenī: "Those who have some familiarity with the philosophy and dialectic of Marxism know that the basis of this philosophy is fixed upon repression, murder of people, murder of nations, and bloodshed." A page of "quotations of the great" ranges from Khomeini to Napoleon, including the ever-present Mohsenī (the HIA has printed separately a handbill with his proclamation for the new year.) Part 11 of a series on ethics deals, in this issue, with dissimulation. The treatment of this promising subject



is lengthy, but it remains fairly academic ("the ulamā divide dissimulation into three types: that regarding a principle of religion, that in an act of worship, and other"). There is a spirited "joint declaration of the HIA and the Hizb-i Islami":

...We seek the determination of the fate of the Muslim nation of Afghanistan by the hand of the Muslim nation of Afghanistan. We condemn the meeting at the White House of those two wild wolves, Gorbachev and Reagan, in regard to the removal of missiles, the Iran-Iraq war, the solution to the situation in Afghanistan, Cambodia and dozens of other subjects. Since they have experienced a feeling of danger due to the nearness of the desperate struggle of the Muslim nations Afghanistan and Iran and unquestionably have suffered blows, they have churned out other schemes to devour them; these likewise are repulsive and condemned.

Eulogy of a martyr, bits of resistance news from Kabul and patriotic verses conclude this issue. And a piece of verse (here illustrated) from the Iranian scholar Shafī' Kadkanī reuses traditional Sufic symbolism:

آن فردی که در این دین
کرمی جام شهادت به دست برداشته
نشان ببردند عجب ستان باد
تا سینه کشد از زلف ابرو شاد
(شعری کدکنی)

Those drifted-down roses scattered about the garden
Who all passed out from the wine of the cup of
martyrdom -
Let the drunken ones whisper their names at
midnight
Lest they say they are forgotten from memory.

The women's publication, with its lead illustration of family, Quran and Kalashnikov, well sums up the HIA message. But this periodical has a special focus of its own, as proclaimed by the Quranic headline "the men believers and the women believers are next of kin to one another."



The theme is taken up by a lead editorial on the power behind the veil and culminates in a two-page article ("great women of Islam") on Fatima. The final column of this article three times quotes the tradition attributed to her: "The proper course for women lies in this, that a man should not see her and she should not see a man." Commentary is brief: "We see here that Blessed Fatima put liberation out of her thoughts in regard to half the human race - women... If we sought to expound this subject, the discussion would be lengthy. For now, we bring our words to a close." Other pages present edifying quotations, "Questions of Islamic opinions" (on articles of faith), "Interview with a warrior daughter" and a poem. The most vigorous article is a request for contributions in the form of a "letter from a daughter in exile":

...Dear brothers, night & day we are waiting for the time when beloved Afghanistan becomes free & an Islamic gov't becomes established, so that we can come back to our own house & courtyard. Believe this! If we could be in our own country, those same dirt roads & earthen houses & the toil of baking bread & the farm labors would be a pleasure to us. But - what can we do - there is no way. Lord, imprison in your wrath those atheistic communists who have wasted all the fields & destroyed all our homes with their bombs & forced us to migrate from our beloved homeland. And may we see again the radiant faces of our mujahid brothers. Believe this! Every time we hear news that the mujahidin in Afghanistan have won a victory, we burst our clothes with joy. Brothers, while we were inside Afghanistan, we furnished monetary aid to the mujahidin who

were in our area. We gave up to the limit of our capacity, especially when we were gathering the harvest of our fields. But the time came when we decided on migrating and we could not give aid. Fortunately, we thank God for his favor, I have sent you the amount of 5,000 toman saved out of our expenditures. I hope you have received this insignificant help of ours; accept our apologies that we were unable to give more.

I really should say that my husband died previously, in Afghanistan. My surviving sons & I managed things so that unfortunately, for the present, all of us emigrated. One of my sons is still at the front..."

Christopher J. Brunner
New York, New York

The Religions of the Hindukush. Vol. 1: The Religion of the Kafirs—The Pre-Islamic Heritage of Afghan Nuristan. By KARL JETTMAR. Translated by ADAM NAYYAR. Wiltshire, England: Aris and Phillips Ltd., 1986. ix, 172 pp. \$35.00.

For Muslims and for students of Islam, the word Kafir triggers trouble. Kafirs are generically "unbelievers," but the term refers to any number of different peoples professing non-Islamic religions. Given this usual understanding, many readers of this review and of the book itself will be surprised to know that the Kafirs, along with the Dards and Chitralis, are tribal peoples of the Hindu Kush, a remote and inaccessible region beyond both Peshawar and Kabul.

Jettmar has made an important contribution by summarizing in this book previous scholarship about these remote pre-Islamic peoples and at the same time taking scholarship several steps further. The book is immensely improved by Peter S. C. Parkes's "Etymological Glossary of Kafiri Religious Vocabulary," which catalogs deities, mythological terms, ritual terms, and institutions in a systematic way at the end of the book.

The map at the front defining linguistic and tribal boundaries is based on work by earlier German scholars and demonstrates the rigor of scholarly work in areas where travel and communication must be difficult at best. Photographs of artifacts from the area, although black and white, offer the reader some visual sense of what the author is discussing. Paintings reproduced from an 1896 volume on Hindukush by G. S. Robertson (*The Kafirs of the Hindu-Kush* [reprint ed., New York: Johnson Reprint Corp., 1970]) strike this reader as fanciful and unnecessary additions.

The first two chapters describe the history, people, environment, economy, and social order of North Kafiristan. Jettmar then turns his attention to the cosmology, gods, and demons of the tribal religion. In a chapter discussing specific gods, he successfully draws comparisons between Kafiri deities and the Vedic gods and compares surviving tribal religious practices to the village religious practices of South Asia more generally. While attempting a phenomenological analysis of the tribal religious way, Jettmar is quick to point out that it is not reasonable to try to bring diverging information from the various districts under study "into a coherent system," for such "would stem from a misguided application of literate rationality, following a 'modern' theological synthesis" (p. 99). He reminds us that the ancient Kafirs were far from such sophistry.

Whereas this readable book may be useful to the general student of Asian religions, it is required reading for anyone working on Central Afghanistan or Pakistan. It demonstrates the tenacity of tribal and folk religious practices in remote areas, even when these areas have been converted to Islam for nearly a century.

A NATION IS DYING

Afghanistan Under the Soviets
by Jeri Laber and Barnett Rubin
(Northwestern University Press,
625 Colfax St., Evanston, Ill.
60201: \$14.95, paper)

While the Soviet military presence is fading from Afghanistan, more subtle instruments of domination remain: The suppression of civil liberties, prohibitions against private business, perks for those who join the Communist Party and penalties for Muslims (99% of the population) who pray in the public schools. Most troubling, however, is the fate that awaits many Afghans who can't be managed this way: arbitrary arrest, torture, imprisonment and execution. No one in the West has been able to pinpoint the number of Afghans killed by the Soviet-supported PDPA government. The estimate believed to be most accurate comes from a French demographer, who calculates that from 6.5-11.5% of the nation's population of 15 million has been killed, mostly because of aerial bombardment by the Afghan government.

"A Nation Is Dying," based on several hundred chilling testimonials from Afghan refugees, does little to confirm this figure or describe the dynamics of Afghan politics. It can be argued that the authors are merely fanning the fires of war by recounting the refugees' stories of torture without reporting on *moujaheden* violence or appraising political motives in the region. But if the objective is to provoke public outcry in the West, it is likely that these personal stories of truly brutal injustice will have more of an immediate emotional impact on Americans than a dry historical chronicle.

Recent Afghan history probably has attracted little attention in the West because it is so muddled; definitive lines have not always divided capitalist, Communist, Muslim and monarchist powers. The *moujaheden* resistance, for one, is an unlikely American ally. Divided between Muslims eager to accept Western weapons and extreme fundamentalists (like Iran's ayatollahs) who are hostile to the United States, the *moujaheden* ("holy warriors") hold fewer Western goals than the country's

Afghan-American Joint Institution

A significant feature of the economic scene in Afghanistan today is the varied nature of its economic enterprises. The private sector thrives along with the State sector, and there are also numerous joint companies owned by Afghan and foreign share-holders.

This contributes to economic growth, and is done with full state patronage.

Castrol Machine Oil Company is one of such joint companies, which has rendered valuable services in Afghanistan over the past 17 years.

The company was established in 1941 with an initial capital of 26 million Afghans and a working capital of 36 million Afghans in Pul-i-Charkhi industrial estate. At that time, 72 per cent of its share-holders were foreigners and 28 per cent were domestic traders.

Last year, the government of Afghanistan, realizing the significance and role of the private sector in promoting the socio-economic growth of the country, endorsed the law on foreign and domestic investments. According to this legislation, the share of foreign capital holders should not exceed 49 per cent, and the share of domestic traders should not be less than 51 per cent. Thus, the surplus shares of the *Castrol* company were purchased by the government of Afghanistan as was provisioned by the law.

Today, the main share-holders of *Castrol Machine Oil Company* are the Ministry of Finance, Central Bank, three Afghan national traders, *Sherkat-i-Service*, *Falcon Petroleum Corporation*, New York, and Abdul Jalil, an American national.

This company has an oil base with a capacity of 12,000 tonnes of oil, a steam unit and a well-equipped laboratory producing 4,500 gallons of lubricating oil per day.

In addition to the needs of the armed forces, it meets 60 per cent of the lubricating oil needs of the country. The oil is reportedly of better quality and lower priced than that available in the open market. To cite an example, 86 types of lubricating oils are produced by *Castrol Machine Oil Company*. Previously, the raw materials were imported from the Gulf region, including Iran, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Supplies were routed through Pakistan. When Pakistan banned the supply of these materials through its territory, the company established commercial relations with European countries. Now raw materials are imported from the *Castrol Company* of England via Leningrad and then through Harirait port on the Amu River in northern Afghanistan.

The price of one gallon of machine oil in the open market is 1,430 Afghans while it is sold for 1,200 Afghans by the company. There are 60 workers on its pay roll.

The company has different sections for producing lubricating oils and gas, a laboratory for analysis, a unit for manufacturing tanks, and sections for repairing barrels.

In 1976, the company was supervised by a British specialist from *Castrol* and five Pakistani experts

Now it is run by Afghan engineers and the entire work is carried out by local employees.

According to Haji Mohammad Maftoon, President of *Castrol Oil*, the government has, in recent years, provided many facilities to encourage local traders and share-holders. Provision of land on an easy long-term credit basis for construction of factories, grant of banking credits, intensification of forwarding and transportation, customs exemptions, electric power supplies, telephone, roads, etc., are among the facilities provided by the government.

Haji Maftoon added that in 1982 and 1986, the Pashtun Tarjari Bank granted a loan of 28 million Afghans to the company. This helped significantly in the supply of raw materials and development of the factory.

The highest and most competent organ of the factory is the general meeting of share-holders, which is held twice a year. In this, members discuss the existing problems of the factory and work out ways of their solution. The selection of the president of the factory and composition of the board of directors is also decided at the general meeting. This high-powered body is also authorized to elect a non-share-holder as president. "For instance, I am the president of the company, but not a share-holder," Maftoon clarified.

Hafizullah Rahimi, who is president of *Sherkat-i-Service*, represents the foreign share-holders in Afghanistan. High demand for its production, economizing of foreign exchange otherwise spent on similar foreign production bringing about better conditions for a number of local workers, selling our products at a far price compared to imported oils and utilization of local raw materials are the main economic features of the company at present, he said.

It is proposed to build, in the future, units for producing grease and anti-freezer. The activities of mixed enterprises intensify the process of the country's economic development. This economic reality is enshrined in the Constitution of the Republic of Afghanistan:

"To develop and grow the economy of the country, the government permits foreign investment in the Republic of Afghanistan and regulates it as per the law."

Article Five of the Regulation on Investments in Private Sector says: "The economic productive and service institutions can be established on the basis of the following criteria:

— enterprises with mixed capital in which the share of the state can be 51 per cent or more but not less than this figure;

— enterprises established with private foreign capital, its share must not exceed 49 per cent of the total capital."

Among other joint industrial, commercial and transport enterprises in the country, which provide high quality products, an Afghan market one can name *Hoechst*, a pharmaceutical company, whose Western share-holders is *Hoechst AG Frankfurt-am-*

Main: *Abbas Shor*, Manufacturing Company, owned by private Afghan entrepreneurs and Swiss Company *Wedmer and Pagani*; *Alghan-Nichi Ltd.*, whose foreign partner and share-holder is *Nichi Populist Co. of Japan*; *AFSOTR*, joint transportation institution of Afghanistan and the Soviet Union; *Samir Spange Ltd Co.*, whose share-holders are Afghan and Indian national traders and *Akara*, a joint Afghan-Czechoslovak company. All

these companies enjoy full government assistance and, at the same time, function independently.

By Farouq

AFGHANISTAN TODAY 2, 88

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Mujahideen turn Soviet helicopter into bus

SOVIETS have lost

hundreds of helicopters in Afghanistan but the creative mind of a Panishiri technician made one of the shot down helicopters part of a story which will never be forgotten.

In 1984 the Soviets launched two major offensives and fighting continued for several months. A Soviet helicopter was shot down by the Mujahideen in Rukha, the biggest town in Panishiri.

When a temporary ceasefire was agreed upon, the Soviets left Rukha. Among other things they left behind was the body of a Mi-5 helicopter on a small airfield which they had built.

When the refugees returned to their villages and started to work on their fields, one farmer saw that part of his field was occupied by the enemy helicopter. He asked the people of the village for help. A large crowd gathered together and moved the helicopter away from the field and placed it close to the road.

A business-minded individual turned the body of the helicopter into an ice cream parlor. People from far distances came to enjoy eating ice cream in the Soviet helicopter. Some visiting journalists from abroad also visited the ice cream shop and wrote stories about it and published its photographs.

Haji Mohammad Amin, a commander of the Mujahideen proposed an interesting idea. This idea made the helicopter part of a story which will not be forgotten.

Haji Amin's proposal was to change the helicopter into a bus. At first, the idea seemed impractical but

because it was

interesting was approved. Haji Amin who headed a transport company in the North before the war, had enough technical knowledge to do the job.

Mohammad Amin who later became the commander of Pashghoor region and scored many victories, succeeded in his plan. He fixed the body of the helicopter on a captured Russian truck. By introducing some changes, for example, reducing the length of the tail, taking the rotors off and fixing seats, it became a real bus.

This bus was taking the passengers back and forth along the valley for several months. When the bus which was called by visiting foreigners 'helibus', passed close to the Soviet base in the lower part of the valley, Soviet soldiers in the base were surprised to see that their helicopter was moving on the road instead of flying in the air. A Soviet defector, who later became Muslim and was re-named Abdulhik, took the helibus to reach the Mujahideen's headquarters.

After a few months, Haji was facing the big task of hiding his helibus when the Mujahideen learned that the Soviets were about to launch the seventh offensive. With the help of his Mujahideen he hid the bus hoping to save it from the Russian attack and once more use it when the valley was liberated.

Haji Amin was killed in the fall of 1984 some months before the Mujahideen captured Pashghoor base. He was not able to see his helibus running along the valley but what he did will be remembered for ever.

The US Sec'y Gen'l Javier Pérez de Cuéllar issued a 29-page appeal for funds for Humanitarian & Economic Assistance Programs Relating to Afghanistan on 10 June. The appeal is the "1st outcome of the collaborative effort of the UN system... It is essential that all Afghans in need, wherever they are located, are reached by a program dedicated to the recovery of self-reliance..." The estimated amounts needed are in the following tables:

Table 1. Estimated relief-rehabilitation needs for Afghanistan, 1988-1989
(In millions of US dollars)

	Relief/rehabilitation needs	
<u>Voluntary repatriation</u>		
Health	8.0	
Transport/logistics	169.4	
Water supply	3.0	
Household goods	5.0	
Shelter	22.0	
Agricultural inputs	4.8	
Agency operational support	<u>13.2</u>	225.4
<u>Food aid a/</u>		
Repatriation refugees/internally displaced persons	239.5	
Vulnerable groups	6.1	
School children	6.3	
Food-for-work programme	80.0	
Agency operational support	<u>3.5</u>	335.4
<u>Agriculture, irrigation, rural development</u>		
Agricultural inputs	164.5	
Agriculture	56.8	
Irrigation	53.1	
Rural development	<u>58.0</u>	332.4
<u>Social services</u>		
Health programmes	37.2	
Drugs and medicines	19.0	
Water supply	17.7	
Education	50.0	
Clearance of mines	<u>9.0</u>	132.9
<u>Communications, industry and power</u>		
Transport/logistics	42.4	
Communications	16.7	
Industry	40.3	
Power	<u>29.2</u>	129.3
<u>Administration and management</u>		
Planning and statistics	6.0	
Project formulation/monitoring	1.5	
Project management	0.5	
Monuments/culture survey	<u>2.7</u>	10.7
Total		<u>1 166.1</u>

Table 2. Estimated rehabilitation-recovery needs in Afghanistan, 1990-1993
(In millions of US dollars)

	Rehabilitation/recovery needs	
<u>Agriculture, irrigation, rural development</u>		
Agricultural inputs	143.0	
Agriculture	63.0	
Irrigation	104.7	
Rural development	<u>73.0</u>	383.7
<u>Social services</u>		
Health programmes	92.0	
Drugs and medicines	68.0	
Water supply	61.3	
Education	<u>31.3</u>	252.6
<u>Communications, industry and power</u>		
Transport/logistics	55.3	
Communications	41.6	
Industry	47.5	
Power	<u>42.2</u>	186.3
<u>Administration and management</u>		
Planning and statistics	14.0	
Project formulation/monitoring	2.0	
Project management	<u>1.0</u>	17.0
Total		<u>839.6</u>
UNHCR VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION PROGRAMME		
(In millions of US dollars)		
A. <u>Purchase of equipment/fixed costs</u>		
<u>Transport/logistics</u>		
Purchase of equipment		
In-country transport:		
75 trucks (7.8 ton) plus spares	4.25	
50 project vehicles	0.80	
Warehouse construction/improvement	3.00	
Fixed costs (18 months):		
Mechanical workshop services		
Vehicle park, fuel and lubricants	<u>3.00</u>	
<u>Domestic needs/household support</u>		
Purchase of equipment		
Household goods (quilts, stoves, buckets)	<u>5.00</u>	
<u>Water</u>		
Purchase of equipment		
Water system construction/improvement	<u>3.00</u>	
<u>Health/nutrition</u>		
Fixed costs (18 months)		
General health services	<u>8.00</u>	

a/ Includes ocean freight and overland/inland transport costs amounting to \$160 million for food aid deliveries to provincial capitals as well as distribution centres inside Afghanistan.

Shelter/other infrastructure

Purchase of equipment	
Refugee shelter:	
Tents/tarpaulins	15.00
Community/other infrastructure:	
Tents (health)	
Tarpaulins/tents (storage)	
Prefabs (administration)	2.00
Fixed costs (18 months)	
Site/land preparation/road improvement	5.00

Agency operational support

Purchase of equipment	
General project management services:	
Communications costs -	
Telex, telephone, radio	0.60
Vehicles (50)	0.90
Office supplies	0.20
Furniture	0.10
Fixed costs (18 months)	
General project management services	
Staff costs	
- salaries/related costs (UNHCR)	5.00
- salaries/related costs (WFP)	1.40
Services - aircraft charter	3.00
Other agency administrative support	2.00
Total, equipment/fixed costs	62.25

B. Non-food budget module

(250,000 beneficiaries)

Transport/logistics

In-country transport:	
Transport contract (trucks)	8.00
Fuel/lubricants, transport/storage	5.00
Refugee labour	0.20

Crop production

Agricultural inputs	0.40
Total, non-food module	13.60

For 3,000,000 beneficiaries

Equipment/fixed costs	62.25
Non-food module x 12	163.20
Total	225.45

Annex II

ESTIMATED TOTAL COST TO WFP TO COVER 18 MONTHS' FOOD NEEDS

(In millions of US dollars)

	Food cost	Transport	Support costs	Total
Repatriation of refugees and assistance to internally displaced	117 396 000	122 040 000	-	239 436 000
Rehabilitation, food for work	41 520 600	32 497 200	6 000 000	80 017 800
Vulnerable groups	3 622 500	2 457 000	-	6 079 500
School children	2 812 500	2 520 000	1 000 000	6 332 500
Total	165 351 300	159 514 200	7 000 000	331 865 800

Estimated total cost to cover staff requirements, material, equipment and running costs in Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran

3 531 800

Estimated total cost of 18-month operation

335 397 600

Annex III

FAO ESTIMATES OF RELIEF-REHABILITATION NEEDS IN AGRICULTURE, 1988-1989

(In millions of US dollars)

Agricultural inputs

Seeds:

Wheat	25.0
Cotton	2.5
Vegetables	2.0

Fertilizers:

Urea	9.0
Phosphates	25.0

Farm tools

Small tractors/draught animals	22.0
Animal vaccines	1.5
Animal feed	2.5

Total, agricultural inputs 164.5

Agricultural infrastructure and services

Irrigation rehabilitation	30.0
Credit	2.0
Research	1.0
Other technical assistance projects	5.5

Total, agricultural infrastructure and services 38.5

Grand total 203.0

Annex IV

WHO/UNICEF ESTIMATED RELIEF-REHABILITATION NEEDS FOR HEALTH SECTOR, 1988-1989

(In millions of US dollars)

	Relief/rehabilitation needs
Restoration of health facilities	8.0
Essential drugs and vaccines	19.0
Logistics for health service	5.0
Health manpower development	4.5
Preventative/curative development	18.2
Immunization	5.0
Malaria control	7.0
Diarrhoeal disease control	1.5
Tuberculosis control	2.5
Nutrition support	1.5
Prevention of blindness	0.5
Rehabilitation of disabled	0.2
Surveys/planning/management	9.5
Total	64.2



Mr. Perez de Cuellar

CHRONOLOGY

4/15 - BIA - Najibullah sent a message to the opposition indicating his regime's readiness to meet with opposition leaders to work out a decision for "the cause of peace & the country's children." The ROA thanked the USSR for its help in solving the Afghan conflict & also sent a message to Reagan thanking him for his "noble role" in the settlement.

4/16 - BIA - The Nat'l Front of Afghanistan proposed that 4/14 be declared National Peace Day in Afghanistan. "Let instead of gun-fires the roar of harvesters & voices of factories be heard."
- The Age (Australia) - UNHCR officials speculate that much of Kabul's refugee population will return to the rural areas & have the same needs as the refugees returning from outside Afghanistan.

4/17 - PT - Mujahideen killed Latif Razamju, Director of the Military Wing of Khad for the 14th ROA Army Division, & Moh'd Hashim, Director of Surveillance, in Ghazni.

- The 1st private US delegation to visit Afghanistan in 8 years arrived in Kabul. The group, organized by the Int'l Center for Development Policy, was led by Robert White, a former US ambassador to El Salvador, (See 4/20, 21, 27.)

- BIA - The Univ. on Studies & Research of Islamic Sciences was inaugurated. The school has 3 faculties & 450 students & will award bachelor's & master's degrees. Moh'd Sidiq Sillani is the acting rector.

4/18 - PT - A special committee was appointed to consider the transfer of control of 181 Soviet bases to ROA troops. Soviet troops based at Darul Aman in Kabul will be replaced by the 1st Brigade of the ROA army. Maj.Gen. Moh'd Afzal Loodin will command 4 new ROA divisions - Khad, Sarandoy, armed forces & the Palace Security Guard. The Sarandoy will control the Khair Khana area & Khad will see to areas housing Soviet families. A new brigade has been formed to maintain the security of Kabul from all directions.

- Hong Kong Standard - On the Indian reaction:

Thursday's Geneva accord on Afghanistan paradoxically brought new uncertainties in New Delhi's gauging of its fragile relations with Pakistan.

Even if the Geneva agree-

ment was diplomatically hailed by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi as a "historic event", the Indian press and a number of Indian experts yesterday sounded dubious.

The first doubt raised, by Mr

Gandhi himself, concerned the fact that the accord did not provide for a cessation of US arms deliveries to the rebels.

New Delhi says some of these arms reach Sikh separatists, who have anti-tank missiles and, some sources say, "Stingers".

Aid to the Afghan rebels has also allowed Pakistan, according to New Delhi, to justify both its military aid requests and nuclear ambitions.

And to a large section of the local press, the accord was primarily a super-power arrangement.



The conservative *Statesman* went as far as to raise memories of "Yalta and Munich", saying that "both Washington and Moscow have in effect struck a deal whereby Afghanistan is removed from the agenda of the cold war and transformed into a localised conflict."

Many observers believe India could find itself confronting a Pakistan more and more active in the Afghan conflict, without the counterbalance of Soviet forces.

4/19 - PT - Gulbuddin announced that the process of forming the Alliance's interim gov't was now completed. Eng. Ahmad Shah, the designated president, said that 3 delegations would soon go inside Afghanistan to select a suitable area for the installation of the gov't.

4/20 - HK Standard - Western diplomatic sources said that large amounts of Soviet military supplies are pouring into Kabul to be trucked south for storage.

- India shut down its consulate in Jalalabad, withdrawing all Indian nationals. India fears for their safety after the Soviet withdrawal.

- BIA - The ROA Ministry of Civil Aviation says it will be able to transfer 50,000 refugees via domestic & int'l flights this year.

- A conference of scientific & social figures from Afghanistan, the USSR & the USA is underway in Kabul. Proposals for attracting assistance of US & Soviet private enterprise for the economic rehabilitation of Afghanistan were put forth (see 4/17, 21).

4/21 - LA Times - US conference delegates in Kabul (see 4/20) stressed that it is unlikely that even private American groups will help with reconstruction while the legitimacy of the Kabul gov't is in dispute (see 4/27).

4/22 - PT - US Gov't aid to Afghan refugee programs in Pakistan since 1980 has been over \$580m. Of that, \$3.5m has gone to the Int'l Rescue Committee.

- BIA - Winners of the recent ROA elections were announced yesterday. Over 1m voted. 184 people's representatives & 115 senators were elected to the National Assembly: 48% from ROWPA, OWPA, IPPA, PJPA [political parties], opposition, nomads, regional forces, etc.; 48% from the National Front [which ran the elections]; 21.7% from the PDPA; & 7% from the Trade Unions, DYOA & the All Afghan Women's Council [Exceeding the target plan by 24.7%! Ed.] The National Assembly is to replace the Revolutionary Council & preparations are underway to convene the body to form a cabinet & other gov't organs.

- LA Times - The USSR says it is not planning to provide more arms to the ROA but that it will not restrict its relations with the Afghan gov't.

4/23 - PT - The Pakistan Gov't has begun plans for a comprehensive schedule of repatriation for 3.3m Afghan refugees. Afghan intellectuals & technocrats who have been living abroad are beginning to arrive in Peshawar with a view to participating in the "broad-based interim gov't & to assist the Afghan Alliance to frame internal & foreign policies for the future gov't of Afghanistan." In the proposed 28-member cabinet of the gov't, 7 spots are available for "personalities living in the US, Europe & the Middle East."

- The OIC called on Muslims of the world to support the Afghan mujahideen & the refugees in their efforts to regain their rights.

- Eng. Ahmad Shah said that very soon portfolios would be allotted to the "14-member" mujahideen cabinet.

(See p. 13)

4/23 - BIA - School census: Badakhshan - 23,352 students in 104 schools; Kunar - 13,655 in 34; Nangarhar - 52,150 in 73; Paktia - 8,881 in 22; Kandahar - 16,000 in 34; Helmand - 12,000; Nimroz - 3,715; Herat - 46,000 in 94; Farah - 7,277; Khost Grand District - 7,000 in 25 with 135 teachers.

4/25 - BIA - The Charboldak District of Balkh was declared a "peace zone" in honor of the 10th anniversary of the April Revolution. Since 1/87, 123,637 people have returned to Afghanistan.

- The Paknewal toilet paper factory was re-activated. It will produce 5,000 rolls of tissue daily.

4/26 - PT - Soviet troops leaving Afghanistan reportedly selling their beds, blankets & teapots along the way: A bed goes for Afs. 200. The SCMP reports: →


- BIA - "The 10th Anniversary of the April Revolution, this great historical event in the socio-political life of the country was pompously marked throughout the country today." In his speech for the occasion, Najibullah said, among other things, that the war had cost the ROA Afs. 60b. & killed & injured hundreds of thousands. Kabul's avenues were decorated with banners, slogans & colored bulbs.

In the bazaars, the Afghan currency strengthened markedly and food prices soared because of worries that Russian food supplies, which Western officials put at 40 per cent of the country's total needs, may dwindle when the troops go home.



A mural of the late King Amanullah has been erected in the centre of Kabul

SCMP 4/27



4/27 - BIA - While 10th anniversary celebrations were underway, extremists fired mortars & rockets on Maimana & Kabul. A car bomb exploded in the parking lot of the Pamir Cinema in Kabul, killing 6 & injuring 49. This crime "also inflicted financial damage to a number of our countrymen."

- SCMP - The US State Dept dismissed a call by Najibullah for better relations with the US as "absurd" since the US views the his gov't as illegitimate. The private delegation which went to Kabul (see 4/17,20, 21) had "no sanction whatsoever from the US Gov't," according to a Dept. spokesman.


4/28 - BIA - ROA Foreign Minister Abdul Wakil sent a message to UN Sec'y Gen'l de Cuellar proposing the creation of demilitarized zones along the Pakistan-Afghan border.

- UN Press Release - Diego Cordovez will represent the UN Sec'y Gen'l in working towards the Afghan settlement. Gen. Rauli Helminen (Finland) will serve as his deputy; Benon Sevan (Cyprus) will be the senior political adviser. Small headquarters will be established in Kabul & Islamabad to monitor treaty violations. This operation, UN Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan & Pakistan, will be known as UNGOMAP. (See p. 20)

4/29 - BIA - An agreement between the ROA & the UNHCR for the establishment of an UNHCR office in the ROA was signed in Geneva.

- LA Times - On the fall of Kabul:


"Kabul will not fall to a frontal military assault," one Western diplomat said this week. "What is much more likely is what happened in Saigon. It will unravel from the inside. Some people will decide it is time to go visit their village. Some officers will take out their freshly printed 'I'm a secret mujahideen' cards."



Bill Sanders
The Milwaukee Journal
North America Edition

4/29 - SCMP - Najibullah at a press conference:

Associated Press



General Najibullah stresses that the Kabul Government is strong enough to defend itself.

5/1 - NYT - British customs agents seized 3.5 tons of Afghan hashish which came overland through the USSR from Kabul. The USSR tracked the shipment & allowed it to go to the UK so the British could arrest the receivers.

5/2 - BIA - Abdul Rahim Karwal was appointed Min. of Transport; Fateh Moh'd Tareen was named Min. of Light Industries & Foodstuffs. - All restaurants will be closed during the day during Ramazan.

- There has been serious flooding in many parts of Afghanistan.

- LA Times - In the 4/10 explosion at the ammunition dump at Rawalpindi, mujahideen lost at least \$80m in US & Saudi-supplied weapons. Most of the materiel were rockets, mortars & heavy arms. The loss has deprived the mujahideen of the sort of weapons needed to launch assaults on heavily defended towns.

"You can't take Kabul (Afghanistan's heavily fortified capital) without things like mine-clearing equipment and mortars, and that's what's short now," one informed official said. "You figure out whether it's a problem." . . .

The Soviets have erected three rings of defenses around Kabul, a city of 2 million, placing rows of mine fields and 8,000 to 10,000 Afghan soldiers between the city and the mujahideen armies.

The official experts said it is unclear how or whether the United States will supply the resistance should the Kabul regime cling to power long after Soviet troops leave.

Congressional experts note that the United States and the Saudis will one day be legally barred from sending arms into Afghanistan under the Afghan peace treaty.

5/2- Globe & Mail (Canada) - 5 Canadian officers will arrive in Islamabad as part of UNGOMAP. Other officers will be from Austria, Denmark, Fiji, Finland, Ghana, Ireland, Nepal, Poland & Sweden.

5/3 - BIA - Hassan Sharq, DPM, is Chairman of the State Committee for Refugee Affairs.

- According to ROA Defense Min. Moh'd Rafi, "The armed forces of the ROA have changed to a united iron fist which is equipped with modern military techniques & can inflict crushing blows to enemies."

5/4 - NYT - Amnesty Int'l reported that Afghans & Soviets have killed & tortured hundreds of civilians in reprisal raids & that, in spite of nat'l reconciliation, they have also tortured rebel prisoners.

- Najibullah will pay a 3-day visit to India:

Some Indians suggested that Mr. Gandhi was deliberately seeking to confer some legitimacy to Mr. Najibullah to strengthen him within Afghanistan itself, hoping that he will prove to be a good friend and serve as a counterweight to India's rival, Pakistan. "This visit will give India a good opportunity to expand its influence in Afghanistan," said Bhabani Sen Gupta, a prominent political scientist. "You will see that Najibullah will last longer than a lot of people in the West expect."

- PT - Ex-king Zahir Shah said that the monarchy could not be restored in Afghanistan but he indicated he might be willing to return as a provisional president. He said, "I do not put any conditions on the table. I have no personal claims to make." (See 5/7)

- Dawn (Karachi) - Voice of Germany reported that Moscow would agree to the division of Afghanistan if Najibullah could not maintain control. The Soviets have built a new airport & train station in northern Afghanistan.

- The European Economic Community reportedly gave a positive response to the mujahideen's request to recognize an interim gov't.

1. Meanwhile, the three-high-powered delegations sent to the interior of Afghanistan to study the possible place for the establishment of transitional interim government of Afghan Mujahideen have submitted report to the head of interim government, Eng. Ahmad Shah, who will submit it to the Supreme Council of the IUAM for final approval. Paktia province might be the first choice for the establishment of interim government headquarters where famous Jaji Maidan, a stronghold of Afghan Mujahideen, lies.

The final list of the remaining nominees to the two proposed vice-presidents of interim government is also said to have been prepared and besides Dr Zabihullah Mujaddidi (already announced) Eng. Ubaidullah of Hezbe Islami (Hekmatyar group) and Haji Deen Mohammad, Deputy of Hezbe Islami (Yunas Khalis group) have been selected for the posts. The names of the 21 members for the proposed cabinet have also been finalised and are expected to be announced in the next couple of weeks.

5/6 - PT - A Soviet newsman was killed in Afghanistan.

- A team of Indian experts will soon visit the ROA to see what part India can play in its reconstruction.

- NYT - Indian officials described Najibullah as willing to share significant political powers with Afghan guerrilla groups & as prepared to accept India as a mediator in bringing about such an arrangement.

- The US told the mujahideen it would support them in forming a provisional gov't of they consolidated their control over Afghanistan. Criteria are "control of territory, consent of the people, capacity & willingness to exercise int'l obligations, & possession of a civil administrative apparatus that can govern."

5/7 - PT - Najibullah has invited Zahir Shah to return home to take part in a coalition gov't. Zahir Shah said no.

5/9 - BIA - Najibullah wants to hold a "peace jirgah" in Afghanistan to start seeking ways of reaching nat'l accord. (When asked at a press conference in India if he would step down, Najibullah said that he had been elected for 7 years.)

- An orthopedic center in Kabul was opened today by the Afghan Red Crescent. Financial & technical assistance were supplied by the Int'l Red Cross.

5/10 - BIA - 4 plane loads of goods for the Watan Nursery arrived from Mongolia.

5/11 - BIA - As a result of a rocket attack on Kabul 2 days ago, 23 people died & 28 others were injured.

- PT - The Supreme Council of the 7-Party Alliance in Peshawar adopted the constitution of the "Islamic State of Afghanistan." The document has 4 chapters & 87 articles & will be enforced the 25th of Ramadan."

5/12 - NYT - Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan was named by the UN to coordinate int'l relief & resettlement efforts in Afghanistan.

(See pps. 26, 35, 36)

Prince Sadruddin, an American-educated Iranian who has spent much of his life working for the United Nations, will have overall responsibility for integrating the activities of numerous United Nations agencies and other organizations providing aid to the Afghans, including the roughly five million refugees. . . .


United Nations officials say the coordinator will also have the politically sensitive task of insuring that international aid to Afghanistan is distributed impartially by the agencies concerned and not manipulated by either the pro-Communist Government in Kabul or the guerrilla leaders in the field.



5/13 - NYT - Soviet troops have begun moving out of Eastern Afghanistan. The 1st large city to be cleared will be Jalalabad.

- LA Times - Kabul has been hit by heavy rocket attacks during the past month.

- SCMP - Soviet troops began pulling out of Jalalabad.



5/14 - HK Standard - The ROA has named new governors for 23 of its 30 provinces.

- SCMP - Gulbuddin announced that the mujahideen will mount extensive operations to coincide with the Soviet withdrawal. Heavy fighting was reported in Kandahar & some expect the city to fall within a month.

5/15 - PT - BBC reported that the Soviets are leaving 500,000 land mines in Afghanistan. A Soviet general in Herat asked the mujahideen for a cease-fire while he pulls his troops out of the area.

- NYT - Lt. Gen. Boris Gromov, cdr. of the Soviet military forces in Afghanistan, said that 25% of the Soviet troops would be out by the end of May. The 18 garrisons occupying more than 170 bases in the ROA will be left to the ROA army along with ca. \$1b worth of equipment. He said that if guerrillas fired on Soviet troops the retribution would be "quick & severe." The LA Times reported that Gromov said all mine fields laid by the Soviets, except for those protecting large industrial projects, will be removed.

5/16 - NYT - Abdurrah Rasul Sayyaf, head of the Islamic Union party, said he will move his main base from Pakistan back to Afghanistan.

- BIA - Festivities marking the start of the Soviet troop withdrawal were held in Kabul. "The citizens of Kabul expressed their brotherly gratitude through offerings of flowers & shouting of friendship & solidarity slogans."



A departing Soviet soldier in Kabul signals his feelings.



Associated Press

5/17 - NYT - Soviet troops have completed their withdrawal from Nangarhar Province & are expected to leave Kunar & Paktia soon.

5/18 - HK Standard - Mujahideen captured Hesarak near the Jalalabad-Kabul highway. Some sources say there are still about 600 Soviet military advisers near Jalalabad even though 1,000 troops left 5/17. (See 5/21)

5/19 - BIA - The body of Brig. Gen'l Abdul Motaleb, martyred in

Kandahar, was buried in Kabul yesterday. He received a posthumous promotion & the Order of the Red Banner from Najibullah.

- The ROA Foreign Affairs Ministry gave UNGOMAP a note protesting the increasing transfer of weapons from Pakistan into Afghanistan.

- Protocols for 38 investment projects were signed by the ROA & the USSR.

5/21 - Sydney Morning Herald - Mujahideen have blocked all roads to Jalalabad. There will be some Soviet troops in Jalalabad for at least 2 more weeks; however, the LA Times on 5/23 quoted Tass as saying that all Soviet troops were out of the city.

- BIA - "Peace caravans" of the ROA armed forces have distributed 35 tons of food, clothing, blankets & radios to deserving families in 140 villages throughout Afghanistan in the past month.


5/22 - BIA - The ROA distributed Afs. 1500 cash as a breakfast allowance to children in 43 primary schools in Kabul.

- PT - Mujahideen captured Jaji Cantonment.

5/23 - BIA - The Ministry of Returnees' Affairs has received Afs. 2b from the USSR & Afs. 21m from Hungary, Czechoslovakia & Poland to help repatriate refugees.

5/26 - BIA - The ROA has 23 movie theaters. The number of museums will be increased from 7 to 9. Archaeological surveys are proposed for Kunduz, Balkh, Jauzjan & Nangarhar.

5/26 - BIA - Sultan Ali Keshtmand, was awarded the high-
 est State order,
 The "Sun of Liberty,"
 & named Sec'y of the
 PDPA CC. Dr. Moh'd
 Hassan Sharq was design-
 ated Prime Minister &
 instructed to form a new
 cabinet to present to the nat'l
 assembly. (See p. 11)
 - NYT - The USSR said 13,310 of its
 soldiers died in Afghanistan &
 35,478 were wounded. 311 are missing.



5/27 - PT - The USSR said it had
 100,300 troops in the ROA prior to 3/15.

5/27 - PT - The USSR said it had
 100,300 troops in the ROA prior to 5/15.
 - Mujahideen captured the Andarab valley
 & some security posts on the Salang high-
 way. They blew up an ammunition dump in
 Herat. BIA reported that extremist
 rockets damaged the congregational mosque
 in Herat. Damage, estimated at Afs.
 250,000, will be repaired in a month.

5/28 - BIA - Moh'd Hakim was elected
 Mayor of Kabul.
 - The Independent - Alain Guillo was par-
 doned by Najibullah (see p.27).

5/29 - PT - The UN Economic & Social
 Council (ECOSOC) ignored the ROA's pro-
 posal for int'l aid to rebuild Afghani-
 stan. ECOSOC will meet in Geneva in July
 & has asked the UN Sec'y Gen'l for a
 briefing on the Afghan situation.
 - BIA - The 1st session of the ROA Nat'l
 Assembly opened. Najibullah appointed
 46 senators & issued a decree estab-
 lishing a 9-member Constitutional Coun-
 cil to monitor the implementation of
 legal matters. Najibullah told the Nat'l

Assembly that he was prepared to receive Zahir
 Shah in Kabul & said he hoped the group would
 call for a dialogue to include leaders of the
 7-Party Alliance & "representatives of the
 moderate opposition & commanders of the 2nd &
 3rd tier echelons operating in Afghanistan."
 - Farid Zarif, former Afghan representative to
 the UN, is now a Deputy Prime Minister.
 - Plans for the Soviet-Afghan joint space flight,
 scheduled for August, were finalized.

5/31 - BIA - Dr. Khalil Ahmad Abawi was elected
 Chairman of the House of Representatives;
 Dr. Moh'd Habibi was elected Chairman of the
 Senate.

6/2 - HK Standard - The US State Dept said
 Soviet military aid to Afghanistan is continuing
 & similar US assistance should proceed. The
 Soviets are leaving \$1b worth of equipment in
 the ROA; the US feels the USSR should have
 taken it with them.

- Financial Times - Gorbachev warned that any
 violations of the Geneva deal would have grave
 consequences. He said Pakistan was continuing
 to allow arms shipments & he cited recent at-
 tacks on Kabul.



- BIA - Najibullah pardoned Fausto Biloslava, an
 Italian citizen sentenced in March to 7 years in
 prison, at the request of Italian President
 Cossiga. (See p. 27)

6/6 - BIA - A cooperation protocol between the
 Tadzhik SSR & the provinces of Kunduz, Takhar &
 Badakhshan was signed today.

- Najibullah arrived in New York yesterday for
 the special UN session on disarmament.
 - PT - Mujahideen captured half of Baghlan city.

6/7 - PT - Mujahideen have liberated the Bagram
 area in Parwan.

- BIA - Prime Min. Moh'd Sharq presented his
 cabinet & his policy outline to the lower House.
 The House postponed discussion to 6/11 (see 6/8).

6/7 - BIA - Najibullah addressed the UN yesterday. He complained that extremist training camps still existed in Pakistan & that weapons were still coming into the ROA. He said that 243,900 Afghans had been killed in the war & 77,700 wounded & asked for financial help for rehabilitation.
 - An extremist group about to "disrupt the peace" in Jaji has been toppled.
 "Security in Ghazni is now improving by every passing day."

6/8 - SCMP - ROA Prime Min. Sharq is having difficulties forming his cabinet, reportedly because Najibullah (Parcham) wants to get rid of Interior Min. Gulabzoi (Khalq). (See p 16).
 - Mujahideen have captured Qarabagh, but heavy fighting around Kandahar may delay the Soviet pullout from there.

6/9 - BIA - Najibullah left New York for Havana.

6/11 - LA Times - UN officials launched an appeal yesterday for humanitarian aid to resettle Afghan refugees. In the next 18 months, \$1.17m will be needed; long-term rehabilitation from 1990-93 will require another \$839m.
 - NYI - Rajiv Gandhi on a future Afghan gov't:

"We ourselves feel that Najibullah is far preferable for the region to the sort of fanatic fundamentalists who are the alternative," Mr. Gandhi said. "We already have a fundamentalist regime in Iran, and a second one coming in will destabilize the region and will affect us. They would really upset us."

Mr. Gandhi asserted that gloomy predictions about Mr. Najibullah's regime were wrong. "We know there are other assessments, but according to our contacts and feedback, Najibullah can last," he said.

Mr. Gandhi's remarks puzzled some senior Reagan Administration officials, who said the Prime Minister indicated to President Reagan earlier this year that Mr. Najibullah's regime would probably not survive the Soviet pullout.

6/12 - BIA - Cuba & the ROA signed a friendship treaty.

- NYT - John Kifner reports from Peshawar that political power is shifting from the 7-Party Alliance to the commanders inside Afghanistan. He also presents the following:

Diplomats, western aid workers, journalists and Afghan refugees in this sprawling, dusty frontier city outline a series of possible scenarios:

President Najibullah could keep at least a symbolic hold on the Government with a tough defense of Kabul, the

capital, and other cities, and by adroitly buying off some tribal leaders. This is regarded as the least likely possibility.

At the other ideological extreme, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the most dogmatic of the Islamic fundamentalist leaders, could take over the Government. His group, the Islamic Party, is regarded as the best organized and probably the best armed of the seven-party guerrilla alliance.

The fractious guerrilla groups here - and, more important, the command- ers inside Afghanistan - could agree

on sharing responsibility and set up a new Government, perhaps beginning with a jirgah, a traditional Afghan gathering of leaders. But this scenario is considered highly unlikely.

The aged king could return as a unifying force. Zahir Shah, regarded as a cautious modernizer in his time, has, however, little association with the guerrillas and has lived quietly for years in Italy.

There could be a complete breakdown of civil authority and a state of civil war.

6/13 - NYT - The Soviet withdrawal has fallen behind schedule, US & Pakistani officials say. RPA charges of treaty violations continue but Pakistani officials say the only things going across the border are "mangos & watermelons."

6/14 - UN Press Release - Sadruddin Aga Khan said he had received pledges for \$25m for UN humanitarian assistance for Afghanistan.


- LA Times - The USSR pledged not to prosecute any Soviet soldiers who were captured by the mujahideen. Everything will be done to help them return & lead normal lives. The Soviets believe that as many as 2/3 of the 311 missing Soviet soldiers are being held by the mujahideen either in Pakistan or Afghanistan.

6/15 - Sayyed Ahmed Gailani of the Nat'l Islamic Front of Afghanistan (NIFA) became the head of the 7-Party Alliance for 3 months (see p 13).

6/16 - BIA - The ROA House of Reps. approved Prime Min. Sharq's cabinet & policy plans after a week's debate (see p 10).

6/23 - NYT - Cdr. Abdul Haq told UN officials that their top priority should be the creation of a broad-based coalition gov't to replace the Marxist regime in Kabul & not the provision of aid to Afghanistan.

"The first thing the relief workers must do is rebuild roads and bridges to reach the people," he said, speaking in English. "But that makes it easier for the Soviets and Najibullah's troops to fight us. Our first problem is to end the fighting with a political solution that removes Najibullah. Then we will need foreign help."



Commander Abdul Haq

Haq was in New York at the request of UN officials, the 1st contact the UN has made with mujahideen commanders. Haq said he was still loyal to the 7-Party Alliance in Peshawar.

AFGHANISTAN FORUM



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ABBREVIATIONS USED

AICMB - Afghan Information Center Monthly Bulletin
 AWSJ - Asian Wall Street Journal
 BIA - Bakhtar Information Agency
 CC - Central Committee
 CSM - Christian Science Monitor
 DRA - Democratic Republic of Afghanistan
 DYOA - Democratic Youth Organization of Afghanistan
 FEER - Far Eastern Economic Review
 FRG - Federal Republic of Germany
 IHT - International Herald Tribune
 KNT - Kabul New Times
 NFF - National Fatherland Front
 NWFP - Northwest Frontier Province
 NYT - New York Times
 NYCT - New York City Tribune
 OIC - Organization of Islamic Conference
 PDPA - People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan
 PSFO - Peace, Solidarity & Friendship Organization
 PT - Pakistan Times
 ROA - Republic of Afghanistan
 RTV - Refugee Tent Village
 SCMP - South China Morning Post
 UNGA - United Nations General Assembly
 UNHCR - United Nations High Commission for Refugees
 WDOA - Women's Democratic Organization of Afghanistan
 WSJ - Wall Street Journal
 UNGOMAP - United Nations Good Offices Mission to Afghanistan
 & Pakistan

Line drawing from the 1982 Afghanistan Calendar of the
Chicago Afghanistan Relief Committee.

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